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H. CON. RES. 63, RELATING TO THE REPUBLIC  
OF CHINA (TAIWAN'S) PARTICIPATION IN THE  
UNITED NATIONS

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
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HEARING  
BEFORE THE  
COMMITTEE ON  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

AUGUST 3, 1995

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations



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## H. CON. RES. 63, RELATING TO THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA (TAIWAN'S) PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS

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Errata, H. Con. Res. 63, Relating t...

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## ERRATA

The name of Mr. Amo Houghton was inadvertently listed as a Democrat on the right hand column of the committee member roster. The list should read as follows:

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# **H. CON. RES. 63 RELATING TO THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA (TAIWAN'S) PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS**

**THURSDAY, AUGUST 3, 1995**

**HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,  
*Washington, DC.***

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Chairman GILMAN. The Committee will please come to order. Members will take their seats.

Today we will be holding a hearing on H. Con. Res. 63, a resolution introduced by the gentleman from New York, Congressman Solomon, who has been a long-standing advocate of this issue with regard to Taiwan, and our colleague from New Jersey, Congressman Torricelli, expressing the sense of the Congress that Taiwan deserves full participation, including a seat in the U.N. and its related agencies.

There are a number of territorial disputes in Asia. One of the most contentious is the sovereignty and future of the Island of Taiwan. Unfortunately, short of an early collapse of the dictatorship in Beijing, the 45-year-old stalemate over the issue shows no sign of any immediate solution.

Taiwan is a free democracy, a nation where people can express their thoughts and practice their religious beliefs. Through the long years, it has remained a loyal friend and a steadfast ally of the United States.

The Republic of China is one of Asia's economic miracles featuring a strong and growing economy with less than 1 percent unemployment. From our perspective, this is the type of free, democratic society we should be supporting in the region and around the world.

In opposition, we have the People's Republic of China. The Beijing leadership has repeatedly proven itself over the years to be a brutal dictatorship with little regard for human and religious rights, much less political freedom. Its military has fought against ours in Korea, supported the Communists in North Vietnam, currently shipping weapons of mass destruction to terrorist nations in the Middle East.

It is this China which our administration witnesses will probably inform us today that objects to our permitting President Lee to visit Cornell and objects to His Holiness, the Dalai Lama, coming

to Washington. We will most likely also be warned that now is not the time for the Congress to express this kind of sentiment that Taiwan should be given a seat in the United Nations.

For the past 10 years, whenever an effort was attempted by the Congress to respond to Beijing's egregious behavior, we were told that there is a political transition period underway in China and if we take any substantive action, we would be strengthening the hands of the hard-liners. So, for the last decade, whenever the Congress attempted to respond to China's export of products made by slave labor, we were told by the State Department to back off. When we raised the issue of the Communist repression of religious and political thought, the State Department told us that economic liberalization will bring about political pluralism.

Accordingly, Beijing has never paid a price for its unfair trade practices; for its arms proliferation; for its repression in occupied Tibet; for its massive military buildup; the recent aggression in the Spratly Islands; its disregard for intellectual property rights; its illegal detention of Harry Wu, an American citizen; and its threatening military exercises off the coast of Taiwan. On the contrary, our State Department believes that we need to further soften our approach to Beijing.

Along with many of our members on the Committee, we are for working peacefully and negotiating quietly with the Chinese. But time and time again, the State Department has failed to bring home the bacon. Constructive engagement cannot continue to be a one-way endeavor. Our State Department needs to recognize this and needs to adjust its course.

Considering these facts, the Congress is compelled to ask if Taiwan's time has come to be recognized by the world's community of nations, and, if so, what can this body do to help the free people of Taiwan?

Taiwan's leadership has repeatedly asked for our help in their quest for their people to have the last word in their own future. Let me say at the outset of this hearing that now is the time to help our friends on the Island of Taiwan. We have been waiting far too long to respond to their aspirations and hope.

Before we welcome our good friend, the gentleman from New York, the distinguished chairman of our Rules Committee, I'm going to ask if there is any opening statements?

Gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Gejdenson.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I think that one thing that becomes fairly clear here is that across the political spectrum in the Congress, there is an appreciation for the institutions that have developed in Taiwan over the last decade. And in sharp contrast to those democratic institutions which provide for freedom of the press, a real opposition and civil rights and civil liberties for their citizens, we have mainland China, which appears to be moving in the opposite direction every day.

Now, at times the Chinese mainland may be able to get the American government to ignore the outrages that occur within China. But I ask all of us to remember the struggles in bringing democracy to South Africa and the Soviet Union.



South Africa, with leadership that worked in a serious way to bring about a democratic government, is facing a transition to democracy that is working and that is working without significant violence.

In the Soviet Union, they obviously waited too long. They tried to impose their dictatorship long after it should have been removed and they are paying the price for that today.

The Chinese need to learn that lesson as well. If they wait too long, they will explode. They will not simply go through a transition. And the list of grievances by the mainland Chinese are significant.

Harry Wu, an American citizen traveling on legitimate papers, was imprisoned by the Chinese and clearly tortured. Harry Wu is still a prisoner today and the Chinese need to understand that in the Congress, the resistance to China will continue until Harry Wu is freed.

But it is more than just Harry Wu that we have to deal with. A violation of the missile proliferation laws of this country, if they were properly enforced, would have us block all sales to the United States by the mainland. And, frankly, I think the American people, while they may not be able to achieve this in every instance, should at every opportunity seek to buy something not made in the mainland. That is the most important message to the Chinese Government.

They may run under a Communist banner but they seem to be the premiere capitalists of Asia. Their \$40 billion trade surplus with the United States is achieved by slave labor and by a lack of freedom for their workers. American purchasers can send the Chinese Government an even stronger message than the American government.

For the Island of Taiwan, it would be wrong for the United States to not continue to increase the closeness of the relationship with a country that has achieved virtually every one of our demands. America demands from its friends and allies democracy. Taiwan has a democratic form of government. We demand freedom of the press. Taiwan has freedom of the press. We demand a legitimate opposition to operate freely within that democratic structure. That clearly exists in Taiwan as well.

This country, by its principles and by its instinct, will continue to make closer and closer relationships with the people of Taiwan and the government of Taiwan. For the People's Republic of China, there is only one direction that can improve relations over the long term and that is for them to follow the leadership of the government in Taiwan to move toward a democratic government that respects international law and that respects the rights and privileges of its own people.

Mr. Chairman, I commend you for holding this hearing. This Committee is going to continue to fight for the rights of Harry Wu, as is the Congress. I would hope that the President will meet with Harry Wu's wife and send the Chinese a message that whether they expel American military personnel or they continue to proliferate missiles, America will not be badgered into accepting Chinese standards for behavior.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Gejdenson.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, this is one of the rare occasions I have a disagreement with my colleague, the gentleman from New York, Mr. Solomon.

My statement is fairly lengthy. I do not know if Chairman Solomon has time constraints but, if he wish, I could proceed now or I could proceed before the beginning of the next panel.

Chairman GILMAN. Why don't we allow Mr. Solomon to proceed and then submit your statement a little later on this morning.

Mr. BEREUTER. I will do that. Thank you.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you.

Does any other member seek recognition?

Mr. Lantos.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to commend you for convening this hearing and I want to salute my good friend and colleague, Chairman Solomon, for bringing this issue before the Congress of the United States. I am proud to be an original co-sponsor of your resolution.

I have a lengthy statement which I will dispense with, but there are a few basic points I would like to make. The first one relates to the Republic of China on Taiwan. This country is more democratic, more developed and certainly more friendly to the United States than the majority of the member states of the United Nations.

Now, let me repeat this because I think what we are dealing with in this resolution is the undoing of a long-standing wrong. We are dealing with 21 million people, one of the most successful economies on the face of this planet, a country with some \$80 billion in foreign exchange reserves—\$80 billion in foreign exchange reserves—and a country which has consistently been a friend of the United States and that friendship is growing and deepening all the time.

I think it is also important to realize that every time this administration and some of my colleagues in the Congress on both sides of the aisle try to propitiate the Chinese in Beijing, that spineless effort backfires. Let me just give some of the most recent examples.

When I introduced my resolution some months ago urging our State Department to issue a visa to the president of Taiwan, a distinguished Ph.D. graduate of Cornell University, some people in the administration went ballistic. "This will destroy U.S.-China relations."

But as we proceeded along the legislative route, Mr. Chairman, the Subcommittee passed the resolution unanimously. The full Committee passed the resolution unanimously. And the full House of Representatives unanimously passed the resolution. Of course they did. How could the government of the United States exclude a distinguished alumnus of a distinguished American University from visiting his own alma mater?

When the Senate took similar action, the State Department reversed itself. The visa was issued. President Lee visited Cornell and the world is still revolving around its axis.

In a similar sense, Mr. Chairman, we had tremendous pressure from the administration not to interfere with China's desire to hold the Olympics in the year 2000 in Beijing. I had the privilege of again introducing a resolution which was overwhelmingly passed in

this body, a parallel resolution overwhelmingly passed in the Senate, and in good measure, this proudly expressed view of the U.S. Congress that the Olympics should not be held in a totalitarian police state prevailed. The Olympics are not going to be held in Beijing in the year 2000, but in Sydney, Australia, a free city in a free country.

Now some argue that it is unprecedented to deal with an issue where there is dispute as to whether Taiwan is part of China or not part of China, a one China policy, or a two China policy. May I remind all of us that we have recent precedence for similar situations.

Not too long ago, there were two Germanys. I had the privilege of leading the last Congressional delegation to East Germany, headed by the Communist dictator, Honneker. That entity has vanished and there is now one democratic Germany and one representative representing the democratic German state in the United Nations.

Nothing will please me more if in the sweetness of time there will be only one democratic China with one representative at the U.N. I would love to see that time come very fast. But that time is not yet here and we are now supporting, our government is now supporting, a position that a dictatorial police state which practices forced abortions; forced sterilizations; the most appalling suppression of human rights; the incarceration of American citizens legally traveling in China; the detention of American Air Force officers who were not engaged in spying, they were there legitimately; should have representation in the U.N. but the democratic, developed and friendly country on Taiwan should not.

I think it is long overdue that we move this resolution and the parallel resolution in the Senate, and bring to bear pressure on our State Department, as it will be necessary to change its policy. The State Department changed its policy on giving a visa to the president of Taiwan. It has changed its policy on many issues when the voice of the American people as expressed by the Congress of the United States is strong, unambiguous and united.

I want to congratulate my friend for introducing this resolution and I pledge to him my strong efforts to see to it that it passes the House of Representatives.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Lantos.

I am going to ask our colleagues if they would withhold their opening statements until Mr. Solomon concludes his testimony since he has some urgent business before the Rules Committee which he chairs.

We welcome Congressman Solomon, the distinguished chairman of the Rules Committee, before us today.

Congressman Solomon, you may either read your entire statement or submit it for the record and summarize, whichever you prefer.

Welcome.

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, I think I will summarize. We have to make sure you have lots of business to do when you come back on September 6, so we do not want you to get stale. We want to

have those bills ready for you and, hopefully, it might be one of these that is before us today.

But let me just say, I really do appreciate—

Chairman GILMAN. Your full statement will be entered into the record without objection.

Mr. SOLOMON. Thank you.

### **STATEMENT OF GERALD B. SOLOMON, REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW YORK**

Mr. SOLOMON. I really do appreciate the opportunity to be here today. It has been 7 years since I served on this Committee, but I still miss it. I almost wish I were back here, especially after the last hundred days in the Rules Committee.

Chairman GILMAN. We want to add that we miss your input on this Committee, Mr. Solomon.

Mr. SOLOMON. Thank you.

Mr. LANTOS. When you relinquish the chairmanship of the Rules Committee, we will be happy to have you back here.

Mr. SOLOMON. Well, let's see, about 20 years from now.

Mr. BROWNBACK. Twenty? Forty. Forty.

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, as I look at the rostrum, I see three members that were here back in 1979—you, my good friend Mr. Hamilton and my good friend Mr. Bereuter. But I am looking at the Taiwan Relations Act that all of us helped write back in 1979 when the Republic of China on Taiwan had been de-recognized and the People's Republic of China had been recognized.

Let me just read you one—

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Solomon, before you read that, since you are referring to the Act, I note that former Congressman Lester Wolf is with us who had a great deal to do with getting that Act enacted in the Congress.

Mr. SOLOMON. He most certainly did.

Mr. Chairman, I was a freshman. I think I had been in the Congress about 60 days when we left and we went to Taiwan to see what the repercussions were on that day when Taiwan had been de-recognized.

But let me just read you a paragraph from the Taiwan Relations Act. It says, "Nothing in this Act may be construed as a basis for supporting the exclusion or the expulsion of Taiwan from membership in any international financial institution or any other international organizations." This is the law of the land and I would appreciate it if you would keep that in mind as you consider this resolution.

My purpose, of course, for being here today is to discuss with you my resolution which expressed just the Sense of Congress that Taiwan deserves full participation, including a seat in the United Nations and its related agencies.

Mr. Chairman and members, the Taiwan success story is increasingly well-known and admired throughout the entire world. It certainly does not need to be recited here before any of you members because you all know it well enough. Suffice it to say that what was an impoverished and neglected island as recently as 45 years ago—and that is a short time—today, the nineteenth largest economy in the world.

Japan is the only larger country in all of Asia that has a higher per-capita income than Taiwan. But economic indicators are not the whole story and it is the reason we are here today.

Perhaps even more impressive is the political development in Taiwan, a process which has led to the establishment of multi-party democracy and which will culminate next March with a new president who will be elected by direct popular vote.

Given Taiwan's extraordinary success and given Taiwan's commercial and cultural relations with more than 100 nations, it perhaps should not be too surprising to learn that the government and many of the people in Taiwan are seeking recognition for a greater position in the international community. They deserve it.

And so the issue of membership in the United Nations has been raised again. The issue is all the more poignant when one remembers that the Republic of China was the very first signatory to the United Nations charter at the famous San Francisco conference in June 1945.

And Mr. Chairman and members, separate and differently worded Sense of Congress resolutions supporting membership for Taiwan in the United Nations were introduced back in the 103d Congress and I see Mr. Torricelli, who has just come in, and he was a part of that. But it was neither possible nor appropriate to go forward with the consideration of either resolution in the last Congress in the absence of a consensus in Taiwan itself on how best to proceed.

All of that has now changed. House Concurrent Resolution 63 which is before the Committee right now is the product of strenuous negotiation that I and many members of your Committee up here today have helped to mediate earlier this year. The wording of this resolution has been welcomed and supported by both the government and the opposition in Taiwan. And, Mr. Chairman and members, it is important to note that House Concurrent Resolution 63 marks the very first time in the history of Taiwan's democracy that the government and the opposition have reached a common position by consensus on a sensitive foreign policy issue. That is how far they have come.

And so I am very pleased with how the wording of this resolution turned out. I believe it can speak for itself. I would simply draw attention to a couple of "whereas" clauses that touch on points of special sensitivity at this present time.

First, Taiwan has repeatedly stated that its participation in international organizations is one of parallel representation without prejudice to the current status of mainland China. We should remember that in the international community and it does not represent a change or a challenge to that status.

And the second, the decision of the United States to establish diplomatic relations with mainland China as expressed in the Taiwan Relations Act which I have just read with you is based upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means. I believe it is especially appropriate to reiterate that latter point, which I am sure is self-evident to every person in this room today.

The political future of Taiwan is for the Taiwan people to decide, not us. But the United States and all democratic countries have a

very vital interest at stake in seeing Taiwan's future decided in a peaceful and, I might add, democratic way.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman and members, I would like to say that this resolution is the result of a genuine bipartisan effort. The resolution enjoys broad bipartisan support and I would like to thank several members of this Committee who were particularly instrumental and supportive in the development of the resolution. Certainly, Chairman Gilman has been very active in this for years; Dan Burton; and, from the Democrat side, Bob Torricelli, Tom Lantos, and Gary Ackerman, to name a few. But there are a lot more with Mr. Torricelli. All of you have been extremely helpful in developing this legislation.

But let me—because I know that there may be minimal opposition to this, but I just want to take a minute to read how many states have passed resolutions in support of this resolution. Thirty-six states, three territories have passed 78 resolutions or proclamations supporting Taiwan's bid for U.N. membership, which is what this resolution speaks to: Alaska, Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana—I say that to my good friend Mr. Hamilton—Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri—and I say to my good friend over here who is opposing my amendment and who I would say to him right now, when you are going to oppose the chairman of the Rules Committee's resolution, you do not walk into a committee and blind-side him by telling me. You see him ahead of time. And we need to talk about that, sir. Now, is that enough—Nevada, New Jersey, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. That covers just about the gauntlet.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. How about the territories?

Mr. SOLOMON. But, Mr. Chairman, let me just again go back and tell you I really do appreciate the work of your Committee. This is of such a serious matter because, you know, American foreign policy has always been, regardless of politics—Republican or Democrat—it has been to promote and encourage democracy and human rights for all people throughout this world.

The people on Taiwan have been such an integral part of that. They have stopped communism dead in its tracks. They helped us do it. We owe it to those people to let them be a democracy and to give them their rightful place in the United Nations.

Having said all that, I apologize for taking so much of your time and I would be glad to try to answer any questions you might have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Solomon appears in the appendix.]

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Chairman Solomon. Thank you for the introduction of the measure and for your strong advocacy of this measure.

I would like to ask you just a couple of quick questions.

Is there anything that we can do to strengthen Taiwan's bid at the United Nations, in your mind?

Mr. SOLOMON. Well, of course, when you go back to the arrangement that the new administration made, in other words, they, in their negotiations, have really supported, in other words, the en-

couragement of Taiwan to participate in all of these international organizations. But yet there seems to be a point where we just cannot get over the hurdle. And the State Department, the administration, need to follow through on those original arrangements and I think we just need to put all the pressure we can on them to make sure that we do follow through on what is really a bipartisan support for this legislation.

Chairman GILMAN. There is before the Defense Department a proposal that the Taiwanese want to purchase two submarines. Of course, the People's Republic of China have over a hundred submarines. But there is pressure being placed on the State Department to refuse to provide that kind of sale.

Do you think we should hold off on the sale of this kind of defense equipment to the Taiwanese?

Mr. SOLOMON. No, I do not, Mr. Gilman, because, again, if you read the Taiwan Relations Act, it says that the United States will provide qualitative and quantitative military equipment to allow Taiwan to defend their interest against outside military aggression. That is a part of it and I think that we should follow through and we should live up to the law of the land, the Taiwan Relations Act. It is not just a policy or a foreign policy of the current administration or previous administrations. It is the law of the land and we should abide by it.

Chairman GILMAN. Is there any divided feeling in Taiwan with regard to this proposal?

Mr. SOLOMON. Absolutely not. And over the years, because of the situation where you have a lot of mainland Chinese people that were forced to come to Taiwan after what had happened in 1948 and 1949, there has been a lot of resentment between islanders and the Chinese that came from mainland China. That has almost disappeared and today you have a democratic parliament that exists there. The feeling is no longer there and I mentioned in my earlier testimony now the opposition is just as strongly in support of this resolution as is the ruling government there now.

Chairman GILMAN. Do you feel the recent testing of missiles just off the shoreline of Taiwan, I guess within 85 miles, constitutes any kind of a threat to Taiwan?

Mr. SOLOMON. Well, Mr. Chairman, I, for one—and I think you—I have discussed this with you—are very much concerned with what is happening in the PRC and I did not want to get into the PRC because, really, this issue needs to stand on its own. But we all have to be extremely concerned with what is happening in the People's Republic of China.

This U.S. Congress and government have reduced military spending since 1986. We are, along with every other major country in the world, reducing our military spending.

China, on the other hand, in the last 2 years alone, has almost doubled their budget on their military expenditures. That has to be concern for not only us and not only Taiwan but other Pacific Rim countries as well. I think that we have to be very much concerned about that. And we always have to be ready. We cannot afford not to be prepared should something happen.

Chairman GILMAN. Again, Mr. Solomon, we thank you for your initiative on this resolution. We thank you for appearing before us.

I now call on the ranking minority member, Mr. Hamilton, for his comments.

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Solomon, we are delighted to have you here and we appreciate your initiative and, as I think you know, this resolution that you have before the Committee, the concurrent resolution, has a good bit of support.

When you leave here in a few minutes, if I understand the procedure, the administration is going to testify against your resolution.

Mr. SOLOMON. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. That may not come as a big shock to you.

Mr. SOLOMON. They are entitled to their opinion.

Mr. HAMILTON. But I do want to raise the question that they raise in their testimony with you. They say that in asking the question, should the U.S. support Taiwan's participation in the United Nations, can it be done without harm to our, what they call, highly successful policy of the past 16 years, the answer they give to that is no.

One point they make is Taiwan, for all of its remarkable accomplishments and progress—and I think you and I both recognize that and applaud it—is not going to join the United Nations. It does not have the support in the U.N. General Assembly Committee and, of course, it confronts a veto. So we ought not, I guess, to fool ourselves that by passing a Sense of Congress resolution that we will, in fact, see Taiwan come into the United Nations.

Now, that is not necessarily an argument against your resolution because the United States and certainly the U.S. Congress ought to be able to express its will on these matters as we see fit.

Mr. SOLOMON. Especially in a Sense of Congress.

Mr. HAMILTON. That is right. We recognize that and you are realistic enough to know.

Now, the other side of it, however, quite apart from what actually will happen in the United Nations, is the argument that the administration makes that this will seriously hurt our relations with the People's Republic of China and that it will jeopardize China's support for, as they put it, a broad range of issues in the United Nations including, for example, stability on the Korean peninsula, and that it will jeopardize peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits.

And that all leads me to the question, in advocating your concurrent resolution, is it your view that there will be or would be no adverse reaction from the People's Republic? Or do you accept those risks as being minor or de minimis? I just wonder how you assess the risk here.

There is something to be said for the success of American policy here over a period of a long time and, as you know, that policy was shaped by both Republican and Democratic presidents and none of them have retreated on that point, this one China policy. And they argue very strongly that it has been a successful policy and that a resolution of this kind jeopardizes it, so I would like to get your reaction to all of that.

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Hamilton, you and I have dealt with the Chinese question for 20 years. You were active long before that. I was active long before that, before I even came to the Congress. So you



and I know the Chinese people very well—those on Taiwan and those on mainland China—as does Mr. Lantos and many of you others.

The State Department is noted for diplomacy and statesmanship and maybe that is their job. But I am going to tell you something. Mr. Lantos brought out a point. There were all kinds of threats from the PRC that if we dared let President Lee come to this country, as we do any other foreign dignitary, that it would have severe repercussions. Well, Mr. Hamilton, there have not been severe repercussions.

Naturally, the People's Republic of China is going to do everything they can to try to prevent us from trying to seat the Republic of China in the United Nations and they will continue to block it. They will continue to veto it. But, sooner or later, with a \$40 billion trade surplus, which, again, Mr. Lantos has brought up, we are a lot more important to them than they are to us.

Going back to 1971 when Richard Nixon played the ultimate China card, perhaps—and it is arguable—whether that was successful or not, it did keep China from siding with the Soviet Union. But, nevertheless, I think those days are over.

We no longer need to play the China card. We really need to deal with them on a bilateral basis. They need our trade. They need that \$40 billion trade surplus—

Mr. HAMILTON. Would you go so far as just to reject the American policy that we have had for these many years, of one China? Of Taiwan as a part of China? Would you reject that and just proceed? Do you believe that American policy should now proceed on the basis of two Chinas?

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Hamilton, the argument against that policy—and I am not arguing against the policy, but—was that there are such bitter feelings between the Russians and the Chinese that they never would have gotten together in the first place and I think I tend to believe that. So whether the China card was necessary or not, it perhaps was helpful because we, in the long run, brought down the Berlin Wall. We stopped international spread of communism coming out of the Soviet Union and—

Mr. HAMILTON. But you are not rejecting, then, today the policy that has guided American policy for a long time and that policy recognizes one China and that Taiwan is part of China. You accept that.

Mr. SOLOMON. Absolutely.

Mr. HAMILTON. I see.

Mr. SOLOMON. Absolutely.

Mr. HAMILTON. After all, the so-called one China policy—and this is kind of in support of your view—

Mr. SOLOMON. That is right.

Mr. HAMILTON [continuing.] Is the creation of a very different era. A lot of things have happened since then.

Mr. SOLOMON. They sure have.

Mr. HAMILTON. And, certainly, there has been enormous and remarkable progress in Taiwan and the international community ought in some way, it seems to me, to recognize that progress.

Well, I thank you. You have put before us a genuine question of American policy and you have done it in a very civil way and an

effective way and I appreciate that and commend you for it. Thank you for coming this morning.

Mr. SOLOMON. Thank you.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Bereuter.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I do want to welcome sincerely the gentleman from New York back to the Committee at any time.

As I mentioned, we have a difference of agreement. But it should be obvious to everyone, as it is to me, that the gentleman's motives for introducing the legislation and advancing it and speaking for it are unimpeachable.

And I must say that I thought that we had enough dialog back and forth between staff that you understood my position. But I do apologize forthrightly for a lapse in collegial courtesy in not directly talking to you. It would have been the appropriate thing to make sure there was no misunderstanding and for that I forthrightly apologize to my friend.

Mr. SOLOMON. And I apologize for mentioning it publicly.

Mr. BEREUTER. In any case, we agree on most things in Europe and most things in the Asian theater and I would say that I thought that the dialog you had with Mr. Hamilton, our ranking member, was very illuminating and I was very pleased to hear what you said. So I have no further questions for you, but thank you for coming.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Lantos.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to pick up where Mr. Hamilton left off because I think it is important we all understand what we mean by one China policy as there are substantive interpretations, legal interpretations, historic interpretations. So let me try to use a number of analogies to illuminate this issue.

Clearly, the United States, since the end of the Second World War, basically had a one Germany policy. For a period of time, we had diplomatic relations with only a part of Germany, West Germany. Then, after a while, we had diplomatic relations with two Germanys. At a certain point of time, two Germanys were represented in the United Nations. And today, of course, we have diplomatic relations only with one Germany, a unified Germany, and there is only one German representative at the United Nations. So the concept of what one means by a one China policy or a one Germany policy needs to be framed in terms of unfolding historical changes and realities.

Let me give another example. We had a one Soviet Union policy. We had an asterisk there with respect to the three Baltic states, but we certainly did not have an asterisk there with respect to Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Moldova, a whole lot of others. Yet, at the same time, there were three members in the United Nations from what we viewed as the one Soviet Union. There was a member from Belarus; there was a member from the Ukraine; and there was a member from Russia. Presumably, the other constituent republics had no representation. But that was the Soviet Union.

I suspect it is also important to realize that by agreement, hopefully, or by violent means, as is the case now in Yugoslavia, these situations change. We then supported a Yugoslavia, a single Yugo-

slavia, for United Nations membership. We supported the U.N. membership of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, the Rump Yugoslavia which is left which is Serbia and Montenegro, and there is an open question as to what point Macedonia will be admitted to the United Nations. So I do not think that these are frozen facts.

To say one China is a very broad concept and we all support it. The government in Beijing supports it and the government in Taipei supports it. They have different views of what that one China should be and hopefully will be.

But I think it is sort of important to deal with the question that Mr. Hamilton raises of adverse reactions. When we take principled stands, whether it is a principled stand with respect to the Olympics in Beijing; whether it is a principled stand with respect to the right of president of Taiwan to visit his alma mater; whether it is the right of 21 million people to be represented in the United Nations—21 million people more advanced, more democratic and more friendly to the United States than the majority of the member states of the United Nations, we are taking a stand on principle.

The authorities in Beijing sooner or later will have to understand that this country occasionally stands on principle. Not always, unfortunately; not invariably. But on many occasions this country takes positions of principle. This is one of those occasions.

No one in his right mind suggested there will be a war as a result of Taiwan's admission to the United Nations. There will be nasty comments made in Beijing if it comes about.

The final observation I would like to make and ask you, Mr. Solomon, to react to is the value of symbolic actions. My good friend, Chairman Hamilton, said earlier that we all understand this is not going to happen because China will veto it. Well, probably so. There is a possibility of moving it into the General Assembly directly and there are strong legal arguments that Taiwan will be able to do that. But I am not a legal scholar and I cannot comment on that.

I would merely like to suggest that symbolic actions have enormous significance. People throughout history have died for symbols. People have dedicated their entire lives to symbols. So if it is only symbolic that a country of 21 million people, democratic, advanced and friendly, who we think should be a member of the United Nations when Libya is a member of the United Nations; when tiny, tiny entities with a fraction of Taiwan's population are members of the United Nations; when countries hostile to the United States are members of the United Nations, well, of course, we should advocate that. It may not happen tomorrow. It may not happen 2 years from now. But it is important for the Congress of the United States to take a stand to say that we think this is the right thing to do and to have our government, within its capabilities, support that position.

I wonder if you would comment on my points.

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Lantos, briefly, because I know you want to get on with the hearing, but let me tell you symbols are so terribly, terribly important. You and I oppose separating human rights from Most-Favored-Nation treatment with other countries. Why? Because we are the beacon of hope for all oppressed people all over the world.

We were that beacon of hope for those people in your native country of Hungary and Poland and the Baltics. All over the world. And we cannot give that up. We are the greatest, freest nation in the world and we must always keep those symbols alive, not just for Americans but for all people throughout the world and I think that is terribly, terribly, terribly important.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Chabot.

And please bear in mind that our distinguished chairman has to return to his own committee, so please be brief, gentlemen.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. I will be brief. I would first of all like to associate myself with the comments from Mr. Lantos. I thought they were excellent and I agree with everything he said, which does not always happen in here and I do—

Mr. LANTOS. I thank my friend.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I also want to thank the distinguished gentleman from New York, Mr. Solomon, for coming here today. I'm well aware of his long-standing commitment on this issue.

Since President Carter abrogated our mutual defense treaty with Taiwan in 1978, Chairman Solomon has been one of the most persistent voices on behalf of the Taiwanese people and he is to be commended for his tireless efforts and I want to say right now I do wholeheartedly support your efforts in this area.

Chairman Solomon, it would seem to me that there is a certain amount of blatant inconsistency in our foreign policy when it comes to the United Nations and its membership. Taiwan is denied a seat even though it was among the U.N.'s founding members, as you mentioned previously, yet the United Nations accepts both South Korea and Communist North Korea. Before the unification of Germany, as was mentioned by Mr. Lantos, both West Germany and Communist East Germany held seats. And during the days of the Soviet Union, Soviet republics Belarus and Ukraine were recognized. But today we still have a one China policy in the United Nations.

I know that the State Department and the Clinton administration has its own view as to what might transpire if our long-standing allies from Taiwan were readmitted to the United Nations. Their views are fairly negative.

What do you see as the positive effects, other than just symbolic, of a Taiwan seat at the United Nations?

Mr. SOLOMON. Well, first of all, let me just digress for a moment and talk about 250 million Americans who have the highest standard of living in the world. And that, my friends, relates to buying power. And 250 million Americans, consuming Americans, every single country in the world licks their chops to do business with the United States. It is not necessarily the other way around and we should use that consumer buying power in our relationships with other countries.

To go back to Mr. Lantos' point, a \$40 billion surplus that the Chinese now enjoy with us, they are not going to do anything to disrupt that. I mean, they will symbolically oppose, but in the long run they want to continue doing business with us because it benefits them. So nothing is in danger here and that is why this symbolic resolution, a Sense of Congress, will make a lot of difference

and, in the long run, I really think it will eventually lead to the seating of Taiwan in the United Nations.

Over a hundred countries today do business with Taiwan. Many of them, 36 countries throughout the world—and you know there are only about 150 countries out there, but 36 of them have diplomatic relations with Taiwan. What we need in our State Department and in our administrations—and I have argued this with President Bush and President Reagan before him—in other words, we need to go out and encourage other countries to do business with Taiwan, not be black-balled or intimidated by the People's Republic of China because, in the long run, that will pay off. That will lead to the seating of them and other countries like them in the future.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you.

And just one final comment. Yesterday we had the opportunity—myself and Mr. Salmon from Arizona and Mr. Brownback from Kansas and some other freshmen—Roger Wicker—to meet with the Ambassador from Taiwan and some other officials. It was a very interesting and informative meeting and I certainly wish you God-speed in your effort on this and I commend you for doing it, Mr. Solomon. Thank you.

Mr. SOLOMON. Thank you.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chabot.

Mr. Torricelli.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me first congratulate my friend Mr. Solomon on his resolution known as the Solomon-Torricelli-Lantos-Burton-Ackerman-Deutsche Resolution. You can imagine it has considerable support in this committee.

Mr. SOLOMON. And that covers a wide spectrum.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Throughout the last Congress, Solomon, you and I had competing versions of this resolution. I have come to accept the inevitability of yours' dominating, given the unmistakable events of last November. I'm very astute at noticing what happened. But very proud to be part of this. It is simply the right thing to do.

When people ask why American policy might change, the simple answer is Taiwan has changed. This is not only one of the most prosperous countries in the world, it has a free press, the right to organize political parties and it governs with the consent of the governed.

There are many things in the nation's foreign policy which, for practical reasons, on occasion need to be compromised. The insistence on the United States of maintaining free, fair and open relations with all other democratic governments should be an uncompromising principle.

After so many generations of relations between the Chinese and the American people, it is hard to understand how we could still know so little about each other. Yesterday the PRC seized two American citizens, including a constituent of mine from Teaneck, New Jersey, unfortunately, and it reminds us of how little we know about each other. The government in Beijing genuinely believes it can intimidate the U.S. Government by seizing our people or insulting our leaders because we take principled positions.

Some members of this Committee worked long and hard to have President Lee come to the United States on his visit. I know it has caused great difficulty with the government of the People's Republic of China. They should accept it as an object lesson. Freely elected leaders of democratic nations are invited to the United States and, if I have anything to do about it and as long as I am a member of this Committee, my voice will be heard in inviting him again and again and again.

We may have differences with the People's Republic of China. I hope they can be settled. But they can never be settled by the United States compromising some of our most basic principles.

I agree with your comments and those of Mr. Lantos. I trust that this difference with the People's Republic of China will be no more than an exchange of unfortunate words. If it is the judgment of the People's Republic of China to punish the United States by no longer allowing us to have a \$40 billion trade deficit with them, I think they will see the wisdom of reversing that position.

Until then, I hope, Mr. Chairman, that we can pass this resolution and we can bring it to the floor, not because we do not want good relations with the People's Republic of China, but because we want to set some basic principles in the conduct of our policy. As the leader of the free world, we will insist upon good relations with all freely elected governments; that we will not entertain into a position relations with any people that begin on the basis of an attempt to intimidate American policy; that the United Nations must be a forum where all peoples are enjoying the right to participate.

For the United Nations to allow in its councils the representatives of Libya, Vietnam, Cuba, North Korea, but exclude the legal elected representatives of one of the most prosperous and now freer nations on earth would be to undermine the credibility of the entire organization. The organization was founded to allow all peoples to be heard. That was a good promise. It was kept when the PRC was admitted. The promise should still be kept.

If I would simply make one note for further discussion—I will not say of disagreement—it is that I hope the people of all of China can find a common future for themselves for the democratic government. But I will caution that there are millions of people on Taiwan, perhaps a majority, who may not seek to live under a common government.

Taiwan, in its long history, was not a Chinese province for longer than it has been independent. I trust and hope they will find national reconciliation under a common democratic government. But I would not preclude the outcome of that internal decision for the Chinese people. If it is democratic, they may choose to be a part of it. If it is not, they certainly have a sovereign right not to based on their history and the right of all people to seek a free government.

Mr. Solomon, congratulations. I am very proud to be part of your resolution even if fate has determined that I will be no more than its first co-sponsor. Well done.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for bringing us today to this hearing.  
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Torricelli.

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, if I may just respond in 30 seconds just to thank Congressman Torricelli because he has bent over

backwards. He has set the example for both the ruling party in Taiwan and the opposition to bend over backwards with each other. Everyone has. The resolution before us is a compromise of the language between your resolution, mine this year and I really appreciate your cooperation.

Chairman GILMAN. Gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much.

Let me just say that Mr. Solomon and I are usually on the same side and we are certainly on the same side today.

I congratulate you, Mr. Solomon. I appreciate this effort that you have made to send a strong signal. And it is a strong signal to many people. It is not just to the PRC but it is also to the free people of the world.

By standing with the free government of China, we are standing the people of the world that we are on the side of freedom. Basically, that is what the United States is all about. We come from every corner of the planet. You go on any street in the United States, we come from every ethnic background and every racial background. We have every religion represented here. But what ties us together is a fundamental belief in human freedom. That, and hopefully the English language, which helps us work together and communicate together.

But the fact is that this measure today—and your measure—will send a word to the dictators of the world and to the oppressed of the world. To the dictators of the world, we do not consider you to be a legitimate government unless you govern with the consent of the governed. You are nothing but people who hold power and that is the situation on the mainland of China. There is no two China policy. There is only one elected government in China and that is the one on Taiwan because they have had free elections and now recognize the rights of their people. That regime on the mainland is nothing more than a clique of—and I say malevolent gangsters who are holding power and willing to suppress their people; willing to crush the heads of anyone that gets in their way.

We are sending a message to them and to the people of China, we are on the side of the one China and that is the Chinese people themselves. They should have the right to choose who represents them.

Now there are lots of complications in this world, as we have heard. Lots of complications and we cannot always push and be a hundred percent consistent. But we can do something.

I mean, this president has chosen to de-couple Most-Favored-Nation status negotiations with any consideration of human rights. I consider that to be the worst disaster for human rights during my time in Congress and certainly it has been a major setback for the human rights movement in the world.

This at least shows those people in Beijing, those people who hold power without the consent of the governed, that we will at least take some steps to back up our rhetoric about human freedom because if we do not have policy decisions that back up our rhetoric, it does nothing but embolden the tyrants and it causes a loss of faith with the oppressed people of the world in the United States of America and their chances of ever being free.

So let me just say that I support this one hundred percent. I am very proud to have been on your side in most issues in this Congress and this one especially, so thank you very much.

Mr. SOLOMON. Thank you very much and thank you for all of your effort not only on this but in dealing with the Vietnamese situation. You have been so effective, Dana, and we really appreciate that.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank the gentleman for his remarks.

Mr. Faleomavaega.

Mr. Berman.

Mr. BERMAN. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Solomon, my first question—about an hour ago, the Chairman said that you had to rush off to the Rules Committee and the first thing that concerns me is in the midst of the second to the last day before we are supposed to leave when we are dealing with a massive appropriations bill and a massive telecommunications bill—

Mr. SOLOMON. Uh-oh.

Mr. BERMAN [continuing.] What possibly could the Rules Committee be planning for the rest of this day and a half that would require you to go there?

Mr. SOLOMON. I want to keep a sense of intrigue in the Congress during the next 72 hours.

Mr. BERMAN. What are you springing on us?

Even though I am the ranking Democrat on the Asia Subcommittee, I have never served on this Subcommittee and this issue is new to me and I have not really focused on it. In the course of my short time in this position, I have had the occasion to meet with representatives of Taiwan, a large number of Taiwanese Americans in the Los Angeles area, representatives of the PRC.

The issue of membership and recognition confuses me a little. I think some very good points have been made and I have learned a lot just from listening to you and my colleagues speak to this issue. But normally you think of extending diplomatic recognition before you think of pushing for U.N. membership. I am enough aware of the history to know the problems there but I am interested in how you square that circle.

You have said you are for a one China policy. You have said you want Taiwan admitted, presumably not to displace the PRC but in addition to the PRC as a separate country. Develop this for me a little bit.

Is this, in a sense, saying Taiwan is the exception to the rule? That only nation-states should be members of the United Nations? Or what is the thought here?

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Berman, first of all, I find it difficult to believe that you have not focused on this issue. You are a man of wide focus and I have served with you and I commend you.

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you.

Mr. SOLOMON. But I realize you have not focused on this as much as you might have other issues. But you are one of the most respected and focused members of this entire Congress.

Now, let me just say, I think that it was a mistake—

Mr. BERMAN. You could have said one of the wisest members of the U.S. Congress.



Mr. SOLOMON. I think it was a mistake when we recognized the PRC that we de-recognized Taiwan. I think that we went further than we had to. Going back to 1971, I think it was a mistake. I do not think that we had to do that then.

What we are trying to do now is to correct an error in policy back then by one a Republican president and the other a Democrat president. But I think that there are unique circumstances in this situation. After all, the People's Republic of China, representing a billion people, most of whom are oppressed and would throw off the Communist government if they had the opportunity, but I think there is a uniqueness to this and I think we ought to pursue both.

But, right now, I think that the symbolic message we can send, as Mr. Rohrabacher and others—Mr. Chabot—have spoken to, is to push for them to have that seat. We have had it in other situations. Mr. Lantos mentioned it with the Ukraine and Belarus and Russia. We should, I believe, recognize them both ways.

But, nevertheless, it is unique but it has been done before and I think we ought to pursue it.

Mr. BERMAN. So, ideally, if you were president, you would recognize one government of China, that being the government based in Taiwan, and that that government would represent that country in the United Nations. But, as a practical matter, you are right now pushing for the U.N. membership figuring that that is the more attainable, more appropriate issue to fight for now.

Mr. SOLOMON. That is correct. But, Mr. Berman, let me just say one thing. The U.S. Government has never said that Taiwan is a part of China. What the U.S. Government has done is say that we recognize that the Chinese say that. But we have never said that.

I personally feel it, but, nevertheless, that is negotiable. That ought to be left up to the people of Taiwan to make that decision.

Mr. BERMAN. As to whether or not they are part of—

Mr. SOLOMON. Two China, one China policy.

Mr. BERMAN. Because a lot of the Taiwanese I speak to do not think of themselves as part of China.

Mr. SOLOMON. That is correct.

Mr. BERMAN. Even though, I gather, the present government of Taiwan considers itself.

Mr. SOLOMON. That is right.

Mr. HAMILTON. Would the gentleman yield here?

My understanding of our policy formulation is that there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of China. Now, the question that Mr. Berman raises is a difficult one. I am trying to help you out here.

Mr. SOLOMON. A question of states, I know.

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes, as I understand it.

My understanding also is that Taiwan itself continues to have a one China policy.

Mr. SOLOMON. That is correct.

Mr. HAMILTON. And what they are seeking here they are not arguing that Taiwan join the United Nations as a separate government. I think they are saying that Taiwan should join because they come into the United Nations not claiming statehood, not claiming to be a government, but as a special kind of an entity.

Mr. SOLOMON. That is right.

Mr. HAMILTON. Now, we will have to examine this with some of our experts but that is my impression of the situation.

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you.

Mr. SOLOMON. The gentleman is correct.

Mr. BERMAN. The last thing.

Now, thinking about what you said, what do you mean by the next 72 hours? I thought we were going to be here 36 hours?

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Kim.

Mr. KIM. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for yielding.

Mr. Solomon has been my most favorite Congressman, but on this issue I have to say that I cannot agree. Perhaps that is the first time that I disagree with you.

Let me just state briefly, just in a couple of minutes. First of all, I look at this from a practical point of view. I understand China was made it very clear that they have every intention of blocking this and they can do it. They have veto power. No matter what we do today, it is not going to pass anyway. That is an embarrassment to us.

I also understand that there are 15 countries in the United Nations already supporting this resolution to allow Taiwan's participating in the United Nations. That is all. Those 15 nations are primarily very small nations such as Grenada, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Panama and Solomon Islands—after your name. Very small countries. None of the big countries ever supported this resolution. So, obviously, even the U.N. membership is not supporting this. So what are we doing here?

Also, it would harm the Taiwan-China relationship. My district has a small section of the City of Industry which has tremendous growth in Taiwanese business out there and I have interfaced with them all the time. No one has ever told me that they are anxious to join the U.N. I do not know where you got the idea that the Taiwanese want to be part of U.N. they've never told me. So why are we doing this? I think it is going to make the situation even worse, even the good relationship between China and Taiwan perhaps might be jeopardized and, practically, I look at this as a very impractical resolution.

Second, I think its timing is wrong. Let's face it. We've got some problems with China because of issuing visa to President Lee from Taiwan. We've got the Harry Wu situation. Now, this morning, I found out that China expelled two military attaches accused of spying. I mean, we have a rock bottom relationship now. We do not need another resolution, another slap in the face. If China was North Korea, perhaps that is a different story. But China is a big nation. Confrontation with China would not do any good. They might cancel some more contracts and I think we have got to calm down emotionally.

I know how we feel. I feel insulted. I am upset. But the timing is not right. I think we should calm down now. Let the professional diplomat; go ahead and proceed, see what happens. Perhaps 6 months from now, let's re-evaluate and come back. This is terrible timing to pass such a resolution challenging and confronting China and I think we are going to be further embarrassed.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank the gentleman for his remarks.

Mr. Faleomavaega.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to personally welcome Chairman Solomon in our Committee this afternoon with some sense of anxiety as he was reading the list of the names of the states who have also passed resolutions supporting this resolution. I know, Mr. Chairman, from experience in the last 7 years that I have served as a member of this Committee, every time after the State of Wyoming is listed then there is absolute silence to the fact that the 5 million Americans, patriotic Americans, who live in the insular areas are never mentioned and I know that this was never intended in any way from Chairman Solomon, given the fact that Congressman Gejdenson and also Delegate Faleomavaega are also original co-sponsors of this resolution.

And I want to say to Chairman Solomon that it is my honor and my personal privilege to be a member as an original co-sponsor of this resolution and, with due respect to my good friend Mr. Kim from California, I think the timing is perfect. I think the timing is perfect and I would like to solicit the assistance of the Chairman and our ranking members of this Committee that we take up House Concurrent Resolution 63. I suggest also House Concurrent Resolution 80. The timing is perfect, Mr. Chairman, that having the editorial commentary of the *New York Times* today and Mr. Chirac's nuclear blunder, a very important and very, very serious issue affecting the Asia-Pacific community and wanted to express my appreciation to the Chairman of our Subcommittee on the Asia-Pacific, Mr. Bereuter, and also our ranking member, Mr. Berman, for the support of these very important issues affecting the Asia-Pacific community.

I want to say that from our friends at the State Department I think some of the things that concern this member is to having a sense of being intimidated by leaders of other countries saying that we cannot do that or we should not do that. I think that we ought to stand up for what we believe in and I believe this resolution simply says that we have a sovereign right to invite leaders of other countries, regardless of their persuasion, to freely express their feelings about issues affecting their needs and as well as our country.

I have heard someone said that diplomacy is nothing but the mere abstractions and the way that we have been playing with the lives of these people that live in the Republic of China, it looks like a duck, it acts like a duck, then maybe it is a duck. The fact that we ought to recognize the rights of these 21 million people whose economy is ranked among the top ten in the world in every way possible and yet we keep denying ourselves and saying we cannot call them Ambassadors. We cannot call them—in every way possible making an abstraction of the reality of the fact is that these people exist and that we have very important relations with the people that live in Taiwan.

So I want to express my full support to Chairman Solomon for bringing this resolution and other members for their supporting the provisions of the resolution and I think it is not in any way being disrespectful to the rights of the People's Republic of China, but I

think, by the same time, they should respect the right of the leaders of our country in giving proper recognition for those people that we want to invite, whether it be by personal or whether it be on an official basis, that we should be given that perfect right to do so.

And so, Mr. Chairman, I want to congratulate you for being the sponsor of this resolution and I urge my colleagues to support it and I hope that the wee hours of the night tonight and hopefully some way or somehow, Chairman Solomon, that we take up both of these resolutions and hopefully maybe by unanimous consent we can pass it before we leave for our August recess.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Faleomavaega.

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Faleomavaega, let me first of all say I am so proud to have you as one of the main sponsors of this legislation and I apologize. I did not see you and Mr. Martinez come in down there that far into the room. I was not as widely focused as Mr. Berman is, but I apologize for that and we really do appreciate your support very much.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Solomon, we certainly appreciate your patience, your willingness to answer all of the questions. This joint meeting of the Rules Committee and the International Relations Committee has been very beneficial to all of us and we wish you well in your endeavors and thank you for—

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Gilman, if I could have unanimous consent to submit the names of those 36 states and three territories that have passed resolutions in support of this specific resolution.

And, finally, let me just say that if, in the infinite wisdom of your committee, if you see fit to report this resolution, it will come before the Rules Committee and I would just assure you of full cooperation of the Rules Committee. It will be to the floor faster than you can say jack rabbit.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Solomon.

Mr. MARTINEZ. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman GILMAN. Yes.

Mr. MARTINEZ. Before we excuse Mr. Solomon, I do not want to be slighted as not having an opportunity to tell Mr. Solomon that I support his resolution and I do have a question being that this is really a Sense of Congress because we cannot translate this into a vote in the U.N. other than for the United States and there would still be other countries that would have to vote for it even if you were able to get it to the General Assembly, somehow overriding the veto from Communist China.

I come at this from a personal perspective, too, because I spent over 2 years in China right after World War II.

Mr. SOLOMON. Is that right?

Mr. MARTINEZ. During the Communist Revolution there and our basic commission there was to train Chinese Nationalist soldiers and, of course, I was in Tangu to begin with when the Communists raided our ammo dumps and killed all of our sentries on post, 14 of them, and then, somewhat later in Chingtau, take five of our Marines prisoners and killed two of them and severely wound the others and be very detrimental in their negotiations with us to re-

turn those that were still alive. So I have no fondness for the Communist government and its activities then and now.

But I also represent one of the largest Chinese community in the United States in that the city that I was the mayor of, Monterey Park, is now called Little Taipei. That gives you the idea of the transition from the kind of multiethnic community it was to pretty predominantly Chinese now. I also realize that times have changed and we need to move forward into the relationship with mainland China because there are great opportunities there for both China and ourselves.

The thing that I do agree with you is that way back when they made the mistake of taking away diplomatic relationships from Taiwan, I was very bitter about that. I did not feel that they should have. They could have recognized mainland China without taking it away.

So my question is this, and in the resolution since it is Sense of Congress and would probably face stiff opposition in the United Nations, why isn't there a resolution here that would at least take that first step that Mr. Berman referred to in recognizing diplomatically China first and then moving from there toward admission to the U.N.?

Mr. SOLOMON. Well, first of all, to go back to, I think it was Mr. Kim that asked the question, but that there were only a few small countries that have supported seating the Republic of China on Taiwan in the United Nations, the reason is intimidation and the rest of the world is looking for United States leadership in this. And Mr. Hamilton or someone asked me what I would do if I were president. I would go to the People's Republic of China. I would sit down with them and I would say, "Listen. Times have changed. This is what we want to do and we want your cooperation," and I think we would get it.

The question is whether or not to go for recognition of them first instead of seeking to seat them in the United Nations. I would be willing to do that. But if we can manage to get them in the United Nations—and I believe that there are ways, legally, to do that, to bypass the veto of the People's Republic of China—I believe, with United States leadership, we could accomplish that and that would do more than to open up the entire world to this situation and I believe that it would lead to better cooperation between mainland China and Taiwan in the long run.

So you can go both ways. You can go tandem if you wanted to. Personally, I believe that it is important to get them seated, let them become a part of the world community, because they have been an integral part in everything but recognition all these years. So let's at least get them seated.

If the gentleman wants to pursue that, I would be glad to co-sponsor his resolution and help him.

Mr. MARTINEZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Solomon.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank the gentleman for his remarks and, again, Mr. Solomon, we thank you and we are so pleased to give prompt attention to this resolution—

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman GILMAN [continuing.] In the event the resolution comes before the Rules Committee.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Chairman, I know that Mr. Solomon—Chairman GILMAN. The gentlelady from Florida.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN [continuing.] Has to leave. I just wanted to congratulate him for his resolution and we need to do more to increase the participation of strong democracies, strong economic fronts throughout the world. I think that this resolution is going to be one step forward in bringing forth the notion of democracy throughout the world, for all the countries. I congratulate Mr. Solomon for bringing it to our attention.

Chairman GILMAN. I thank the gentlelady.

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I was in Miami, FL not too long ago with Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and I can just tell you she is one of the most respected members of this body and she is recognized for the long fight against the spread of deadly atheistic international communism and I take my hat off to her and to the job she has done over the years.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, again, Mr. Solomon.

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, thank you so much. I apologize for taking up so much time of the body.

Chairman GILMAN. To our members who I cut short on opening statements, if anyone cares to make an opening statement at this time.

Mr. BEREUTER had a statement that he wanted to make.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will summarize parts of it and deliver others. I had asked unanimous consent to have the whole—

Chairman GILMAN. Without objection.

Mr. BEREUTER [continuing.] Put in the record, I would appreciate it and I had not anticipated we would keep Mr. Solomon here this long, but I appreciate the opportunity he gave us for dialog for our colleagues.

I would like to take a few minutes to speak forthrightly on the legislation, H. Con. Res. 63, which has been referred to this Committee. I believe it is necessary to speak on this legislative issue and I want to explain my position in some detail because, as you know, I have strong views on the matter before us today.

At this time in particular, I strenuously oppose H. Con. Res. 63 which calls for a U.S.-led effort to promote Taiwan's full membership in the United Nations. I think there is really little disagreement among us about what we would like in the way of Taiwan's standing in the United Nations or elsewhere. But, practically speaking, this membership in the United Nations is not possible without Beijing's consent because, of course, China has a permanent seat on the Security Council with veto power over new memberships.

Because of that reality, this resolution will only aggravate, in my judgment, the downward spiral in U.S.-Chinese relations with no hope of achieving its espoused goal. I am afraid that in general, not specifically addressing this legislation, Congress is, despite outward appearances of agreement in Taiwan, allowing itself to be drawn into a domestic partisan contest in Taiwan.

Now I know that, on a formal basis, the parties have come together. If anyone were to believe that this resolution is totally non-controversial, as some lobbyists have apparently said, I do think

they are mistaken. I have to believe that responsible leaders in Taiwan, having witnessed the aftermath of the Lee visit—and by the way, of course, I moved that legislation quite freely and with full support because I thought it was an appropriate step for the Congress to take—having witnessed the aftermath of that, I think that some of the leaders in Taiwan must be questioning the pace of Taiwanese-American and U.S. congressional promotion of more official U.S.-Taiwan ties.

It is no accident, I believe, that the stock market in Taiwan has dropped sharply in the wake of the visit of President Lee, the heightened Chinese rhetoric against the United States and Taiwan. I suspect that President Lee's recent decision to regret the invitation to visit Anchorage in September is evidence of their second thoughts; in short, I think perhaps an effort to cool it for the moment, something that my colleague from California, Mr. Kim, mentioned, in effect.

In their heart of hearts, I am convinced that the leadership of the Taiwanese government do not want to see this legislation enacted, at least not at this time. In fact, I am convinced, at least in retrospect, they would not even want to see it considered at this particular time.

In part, of course, the support for this legislation is driven by Taiwanese-American interests whose motives, in fact, are the best. But it may well damage the very values and ends that they hold dear and that they seek.

U.S.-China policy, Mr. Chairman and my colleagues, has undergone many swings and changes, of course, since President Nixon's visit to Beijing in 1972. One consistent thread throughout this period, however, has been our one China policy. For the last 23 years, six administrations of both political parties have closely examined this policy and reached the same conclusion; that is, that it serves fundamental U.S. interest and must be maintained.

Even former President Reagan, as close an American friend as Taiwan has ever had, embraced this policy. In several letters to Chinese leaders in 1982, President Reagan wrote, and I quote, "Our policy will continue to be based on the principle that there is only one China. We will not permit unofficial relations between the American people and the Chinese people on Taiwan to weaken our commitment to that principle."

Why did all these administrations of different political parties and orientations reach the same conclusion? Very simply, I believe, because this policy has been essential in maintaining peace and stability and economic development on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Not only has this policy permitted us to maintain mutually beneficial ties with both parties, but it has also provided an indispensable foundation for the expansion of contacts between Beijing and Taipei.

Historical animosity between the PRC and Taiwan can only be resolved by the parties themselves. Unofficial but government-sanctioned bodies from both sides have met for formal negotiations on several occasions since April 1993. Practical agreements have been signed on hijacking, stowaways, fishing disputes and mailing services. More than five million visitors from Taiwan have gone to the mainland. Taiwan's annual trade with the PRC is \$14 billion. Cu-

mulative Taiwan investment on the mainland amounts to an incredible \$20 billion and it is going up rapidly.

While contacts at the political level have lagged, we have even seen suggestions of movement in that area. In speeches earlier this year, China's President Chang and Taiwan's President Lee have hinted at the possibility of an eventual summit between the two. Such talk across the Taiwan Straits is unprecedented and deserves our encouragement.

In opposing this resolution, I am not saying that I oppose Taiwan's membership in the U.N. As my colleagues are all too aware, Taiwan has all the de facto attributes of an independent state except one. But it is a very big one. The political reality is that very few countries recognize Taiwan as a state and China will not tolerate Taiwanese membership in the United Nations. Taiwanese membership in the United Nations, if it is ever going to happen, must be part of the negotiations between the parties concerned, not imposed from the outside against the will of one party.

The precedent of the two Germanys and the two Koreas joining the U.N. is often cited in support of the resolution. But we must remember these parties joined the U.N. simultaneously at their own initiative, not because the United States or some outside power pressured one party to agree to allow United Nations access and accession by the other.

All three witnesses at a recent Subcommittee on Asia and Pacific hearing on China's future agreed that it would be a mistake for the United States to push for full Taiwan membership in the U.N. Even former Ambassador James Lilly, an outspoken Taiwan supporter, warned against a U.S. initiative for Taiwan's admittance to the U.N. as, "A sudden leap in policy in a manner which challenges the PRC on a matter of sovereignty." That is a quote.

Finally, I would point out that the Heritage Foundation, hardly a coddler of Chinese Communism, has modified its position on Taiwan's U.N. membership and endorsed only Taiwan's membership in U.N. specialized agencies which, in Heritage's view, would not threaten PRC sensibilities.

In closing, Mr. Chairman and my colleagues, I agree the United States should take steps to continue to advance Taiwan's international stature commensurate with its economic power, its political development, and certainly its amazing changes in democracy. We should focus these efforts on financial and trade institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO and possibly U.N. specialized agencies.

Nevertheless, I believe any step we take in this direction must be taken carefully so as not to upset the delicate Taipei-Beijing relationship. Notice, I did not say Sino-American relationship but Taipei-Beijing relationship. These steps must be taken in a fashion that only serves to raise Beijing's already high level of suspicion of U.S. attentions if we take this step by passing H. Con. Res. 63. The passage just does not meet this test.

Mr. Chairman and my colleagues, I believe the advancement of this legislation at this time is contrary to the national interest of the United States of America and in my view at this time, contrary to Taiwan's interest. Those are my views, Mr. Chairman.



I look forward to the testimony of the four witnesses today. I strongly urge the committee to avoid taking up H. Con. Res. 63. If we do mark it up, we should vote against it.

Chairman GILMAN. I thank the gentleman for his comments.

Mr. Funderburk.

Mr. FUNDERBURK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have a brief opening statement directed especially to the State Department and administration witnesses. First, I appreciate Chairman Solomon's work and support his resolution.

Why are we doing this, the question was asked. It is the right thing to do, morally and democratically, and I would bet that my Republican colleague from California is glad that we recognize South Korea and when we did, just maybe it upset North Korea and Communist China.

Well, I feel ashamed that once again this Committee is forced to shine the light on yet another administration which has failed to treat the freedom-loving people of the Republic of China as full and equal partners in the family of nations.

Taiwan has been a loyal ally for 50 years. It is the world's nineteenth largest economy and in a short time, it will popularly elect a president for perhaps the first time in 4,000 years of Chinese history. In the name of justice, we must fully recognize Taiwan, return her to the United Nations, and turn our moral and economic force against the real villains, the mainland Communists.

Despite an outpouring of goodwill from the American people and the Congress, this administration continues its one China policy with a regime which represses its own people and floods America with cheap goods produced by slave labor. Not content to ostracize Taiwan from the world community, this administration has imposed humiliating sanctions on free China while it curries favor with the brutal Communist gerontocracy in Communist China.

The State Department and administration have aided and abetted the Beijing plan to isolate Taiwan. Once a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, today only 29 or so countries recognize Taiwan. And, as we speak, South Africa is planning to expel Taiwanese diplomats from Johannesburg, which is a disgrace.

Mr. Chairman, it is no secret that this Member of Congress considers the United Nations to be a moral cesspool. It is corrupt. It is ineffectual. And it is often a tool of anti-American interest. And, as I said, I am ashamed that we fully participate in an institution which toasts Castro and fetes Arafat and the Ayatollahs but refuses to let free China in the door.

It is long past time to stop our seductive dance with the ruthless Communists on the mainland. It is time we stand up for free China and if the Foggy Bottom crowd and the Secretary General do not like it, so much the better. Thank you.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank the gentleman for his remarks.

Mr. Leach.

Mr. FUNDERBURK. Mr. Chairman, also I would like to ask unanimous consent to place in the record a statement by our colleague, Mr. Dan Burton.

Chairman GILMAN. Without objection.

Mr. FUNDERBURK. Thank you.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Leach.

Mr. LEACH. Well, I thank the gentleman.

I had not intended to speak but I think there are several issues that need to be addressed. One is that this Congress has moved very forthrightly to suggest that Taiwan match its enormous economic stability and economic democracy with real political democracy. Over the last several decades, very significant strides have been made. Taiwan is now clearly a very real economic and very real political democracy and I stress this first in economic terms.

There is probably no developing country in the world in which the divisions between rich and poor are less pronounced. In terms of democracy, a ruling elite from the mainland had for long dominated, but clearly the reins of power have moved to a greater number of the people, many more of whom are native Taiwanese than born on the mainland.

The second issue that I think we have to recognize is that Taiwan is unique in the world. It has the fuzziest status of any land mass that I know of. But there is often greater protection in fuzziness than clarity and it is not necessarily moral to precipitate conflict and it is not necessarily democratic to jeopardize democracy. And it strikes me that for this time period, one should make a distinction between self-determination and nationalism, with self-determination in a limited definition meaning the ability of a people to determine their own fate in a democratic way; nationalism meaning raising a flag and taking on all of the outside symbols of national power.

My own view is that Taiwan can be effectively self-determined and effectively national if it does not raise a different flag in terms of the international community. For us to play games with the current circumstance only jeopardizes the capacity of the Taiwanese to self-determine their own future and their own way of life as it is currently. And so I would urge the greatest kind of conceivable caution at this particular time with this kind of measure.

Thank you very much.

Chairman GILMAN. I thank the gentleman for his statement.

Mr. Kim.

Mr. KIM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for yielding. I will be brief.

I cannot help, listening to my colleagues that have serious concerns about China, their human rights, et cetera. I cannot understand it. It is a separate issue. Let's deal with China. I do not think it is right that they are using Taiwan as a mechanism, as a way of bashing China. Do we have a solid China policy? Perhaps not. That is a totally separate issue. Because of that reason, we have to admit or pass a resolution to persuade United Nation to accept Taiwan, I do not think so. In my opinion, this is a very emotional, and wrong approach.

All Taiwanese friends know that I have been supporting Taiwan. As a matter of fact, President Lee's case was again my original co-sponsorship. I have been supporting Taiwanese all this time. But this is different issue. I do not think it is right that we push a Taiwanese resolution trying to get even with China. I think China policy should be separate.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Kim.

Mr. Hamilton.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I will just ask permission to insert my remarks in the record and just make the statement that, as we listen to the witnesses today and consider what new steps the United States ought to be taking with respect to Taiwan, we do not want to discount the importance of our relationship with Beijing, nor should we discount the progress that Taiwan has made under existing policy. And we have to think carefully about disrupting that policy.

The other thing, Mr. Chairman, I just want to point out is that I did not have anything to do with the drafting of this resolution. But in the resolve clause, drafted with some considerable skill, it does not say that the United States policy should push for full participation in the United Nations for Taiwan.

It says two things. It says, first of all, that Taiwan deserves full participation. That is a view of the Sense of the Congress as this is structured. But the second clause is the one that is quite artful. It says that the Government of the United States should immediately encourage the United Nations to take action by considering the unique situation of Taiwan in the international community and adopting a comprehensive solution to accommodate Taiwan in the United Nations and its related agencies.

So I think it is important for my colleagues to see what this resolution says and what it does not say. It does not direct, ask, or seek the United States as a matter of policy to push for full participation in the United Nations by Taiwan.

Chairman GILMAN. I thank the gentleman for his comments.

Without objection, I am submitting a full statement by the gentleman from California, Mr. Royce, as an opening statement to be made part of the record.

Now we will call our first administration witness. We regret the delay in calling our witnesses.

Mr. Kent Wiedemann, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State.

Mr. Wiedemann, you may either put your full statement in the record or summarize it, as you may desire.

Mr. Wiedemann.

#### **STATEMENT OF KENT WIEDEMANN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS**

Mr. WIEDEMANN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

If you do not mind, I would like to read my full statement. It is not terribly long. After having heard the very excellent discussion among members of the Committee this morning, I think it is important to put the administration's position full on record.

As a point of fact, I think as I go through my testimony you will find that in many, many important areas there is not any real difference, significant difference, between the administration's position and many of the views voiced by this Committee. We all have the same concerns about practices in China, whether it be human rights or whether it be non-proliferation. We all admire Taiwan for a host of reasons and wish to have good relations with it and are, in fact, resolutely determined to maintain good relations with it. The question that I will address in this testimony, of course, relates to the U.N. matter more specifically.

I welcome the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss one of the United States' most important relationships in Asia. We may have only unofficial ties with the people of Taiwan, but I will describe today a relationship that has strengthened and prospered under a unique set of circumstances. I will explain why the administration cannot support Taiwan's participation in the United Nations and the administration's view that only by maintaining the unofficial character of our ties with Taiwan can we ensure that the people of Taiwan and the United States continue to enjoy a stable and peaceful future.

#### The "One China" Policy:

I would like to begin by reviewing U.S. policy toward Taiwan. Our policy is often described simply as "one China," but too rarely is the full definition of this position set out. The key elements of our policy are as follows:

Since 1979, the United States has recognized the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China.

Since 1972, the United States has acknowledged the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China. The Reagan administration, in 1982, clarified that the United States has no intention of pursuing a policy of "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan."

Within this context, the people of the U.S. will maintain cultural, commercial and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.

The United States has consistently held that resolution of the Taiwan issue is a matter to be worked out by the Chinese people themselves. Our sole and abiding concern is that that resolution be peaceful.

These elements of our policy are set out in the three joint U.S.-PRC communiques of 1972, 1979, and 1982, and the legal framework for our unofficial relations with Taiwan, as has been pointed out by the Committee, is provided by the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. That Act also stipulates that the United States will make available to Taiwan such defensive arms as necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. The Clinton administration is committed to fully implementing this and all other elements of the Taiwan Relations Act, which is consistent with the three communiques. In our view, the TRA and the 1982 communiques are complementary, both serving our goal of maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait area.

The foundations of our China policy have been supported by six administrations of both parties. All administrations since 1972 have shared these basic objectives: peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait area; constructive engagement with China; continuation of strong economic and cultural relations with the people of Taiwan; and peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue by the Chinese people. This "one China" policy has worked exceptionally well, and has enabled us to achieve progress toward all U.S. objectives. I will briefly discuss that progress.

First, peace and stability. Without a doubt, our China policy has been a key factor in the reduction of tensions in the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan's defense capability is as strong as it has ever been. We

cannot overlook, of course, the recent PRC missile exercises near Taiwan that the Chairman has mentioned, clearly not helpful to a peaceful and stable atmosphere in the Strait, as we have publicly announced. But we do not believe China poses an imminent military threat to Taiwan. In fact, we believe Taiwan has never been more secure.

What has this meant for the people of Taiwan and for our relations with them? A great deal, in both political and economic terms.

The shift from a belligerent to a peaceful and stable climate in the Strait has had a direct impact on Taiwan's tremendous political transformation. Marshall Law has ended in Taiwan—excuse me, was ended in Taiwan in 1987, setting the stage for democracy and a blossoming of individual political freedoms. In 1992, the legislature was directly elected by the people of Taiwan and, as others have said this morning, there will be another election in December and next spring the president will be directly elected. We have already seen last year the Governor of Taiwan province and the mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung were, for the first time, directly elected. This movement toward democracy is, as all members who have spoken this morning already pointed out, extremely encouraging and something that this country resolutely supports and obviously recognizes as absolutely consistent with not only this nation's fundamental values but our foreign policy priorities.

Peace and stability in the Strait also created the foundation for Taiwan's economic miracle. The people of Taiwan now enjoy an average annual income of approximately U.S. dollars \$11,600, up from less than \$2,000 in 1979. Taiwan holds about \$100 billion in foreign exchange reserves by our reckoning, the second highest reserve level after Japan. Taiwan is a major force in the global high-technology market as a producer of personal computers, for example. It is the world's largest supplier of computer monitors. Just over 25 years ago, the United States was providing aid to Taiwan. Now, Taiwan is an important aid donor to others. The unique nature of our relationship with Taiwan has helped its integration with a global economic system and ensured that it would not be isolated.

Peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait has permitted the United States to focus on the long process of building a relationship with mainland China, a nation whose rapid economic growth and modernization is propelling it toward great power status. In recent testimony before this committee, Assistant Secretary Winston Lord and I have described the importance of the President's policy of engagement, of pursuing a constructive relationship with the PRC. Our strategic goal is to help China integrate further into the international community and to encourage it to accept both the benefits as well as the obligations that come with interdependence and global cooperation. Under this engagement strategy, this administration has secured China's cooperation on some security issues such as North Korea, Cambodia, extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, narcotics trafficking, alien smuggling and in the area of regional security dialogs. We have also reached important bilateral economic agreements. At the same time, we have had ongoing problems in other areas, as has been already noted this morning, nota-

bly in the human rights field where the situation is indeed distressing and disturbing. We hope to overcome our current difficulties and make progress in this very important relationship and, indeed, it was on Monday this week in Secretary Christopher's meeting with his counterpart, Foreign Minister Chen-Shi Chung, that we engaged on just these and other key issues.

Mr. Chairman, faithful adherence to our fundamental policy toward Taiwan and the PRC in the last 16 years has not only promoted peace and prosperity in the area but has enhanced the ties between Taiwan and the PRC. These ties have grown at a phenomenal pace during the last two and a half years. New exchanges in the fields of commerce, science and culture take place virtually every week. This year trade across the Strait is expected, by our account, to reach almost \$20 billion, nearly double the level of 1992. China may this year replace the United States as Taiwan's largest export market. Since 1987, Taiwan is estimated to have invested more than \$20 billion in the mainland. Delegations from academic and business communities crossed the Strait for meetings, and nuclear scientists from the mainland have visited Taiwan to discuss power plant operation and disposal of low-level waste. Taiwan residents may take as many as 1.5 million trips to the mainland this year. Recent frictions between the two have introduced unwelcome confrontation. China's missile tests 85 miles away from Taiwan were declared to be routine but obviously are widely speculated also to be PRC's warning to Taiwan. China recently suspended high-level meetings of the unofficial cross-Strait dialog, making clear that that is was tied also by Lee Teng-hui's private visit to the United States. As a result, the pace of cross-Strait exchanges has slowed, but we expect them to continue because they are, after all, in the interests of both sides. U.S. policy and adherence to the three communiques depends on peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. We urge that the cross-Strait meetings be continued soon.

Given Taiwan's important role in the global economy and its more recent emergence as a vigorous democracy, it strikes some as anachronistic that the United States and all but 30 of more than 170 countries or so around the world maintain only unofficial relations with Taipei. I agree that it is indeed unusual. In fact, it reflects a unique relationship. Again, the key point is that our policy works. Only by maintaining this unique nature of our relations with Taiwan will peace and prosperity in the Strait be assured.

Let me quickly review the extent of our unofficial relationship with Taiwan:

United States economic ties with Taiwan have grown stronger since 1979. Taiwan is our seventh largest trading partner. It is the fifth largest importer of U.S. agricultural products. We have a \$10 billion trade deficit with Taiwan, but that has declined from a high level of \$17 billion in 1987. Cumulative U.S. investment in Taiwan now stands at over \$5 billion, representing a quarter of all foreign investment in Taiwan.

We are selling to Taiwan the material necessary for it to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act and the 1982 joint communique with China.

Under the auspices of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), our unofficial link to Taipei, senior administration officials regularly meet with Taiwan representatives. Most recently, under Secretary Summers of the Department of Treasury and his Taiwan counterpart met at the Treasury to discuss a broad range of bilateral and global economic issues. This is one example.

The AIT has signed 90 agreements with its Taiwan counterpart, providing substance and structure to relations that serve the people of both Taiwan and the United States. These agreements call for U.S.-Taiwan cooperation on issues such as protection for the environment and endangered species; protecting for copyrights; textile trade; safeguards for nuclear power plants; and disease prevention.

Cultural ties have continuously expanded. In 1981, AIT processed about 70,000 non-immigrant visas. Last year, by contrast, there were more than 300,000. More than 37,000 Taiwan students are in the U.S. and American institutions are the top choice for Taiwan's post-graduate students. By now, everyone knows, of course, that Lee Teng-hui earned a Ph.D. at Cornell. Complementing the flow of people from Taiwan, more than 25,000 Americans are now estimated to be residing in Taiwan.

We have actively supported Taiwan's membership in international economic organizations open to entities other than states. Going back to 1985, we worked with other members of the Asian Development Bank to ensure Taiwan's participation, along with that of mainland China. In 1991, again working with others, we ensured that Taiwan, under the name Chinese Taipei, became a member of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Group. We are also strongly supporting Taiwan's accession to the World Trade Organization.

All of this adds up to an unofficial relationship that is closer and more productive than the official diplomatic ties we have with many countries. Constant, steady application of our China policy over the years has made this possible.

The principal question before us today is, should the U.S. support Taiwan's participation in the United Nations and can it do so without harm to its highly successful policy of the past 16 years? The administration's answer is no. Let me be clear. The United States could accept any solution to this issue which is consistent with the U.N. Charter and is agreed upon by the people on both sides of the Strait. Until Taiwan and the PRC reach such an agreement, however, we believe that no good, and considerable harm, could come from U.S. support of Taiwan's participation in the U.N. We should not seek to insert the United States into the middle of this issue.

Let's look at this question from a practical perspective. Last year, 12 countries supported a U.N. resolution for Taiwan participation. The U.N. General Committee dropped it without a vote. This year, 15 countries support a similar resolution: Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, Costa Rica, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Guatemala, Nicaragua, the Niger, Panama, Solomon Islands, and Swaziland.

Outside of these co-sponsors, there is almost no support for the resolution among U.N. members, and China has made clear its intention to block or veto U.N. consideration of the Taiwan issue. With a permanent seat on the Security Council, China can accomplish this.

Even if a motion for Taiwan participation in the U.N. is an effort doomed to fail, why shouldn't the United States lend its support, an issue already discussed this morning. I would say the U.S. support for this futile effort would come at great cost to our interests involving China. Support for Taiwan participation in the United Nations, an organization of states, would contradict our policy, since 1979, of recognizing the PRC as the sole legal government of China. Consequently, the PRC has said it would view U.S. support for Taiwan's U.N. bid as our abandoning one of the most fundamental elements of the U.S.-China relationship, an element affirmed by the commitment in 1982 under President Reagan not to pursue a policy of "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan." Again, it is important to note that Taiwan itself continues to have a "one China" policy. This fact sets the Taiwan U.N. issue distinctly apart from the two Germanys or the two Korea examples cited by others as precedents to support Taiwan U.N. membership.

We must also realistically and soberly consider that U.S. support for Taiwan's U.N. effort could also jeopardize China's support as one of the five permanent Security Council members for a broad range of important issues in the U.N.—issues of importance to the American people, such as democracy building in Haiti and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Without Chinese cooperation, the U.N. would be significantly weakened.

Mr. Bolton, I think, one of the witnesses to come after me, certainly remembers this fact well from his work in securing Chinese acquiescence to the structure of U.N. resolutions necessary for building the coalition and the international authority ultimately necessary for Desert Shield and Desert Storm back in 1990.

Most basically, U.S. support for Taiwan participation in the U.N. would jeopardize peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. We would put at risk the economic and political progress achieved by the people of Taiwan. We would also risk the growing peaceful exchanges between Taiwan and the mainland, exchanges that benefit people on both sides of the Strait.

In the end, our support for an effort that clearly will not succeed could put at risk U.S. interests in the Strait area, as well as the interests of the people of Taiwan. Until Taipei and Beijing can reach agreement on this issue, supporting Taiwan's participation in the U.N. is not in the U.S. national interest.

So, where do we go from here? As I stated at the outset of my testimony, we continue to maintain that the question of Taiwan's relationship to the PRC is an issue to be resolved by the Chinese people themselves. Our abiding interest is that the resolution come about peacefully. We urge Beijing and Taipei to continue patiently the talks and economic interchange that they have successfully initiated. This—and not U.S. support for a quixotic resolution in the U.N.—is the way toward a secure and prosperous future for the people of Taiwan.



Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for permitting me to deliver my statement in full.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wiedemann appears in the appendix.]

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Wiedemann.

We have a few questions. We will try to be brief.

Is our nation going to sell Taiwan Patriot missiles so that it can defend itself against ground-to-ground missiles?

Mr. WIEDEMANN. Yes, sir. We have undertaken agreement with the Taiwan authorities to sell them a Patriot missile system of the type and for the purpose you described.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Wiedemann, if we could not support Taiwan's membership in the United Nations, then why do we support its membership in the Asian Development Bank and also in some of the other organizational activities such as Food and Agricultural Organizations and World Health and others? If they are not members, can we support them for those organizations that are not political?

Mr. WIEDEMANN. We have long sought—I referred earlier to 1985 and our work to keep Taiwan in the Asian Development Bank. That was a case where Taiwan was already in the bank. The PRC wanted to join it. We were resolved to ensure—and I think this is consistent very much with the language of the Taiwan Relations Act—to make sure that Taiwan did not leave that institution. We were successful.

Since then, we have made it a matter of U.S. policy and a priority in our relations with Taiwan to look for opportunities to promote Taiwan's participation and have its voice heard in as many international and multilateral organizations as possible. However, it turns out that most such organizations require, clearly, statehood or U.N. membership for participation and therefore we have come down to, in recent years, supporting Taiwan where we can. APEC is one of those issues where we could do so and did.

Chairman GILMAN. How about World Health Organization and FAO and UNESCO? Can we support them—

Mr. WIEDEMANN. The specialized agencies of the United Nations present a very serious obstacle for us because they require U.N. membership. This is my understanding. I am not a legal expert.

Chairman GILMAN. I do not think they do require. Some of those do not require membership. But I welcome your exploring that and see if there is any way we could help Taiwan become members of those organizations, since they are not political. I would think that we have already opened the door with the Asian Development Bank. We ought to be able to open the door on some of the other organizations.

Mr. WIEDEMANN. We are working closely, in fact, Mr. Chairman, with the authorities of Taiwan together looking at a list of international organizations that Taiwan believes that it could contribute to through participation and we are studying whether the terms of participation or membership in these organizations could accommodate Taiwan's special situation.

I just might finish by saying what we are really very, very intensely focused on right now in this regard is the WTO accession issue. It seems to us that probably—I dare say, I think, on Taiwan,

probably the most important international organization for Taiwan at this juncture would be the World Trade Organization bringing it all the more into the fold of the global trade system.

Chairman GILMAN. Are we trying to help them get into that organization?

Mr. WIEDEMANN. Yes. We are working very closely with them, both bilaterally as well as in the working committee in Geneva.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, would you yield?

Chairman GILMAN. Yes, I am pleased to yield to the gentleman.

Mr. BEREUTER. I thank the Chairman.

I am told that some U.N. affiliated organizations require membership and some do not and I am wondering if we could request the legal division of CRS to examine that for the Committee.

Chairman GILMAN. It please—

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you.

Chairman GILMAN. Perhaps our witness could provide that listing for us and make it part of the record without objection.

[The information referred to follows:]

#### TAIWAN AND UN-AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS

Q: Do United Nations-affiliated organizations require that their members must be members of the United Nations?

A: The specific requirements for membership in the various United Nations-affiliated organizations are set forth in their respective constitutive documents. With respect to these organizations (which are listed below), membership in the United Nations is not a requirement of membership. However, many of these organizations permit automatic membership for UN members who wish to join (these organizations are marked by asterisk).

#### UN-AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS:

1. International Maritime Organization\*
2. Food and Agricultural Organization\*
3. International Civil Aviation Organization\*
4. International Labor Organization\*
5. International Telecommunications Union\*
6. United Nations Industrial Development Organization\*
7. Universal Postal Union\*
8. World Health Organization\*
9. World Intellectual Property Organization\*
10. World Meteorological Organization\*
11. International Atomic Energy Agency\*
12. International Monetary Fund
13. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)

Mr. WIEDEMANN. Yes, Yes, sir. We anticipated that we might get such a request and we certainly will be prepared to do so.

Chairman GILMAN. In your opinion, was the recent testing of intermediate range ballistic missiles at a target range of 85 miles off the coast of Taiwan any threat to their security?

Mr. WIEDEMANN. That test was clearly an unwelcome development, to say the very least. And, as we have stated in our public statement as well as privately to the Chinese, not at all hopeful in terms of maintaining peace and security that China says it is committed to.

However, we did not judge that that constituted an imminent threat to Taiwan. It is—

Chairman GILMAN. It seems to me 85 miles is pretty imminent.

Mr. WIEDEMANN. Well, it is a judgment call, sir.

Chairman GILMAN. Yes. I am reminded of Section 3(c) of the Taiwan Relations Act that says that the President is directed to inform the Congress promptly of any threat to the security of the social or economic system of the people of Taiwan and any danger to our interests arising therefrom. Then the president of the Congress shall determine, in accordance with Constitutional process, appropriate action by the United States in response to any such danger.

Apparently, then, the State Department did not believe that this was any threat to the security to come within the provisions of Section 3(c).

Mr. WIEDEMANN. That is correct, sir. In consultations with Defense Department, we in the State Department and also in consultation with the National Security Council determined that this was not a threat in terms of that section of the law.

Chairman GILMAN. Well, I would hope that the State Department would get their vision adjusted to 20/20 so that we can take a better look at these kind of security threats in the future.

Mr. WIEDEMANN. I might point out, we have an encouraging pattern of reduction of tension, one that we want to, of course, encourage. Just last year—in fact, not so many months ago—Taiwan mistakenly fired some anti-aircraft artillery which happened to land in the province of Fujian just across from Jinmen Island. And that was handled quite discretely between the two sides. Absolutely no fall-out. And that is the way things should happen. It is very disturbing now that China would launch missiles 85 miles north of Taiwan and it is something we cannot but comment on and express concern about and put China on notice that we see that as a dangerous development. We have done that.

Chairman GILMAN. Well, we welcome that kind of a public statement.

Thank you very much, Mr. Wiedemann.

Mr. Hamilton.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Secretary, the Chinese said today that the two American military attaches had sneaked into the restricted areas, illegally acquired military intelligence by photographing and videotaping. In other words, they accuse us of spying.

Do we deny that?

Mr. WIEDEMANN. Let me tell you that those two Air Force officers have only within the last few hours returned to Hong Kong and are now being debriefed. I think you are probably aware that our ordinary—or, that is, our normal practice is not to comment on intelligence matters. That principle applies in this case, but especially since we have not finished the debriefing of these two officers in question.

Mr. HAMILTON. You recognize, do you not, when you refuse to deny it that the assumption everybody makes is that the charge is probably correct?

Mr. WIEDEMANN. Well, I hope that they do not draw that conclusion. I would not draw that conclusion.

Mr. HAMILTON. Will you at some time make a statement if in fact we deny it? Will that come out soon?

Mr. WIEDEMANN. Once we have had a chance to debrief these two officers, evaluate the facts, then we will make clear our evaluation.

Mr. HAMILTON. And if, in fact, they were spying, we would acknowledge it?

Mr. WIEDEMANN. No, sir. I doubt that we would.

Mr. HAMILTON. I recognize it is a difficult question for you, but it is obviously on the minds of many of us.

Now, during the discussion with Chairman Solomon, those who support this resolution really made, I think quite eloquently and very strongly, the argument that what they were advocating here, putting Taiwan in the United Nations, was the moral thing to do.

Mr. WIEDEMANN. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. I think one or two of them said, "This is the right thing to do." We have a Communist government over here in Beijing. Authoritarian, in many respects does not represent our view of the way you ought to behave. On the other hand, Taiwan, democratic, free market, remarkable progress.

What is wrong with that argument? I mean, why are we taking the immoral position here?

Mr. WIEDEMANN. I would not call it an immoral position.

Mr. HAMILTON. What is wrong with their argument?

Mr. WIEDEMANN. Their argument is right only to the extent, I think, that it points out the fact that Taiwan reflects values, a system of both government—specifically democracy—as well as an economic system and even people-to-people ties to this country that compare extremely favorably, to say the very least, with the mainland China where, indeed, political oppression is manifest. It is demonstrated by stories in our newspapers daily; by the continued detention of Harry Wu, as mentioned earlier today; and countless other depredations.

Mr. HAMILTON. Aren't we kind of putting ourselves as a government on the side of the authoritarian Communist government of China?

Mr. WIEDEMANN. No, we are not. What we are doing—

Mr. HAMILTON. We are letting them sit in the U.N. and we are not letting Taiwan sit in the U.N.

Mr. WIEDEMANN. We recognized the PRC as the sole legal government of China, in recognition that that government has jurisdiction over China. Our policy is designed to maintain peace in the Taiwan Straits. That is the fundamental purpose.

Mr. HAMILTON. Let me go on. Just as a technical matter, is it your view that China has the power under all circumstances to veto a Taiwanese application for membership in the United Nations?

Mr. WIEDEMANN. I am not a legal expert, sir. But—

Mr. HAMILTON. OK. Could you answer that or have the Department answer that for us?

Mr. WIEDEMANN. Sure.

[The information referred to follows:]

#### TAIWAN PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS: PRC VETO

Q: Is it your view that China has the power under all circumstances to veto a Taiwanese application for membership in the UN?

A: Taiwan would apply for membership as a new member, under article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations. article 4, in turn, presents the possibility of a PRC veto. Article 4(2) states that the General Assembly must decide on applications of states for membership upon the recommendation of the Security Council. The Secu-

rity Council recommendation is considered a substantive, as opposed to procedural, matter under article 27(3) of the permanent members of the security Council. The PRC could therefore exercise its veto and prevent the Security Council from recommending to the General Assembly that a Taiwan application for membership be voted upon.

Another issue is posed by article 4(1) of the U.N. Charter which requires that applicants for new membership be "states." Taiwan does not claim to be a state separate and distinct from china. Moreover, Taiwan is not recognized as a state by the vast majority of UN member states, including all of the permanent members of the Security Council.

Mr. HAMILTON. The other question I want to make is, of course, let's suppose this becomes the policy of the U.S. Government, that we implement the terms of H. Con. Res. 63 and even go a little bit beyond the specific wording of it and it becomes the policy of the U.S. Government to put Taiwan in the United Nations. What is the impact of that? What happens?

Those who support the resolution, as I recall what they said this morning, was "Well, the Chinese will blast us a few times. They will say some unfriendly things about us and it will be rhetorical, but it will blow over." Is that your assessment?

Mr. WIEDEMANN. No, it is definitely not my assessment. The impact of such an action would, I think, be catastrophic. We have to recognize—

Mr. HAMILTON. That is a big word. Let's spell that out.

Mr. WIEDEMANN. Yes, it is a big word. I am absolutely convinced. I believe most of my colleagues in the foreign policy agencies in Washington, knowing both the history and also studying current affairs in China, and looking carefully at all available sources of information, would tell you that if the PRC saw Taiwan drifting toward independence and it would regard membership or participation in the U.N. as such a drift, that China would react quite possibly using military force, as its defense minister said only 2 days ago could be the case.

Mr. HAMILTON. Against whom?

Mr. WIEDEMANN. Against Taiwan, in the first instance.

In any case, destabilizing an atmosphere of peace which has been very, very carefully nurtured and built up through the application of what has been up till now, I believe, the very wise policy.

Mr. HAMILTON. So you believe, then, that if this policy suggested at least, if not advocated, by H. Con. Res. 63 became the policy of the U.S. Government that the risk is very, very high that the Beijing government would attack Taiwan.

Mr. WIEDEMANN. No. Let me clarify. Speaking about the general issue, let's say, if Taiwan were to actually succeed in achieving U.N. membership under the current situation and current policies of the PRC, I would fear such a result with respect to H. Con. Res. 63. If that were to pass, what I would expect is that China would react severely based upon its conviction that this is a direct attack on its national sovereignty by pulling back entirely from its relationship with the United States; finding every way possible it could to see areas in which it could affect negatively U.S. interest.

Mr. HAMILTON. I want to be clear about that. You are saying that would be the reaction if H. Con. Res. 63 passed the Congress.

Mr. WIEDEMANN. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. Now, Passage of this resolution of course, that would not be the same as becoming U.S. policy because this is a Sense of Congress resolution.

Mr. WIEDEMANN. I understand.

Mr. HAMILTON. You understand that.

Nonetheless, even the passage of the resolution would have very severe consequences, in your view.

Mr. WIEDEMANN. I believe it would in the context of what has already gone on over the past couple of months between the United States and China and the fact that we are at a nadir in our overall relationship.

China's sensibilities are piqued to a point now where they are very, very suspicious of the United States. They already believe that we are bent on a conscious policy of supporting Taiwan movement toward independence, but also challenging China's sovereignty in other ways with respect to Hong Kong, to some extent; with respect to Tibet and other cases. And they even regard our continued and very forceful representations on behalf of human rights in China, in effect, as an attack on their internal security. So their reaction, I believe, at this time would be pretty sharp.

The extent to which that sharp reaction would last or the cutoff in ties in dialog with the United States and efforts by China to harm U.S. interests, it is hard to say how long that would go on. If it became U.S. policy, then I think we have a real disaster.

Mr. HAMILTON. The argument made by the proponents of the resolution is that China needs us more than we need them, if I recall what they said. You do not buy that.

Mr. WIEDEMANN. Well, I think, technically speaking, in 1995, pulling together all kinds of statistics, one might make that argument. The argument, I think, that is more important, however, is that we have to see the world in dynamic terms. China is growing, as well all know—it has been for the past decade—at a rate of over 10 percent per year. It is growing into, in short, a powerful country. It is going to emerge in the next century, willy nilly, as a major power, if not the dominant power in Asia. It is a country, in short, with which we have to deal. It is a country with which we should start now to develop at least a businesslike relationship such that we can resolve serious problems that may crop up between us or work with it to help resolve major global questions that may arise given that we are both permanent members of the Security Council or key regional issues, as we recently cooperated on the North Korean nuclear issue, Cambodia and other questions in the region. Spratly Islands is another example.

Mr. HAMILTON. I just want to encourage you on the question I asked about what would the impact be. That is obviously a key question and your judgment about that is important—that is, the administration's judgment—and I would encourage you to look over your response and it might be that you would want to elaborate further on it for the record. Thank you.

Chairman GILMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Bereuter.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There are lots of questions, but I will be brief and I do think that the comments that the Secretary has just responded to Mr. Hamilton are very impor-

tant and sobering. I would restrict my questions to two, I believe, just in the interest of time so we can get on to the third panel.

I would say, first of all, I have no illusion about the fate of the resolution when we do pick it up and act on it and I am sure you do not either, Mr. Secretary.

While I am not asking you to condone the passage of it in any fashion, because I understand the position of the administration opposition, are there any modifications you can suggest that would make the resolution a bit more palatable to the administration? For example, in the resolution clauses, would it be preferable if the operative clause of the resolution were to be directed to the United Nation rather than to the administration because it does say, "The Government of the United States should immediately encourage the United Nations . . ." and so on and so forth.

Mr. Hamilton was very appropriately calling our attention to the very specific language of the resolved clauses. I have no doubt, however, that this will be characterized as a resolution which endorses membership of Taiwan in the United Nations. But are there any changes? Is that one of them that makes it more palatable or is there no way to make it more palatable to the administration and to the interest of the United States of America?

Mr. WIEDEMANN. First of all, let me say I would like to take that question back with me and consult. But to give you an initial preliminary view, based on our overall policy, I would say that we would still oppose a resolution even with such revisions, the reason being that it would still represent a change to what has been a fundamental and a very successful policy and that is the one China policy. It would derogate from that.

[The information referred to follows:]

#### H. CON. RES. 63—ADMINISTRATION VIEWS

Q: While not asking the Administration to condone passage of H. Con. Res. 63, understanding that the Administration opposes the resolution, are there any modifications you can suggest that would make the resolution a bit more palatable to the Administration? For example, in the resolution clauses, would it be preferable if the operative clause were to be directed to the UN rather than the Administration?

A: As you note, the Administration does not support H. Con. Res. 63 and does not support Taiwan's participation in the UN. The United States could accept any solution to this issue which is consistent with the UN Charter and is agreed upon by the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Until Taiwan and the PRC reach such an agreement, however, we believe that no good, and considerable harm, would come from U.S. support of Taiwan's participation in the UN. We should not seek to insert the United States into the middle of this issue.

U.S. support for Taiwan participation in the UN would jeopardize peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. We would put at risk the economic and political progress achieved by the people of Taiwan. We would also risk the growing peaceful exchanges between Taiwan and the mainland, exchanges that benefit people on both sides of the Strait.

Although we would continue to oppose the resolution, the modification you suggest does, in the Administration's view, improve the resolution by acknowledging that this issue must be resolved on a multilateral, rather than bilateral basis.

Mr. BEREUTER. All right. I think it is right.

I understand that some Chinese human rights activists have been expressing some misgivings or very strong concerns about Congressional efforts to push Taiwan's agenda, including at this time the resolution that relates to U.N. membership.

Is there anything you would like to comment on in that respect? Is that true and what does the State Department have in the way of information on that subject?

Mr. WIEDEMANN. Frankly, we are aware, of course, that Chinese Americans, including those from Taiwan or who trace their roots to Taiwan, have a very wide variety of views about this issue as well as about Taiwan's relations with the mainland and I am not aware of all the points of view. I am aware, of course, of major strains. I know that this issue is as controversial in Taiwan and among Chinese Americans as it is in this room. But I do not really have any comment beyond that.

Mr. BEREUTER. I am talking about the Chinese dissidents, you understand, from the PRC, their reactions to—

Mr. WIEDEMANN. Well, the Chinese are nationalists, very, very basically, and the Chinese, as you say, dissidents—those from the mainland—see Taiwan as part of China. That is, they believe in a one China policy just as the authorities on Taiwan believe in a one China policy still and see Taiwan as part of that. That does not represent the view, however—as I think has been noted here—absolutely every Chinese in Taiwan or perhaps even every Chinese in China. But I would say, from my experience in 7 years living on the mainland and 1 year in Taiwan, at least in the mainland case, the great majority of Chinese believe very firmly that Taiwan is an integral part of the Chinese nation. They feel very strongly about that.

Mr. BEREUTER. Finally, the *Washington Post* on Wednesday reported that President Clinton, in a letter to the Chinese president Jeing, referred to Taiwan as a province of China. Is this story accurate? Has there been a clarification or a change on that, because, of course, that would be inconsistent with the way we have always characterized Taiwan.

Mr. WIEDEMANN. Oh, no. That is a clear misstatement. As you point out, it is absolutely inconsistent with all of our statements and, indeed, our policy. What we recognize is that the Chinese had said that.

Mr. BEREUTER. All right.

Mr. WIEDEMANN. There is but one China and Taiwan is a part of it.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WIEDEMANN. We acknowledge that point.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Bereuter.

Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRBACHER. Mr. Secretary, when you say that this would hurt our relations with China and some of the other statements that you have made, for example, you said that China views with suspicion the United States' stress on human rights, I am trying to figure out who you mean by China. Are you talking about the oppressor or the oppressee? Are you trying to say the people of China are—when you say China, you mean the people of China are suspicious of our use of human rights or is it just this clique in Beijing that have their boot on the people's face?

Mr. WIEDEMANN. Remember, sir, my question was in response to a question that had to do with what would be China's response—



Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right.

Mr. WIEDEMANN [continuing.] To a given piece of legislation or resolution. So therefore, of course, my question had to do with the authorities in Beijing, not the—

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, the people of China are not the—

Mr. WIEDEMANN [continuing.] Average person on the street.

Mr. ROHRABACHER [continuing.] Are not suspicious.

Mr. WIEDEMANN. No, of course.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. The point I am getting at, the people of China are not suspicious of the United States proclaiming human rights as a positive goal. I mean, they do not think that we have some other ulterior motives that we are trying to be against them in some way.

Mr. WIEDEMANN. No, of course not.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, whose side are we on?

Mr. WIEDEMANN. We are clearly on the side of those who support democracy.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We are? It sounds like, to me, that all the judgments you have been making today are based on what effect it will have on the psyche of those who are in power and I might say illegitimately in power.

Mr. WIEDEMANN. Oh, no. No, no, no. My statements had nothing to do, sir, with a fear of offending China. My statements had to do solely with a consideration of the impact on U.S. national interests and if—

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, that is—

Mr. WIEDEMANN. And if China were to react to this resolution or any other piece of legislation in a way that harms what are our fundamental interests, including maintenance of peace in the Straits, keeping good relations with the people of Taiwan, and maintaining a dialog on human rights with the PRC, then we should not do it, in our view.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, you know, about these fundamental interest that you are talking about, do you think that fundamental interests should be measured in terms of short-term interests or long-term interest?

Mr. WIEDEMANN. Both.

For example, today we are pressing the Chinese daily on the case of Harry Wu. Release him. But we also have in mind a long-term fact that China is going to be economically, politically, militarily extremely influential in the next century. We have to anticipate that and deal with it.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes.

Won't it be a better China, militarily, and all those other ways, economically, if it is not ruled by a government that imprisons people like Harry Wu?

Mr. WIEDEMANN. Absolutely. No question.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So it is a short-term and a long-term interest in that case.

It seems to me that some of the things you are talking about in the interest of the United States are just in terms of maintaining short-term stability rather than in terms of a long-term approach of what is in the interest of the United States, which would be to have a democratic China.

Mr. WIEDEMANN. Well, I hope not, sir. Really, what I have been trying to say is that the policy of several administrations—especially since 1979 when we actually switched recognition from Taipei to Beijing, about 16 years—has been one where empirical evidence would show that we have seen an evolution where Taiwan has been transformed from a country which was not so democratic to a country that now is extremely—very, very robustly democratic and, of course, its economy has increased in value many, many fold.

At the same time, we have seen the overall level of tension reduce in the Straits between these two traditional adversaries which have been having a civil war since the 1920's and were bitter, blood enemies. Even when I was living there in 1980, they were still lobbing shells across at one another and the like and, anyway, that enmity level has come down and prosperity has risen. China has opened up more. And, despite all the egregious human rights violations in China, I would say, based on my own observations from being posted in Beijing as well as Shanghai, at least, that there has been improvement there, too, for the lives of the average Chinese in some important ways.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. In recent years we have seen a reversal of that, have we not? Tiananmen Square? I mean, certainly there was progress in that area but since Tiananmen Square haven't we seen a reversal of the progress that has been made on the—

Mr. WIEDEMANN. We have seen an increase in the arrests and the obvious oppression of people who would exercise the freedom of assembly and the freedom of speech.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Secretary, just to say that in the 1970's we changed our position in regard to the government of China or those who were governing China, I guess would be more accurate to say, because—and it is well known that we were playing the China card against the Soviet Union. It was in the long-term interest of the United States to deal with a dictatorial regime and to basically de-emphasize human rights because we needed to maintain peace during the cold war and that was the way we were doing it. The cold war is over and perhaps it is time—

I think what disturbs me is that at a time when we should be restating some of our fundamental values and principles which have served the long-term interest of our country very well, and that is democracy and human rights and freedom, instead we now seem to be de-emphasizing that, especially in this administration where we have had a decoupling of Most-Favored-Nation status negotiations with any consideration of human rights. This, to me, does not bode well in the long term. It may make the tyrants in Peking, or Beijing, I should say, a little—it may make them more comfortable today. But in the long term, isn't our interest in having a democratic China and having a country ruled by the people rather than by a clique of Communist ideologues or whatever they are? I guess they are not Communist ideologues any more, they are just gangsters without an ideology any more.

Mr. WIEDEMANN. I would agree with everything you have said. Yes, indeed, it is in our interest.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, then why is the administration moving away from emphasizing human rights with decoupling the human rights component of the Most-Favored-Nation status negotiations?

Mr. WIEDEMANN. By decoupling human rights from MFN, we were not moving away from a commitment to the improvement of human rights and a movement toward pluralism and democracy in China. Rather—

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Does anyone out there really believe that? I mean—

Mr. WIEDEMANN. I certainly do. I believe in it very strongly, based on my experience and very, very careful analysis.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, I do not believe that the people who count believe that, but—

Mr. WIEDEMANN. You have not let me finish.

Mr. ROHRABACHER [continuing.] Meaning the tyrants and the people who are being oppressed.

Mr. WIEDEMANN. It is predicated also on the notion that without the MFN element in the relationship, you have no basis upon which to remain engaged with China to resolve those very issues that you are so concerned about, not to mention a whole host of others in the non-proliferation area, in the trade area, counter-narcotics, environmental, on and on—even some of the POW/MIA issues that I know that you personally are so interested in.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, if you decoupled it from the negotiations, how does it give us any leverage then to talk about human rights?

Mr. WIEDEMANN. Oh, we have plenty of leverage, sir. We are, as you know, the last remaining superpower. We will remain a superpower. China knows we are important. We have leverage, believe me.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for letting me have the extra couple of minutes here. I think these people are gangsters and I think they are laughing at us and I think the people of China, every time we make a stand for freedom, they, down deep, they are grateful to us and those are the people we should be on their side and that is all I have to say. Thank you very much.

You can retort to that. I am sorry. Please have a retort.

Chairman GILMAN. Secretary Wiedemann, I would ask you to provide for the record the policy of our government on Taiwan membership in specialized agencies of the U.N. and the World Bank and the IMF. If you would be kind enough to do that, we will make it part of the record without objection.

Mr. WIEDEMANN. Yes, sir. We would be pleased to do that.

[The information referred to follows:]

#### TAIWAN AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: ADMINISTRATION POLICY

Q: Please provide the policy of our government on Taiwan membership in specialized agencies of the UN and the World Bank and the IMF.

A: It is the Administration's policy to provide more active support for Taiwan's participation in international organizations, when it is clearly in the U.S. interest to do so. We will support Taiwan's membership in organizations that allow non-states to join as members, and seek opportunities to have Taiwan's voice heard in other ways in organizations where Taiwan's membership is not possible.

We are looking at a list of international organizations in which Taiwan believes its participation would make a contribution. We are studying whether and to what

extent the constitutive documents of these organizations would permit participation by Taiwan. We must also determine if support for Taiwan participation in these organizations would be in the U.S. national interest.

At this time, we have focused our efforts on Taiwan's application to join the World Trade Organization. We understand that this is the highest priority for many on Taiwan, and we strongly support Taiwan's accession to the WTO based on sound commercial terms. Taiwan's participation in the WTO would further integrate its economy into the global trading system and would help open its markets to U.S. exports.

Chairman GILMAN. We thank you for your patience and for being with us today.

Mr. WIEDEMANN. Thank you, sir.

Chairman GILMAN. I now call panel No. 3 to the witness table, Ambassador Harvey Feldman, who was our Ambassador and alternate U.S. representative at the U.N. between 1981 and 1986; Mr. Yu-Ming Shaw, Director of the Institute of International Relations of National Chengchi University; and Honorable John Bolton, president of the National Policy Forum, former Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations during the Bush administration; and Parris Chang, Director of the Taiwan Democratic Progressive Party.

**STATEMENT OF JOHN BOLTON, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL POLICY FORUM; ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR HARVEY J. FELDMAN VICE-PRESIDENT, GLOBAL BUSINESS ACCESS, LTD.; AND YU-MING SHAW, DIRECTOR, INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS NATIONAL CHENGCHI UNIVERSITY; AND PARRIS CHANG, DIRECTOR, TAIWAN DEMOCRATIC PROGRESSIVE PARTY**

Mr. BOLTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have a prepared statement that I would ask be included in the record. I actually even—

Chairman GILMAN. Without objection.

Mr. BOLTON [continuing.] Had a summary of the prepared statement that I will dispense with in light of the lateness of the hour.

Let me just make three points very quickly. First, the issue of bilateral recognition by the U.S. of Taiwan, or the status bilaterally of the U.S.-ROC relationship, is utterly irrelevant to and completely divorced from the question of whether the United States should support the ROC's representation in the United Nations. They are entirely different issues, as the recent example in 1991 of U.S. support for the admission of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea as a U.N. member when the United States had no diplomatic relations or no recognition of that regime at all.

A subsidiary point here is that support for the ROC's membership in the U.N. is in no way a violation of the concept or the policy of "one China". The "one China" policy is not a "one PRC" policy. It is a one China policy. And different representation for the different governments on the territory of China is not inconsistent with that as a goal.

Second, and I think this is absolutely fundamental, you have heard a lot this morning about the PRC's veto of any effort for Taiwanese representation—a PRC veto in the Security Council. The very simple fact is that representation for the ROC can be obtained without any recourse to the Security Council whatever. This is not

a question of an application by a new member under Article 4 of the U.N. Charter. The fact is that Resolution 2758, which was adopted by the General Assembly in 1971, was illegal. It did not expel the ROC from U.N. membership. It did not follow Article 6 of the U.N. Charter or Article 18 of the U.N. Charter. It was fundamentally illegitimate. It was a clear mistake by the General Assembly, both legally and politically.

The General Assembly has the inherent authority under the U.N. Charter to correct a mistake like that. The way to correct it is to repeal Resolution 2758 and provide for dual representation, both of the PRC and the Republic of China. That was exactly the suggestion that the United States made in 1971. I quote in my prepared statement the very prescient remarks of then-Ambassador Bush which are just as true now as they were in 1971. I just want to say it one more time. There is no need to go to the Security Council to secure representation for the Republic of China.

And, finally, I want to close by making a point about the reaction in Beijing either to the passage of H. Con. Res. 63 or a switch in U.S. policy in support of ROC representation in the United Nations. It may well be that the reaction is negative. It may well be the reaction in Beijing is very negative. But I have not heard any credible statement that there is any fundamental danger to basic U.S., national interests in that reaction, and I would say as well—and I think this is the most important point—I think American policy with respect to Taiwan and the U.N. should be made in Washington and not in Beijing.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bolton appears in the appendix:]

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Bolton. We appreciate your concise summary.

Ambassador Feldman.

**STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR HARVEY J. FELDMAN VICE-PRESIDENT, GLOBAL BUSINESS ACCESS, LTD. (FORMER AMBASSADOR TO PAPUA NEW GUINEA AND SOLOMON ISLANDS)**

Mr. FELDMAN. Thank you very much, sir.

I am very pleased to be talking about this subject because I was in charge of the task force on dual representation in the United Nations back in 1971 and have been associated with this problem one way or another ever since, including my service between 1981 and 1986 as alternate U.S. representative to the United Nations and as U.S. delegate to six General Assemblies, 1981–1986.

I agree with much of what Mr. Bolton has said. I disagree with some. And I would like to begin with a clarification. There is an awful lot of obfuscation of these issues. For example, this famous one China policy. We have heard Mr. Wiedemann gloss over the fact that we have never, ever as a government recognized or said that Taiwan is a part of the People's Republic of China. What we have said is we acknowledge the Chinese claim that there is but one government of China, one China of which Taiwan is a part. Acknowledgment is diplomatspeak meaning, "We hear you." It does not mean we agree. We could have acknowledged the Chinese claim that everything that Mao Ze-dong said was holy truth. That would not mean we agreed it was holy truth.

Mr. Bolton has said that when the ROC was expelled by Resolution 2758 in 1971, this was an illegal act because only the Security Council can recommend the expulsion of a member. But that was not the issue. In 1971, there were two delegations each of which claimed to represent the same country, China. The General Assembly has the power to decide in such cases which delegation it will seat. It had done it before 1971. It has done it since. It has done it in the case of Hungary in 1956; in Cuba, 1960; Grenada, 1984; Cambodia, throughout the 1980's. It is up to the General Assembly, because it is master of its own house, to decide when there are two competing delegations which delegation it will seat. For 22 years prior to 1971, it had seated the delegation from the Republic of China on Taiwan. In 1971, it seated the delegation from the PRC.

At that time in 1971, both delegations indeed did claim to be the lawful representative of China. The PRC still makes that claim. But the ROC does not. The ROC no longer seeks a seat in the United Nations as the government of China. What it says is that in the territory of China, the historic territory, the cultural territory of China, there are now two Chinese states with incontestable claim to international recognition. And here let me give you another clarification.

The fact that the United States does not recognize Taiwan as a state does not mean it is not a state. We do not recognize Libya, but Libya is a state. We do not recognize Cuba, but Cuba is a state. We recognized the ROC up until midnight on December 31, 1978. At 12:01 a.m. on January 1, 1979, we no longer recognized it as a state. Does that mean it stopped being a state during these two minutes because we stopped recognizing it? Of course not. All that means is that we withdrew diplomatic recognition. It was a state. It is a state. We should understand that.

There is a great deal of confusion about the United Nations. There are people who seem to believe that this is a gathering of the world's most brilliant and intelligent people who sit down and, on the basis of some pure rationality, decide the problems of the world. But, the General Assembly, as the name implies, is an assembly. It is a legislature. And it operates just as this legislature operates, on the basis of politics. It is politics that determined that the ROC was going to be expelled in 1971. It is politics that can get the ROC back in. How? By votes. And, really, the question is, how does Taiwan accumulate enough votes to get back into these organizations?

What you hear from the DPP is that Taiwan should apply as a new member called Republic of Taiwan. But that runs into a veto. What you are going to hear from the representatives of the government on Taiwan is, "We are going to call for a study committee and we hope that the study committee will recommend Taiwan's membership." In fact, study committees—and I was a member of two U.N. study committees—are appointed by the Secretary General of the United Nations and one of the things he does when he appoints a study committee is, under the operation of a convention called courtesy to the five permanent members, he asks each of them to nominate somebody to be on the study committee. So, of course, he will ask the PRC to nominate somebody to be on the study committee, if a study committee is formed.

Study committees do not vote. They operate on the basis of consensus. That means anybody in the study committee can say no and that ends the matter because there has to be a consensus. So the study committee is not going to get Taiwan in either.

If an ad hoc study committee cannot do it and if applying as a new member would face a PRC veto, are there alternatives? Of course there are. And Mr. Bolton has alluded to some of them.

The specialized agencies of the United Nations are masters of their own house, just as much as the General Assembly is master of its house. Are there specialized agencies which say you do not have to be a member of the United Nations? Yes, there are. No one would be the least surprised to know that Switzerland is in every specialized agency under the U.N. aegis. Is Switzerland a member of the United Nations? It is not. It has never joined the United Nations. Even mini states like Cook Islands and Tonga, which are not members of the United Nations and indeed are not usually recognized as states, are members of some of these specialized agencies.

Let me give you some other examples. The International Labor Organization allows its general conference to admit members without specifying either statehood or U.N. membership. The World Health Organization nominally requires members to be states but a few years ago was prepared to make an exception in the case of the Palestine Liberation Organization. Why? Because the PLO had the votes to force consideration. That initiative was thwarted at the eleventh hour only because the United States threatened to withdraw from the WHO.

By the way, the director of the World Health Organization has the authority himself, without reference to anything else, to invite any state, member or not, to send a delegate to the World Health Assembly. Both UNESCO and the International Atomic Energy Agency specifically open membership to non-U.N. members. Not only does it not bar countries which are not members of the General Assembly, but the World Meteorological Organization opens membership to non-self-governing territories.

Let me also point out that for 9 years after Taiwan was expelled from the General Assembly, it continued to be a member of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. This proves two things. One, you do not have to be a member of the General Assembly to be a member of the Bank and the Fund. Two, it was in for those 9 years because the United States insisted that it stay in, and the United States has a weighted vote equal to 33 percent of the total vote in those institutions. And if we want to, we can very easily get together the other missing 17 percent and so have 50 percent. Taiwan was turfed out of the Bank and the Fund when we stopped supporting their membership.

Given these facts, I believe the most effective way for Taiwan to elevate its international profile and ultimately to rejoin the General Assembly is by a strategy of working through the specialized agencies to establish a pattern of steady and growing interaction with key parts of the U.N. system and that is totally consistent with H. Con. Res. 63, which I completely support.

Let me give you an example of how this might work. There is an organization called the Special Program for Research and Training in Tropical Diseases, usually called TDR. It is a sub-body which is

controlled by three organizations. It has three fathers: the World Health Organization, the U.N. Development Program and the World Bank. It hosts international conferences. It conducts programs in Latin America, Africa, Asia and the South Pacific. It accepts donations for special purpose funds; for example, a fund for spraying mosquitoes in a country where Malaria is endemic. And when it accepts the donation and establishes the fund, TDR names the fund in honor of the donor and invites it to help administer the fund.

I believe, on the basis of conversations that I have had, that if the ROC were to make a donation to TDR, something which might be called the Taiwan People's Trust Fund for the Eradication of Malaria would be established with the ROC given the ability to nominate respected health professionals to membership on its board of directors. In the normal course of time, those health professionals would be invited to World Health Organization meetings, probably at first only those connected with tropical diseases. But after a time, generally. And because TDR is also the child of the U.N. Development Program and the World Bank, participation in the activity of those agencies becomes a natural consequence as well. And the same pattern could be established in a whole bunch of other agencies. The United Nations Children's Emergency Fund has the same authority. So does the Development Fund for Women.

Now, obviously, the PRC would attempt to block Taiwan's participation. But I suggest that in every case in which a donation of funds for health or development projects in developing nations was blocked by the PRC, Taipei wins friends and Beijing wins enemies.

I think it is also important to understand that the PRC is the beneficiary of these U.N. agencies and it is not a benefactor of any of them. It is not generally understood that the entire annual contribution of the PRC to the whole U.N. system is on the order of \$8 million a year. That is all they give for everything—\$8 million a year.

I should also point out that the PRC is the largest borrower from the World Bank. Now, both the Bank and the IMF are in need of a very substantial recapitalization. Recalling that the ROC remained a member of the bank and the fund for 9 years after being expelled from the General Assembly, understanding that the ROC has more than \$100 billion in foreign exchange reserves and is able and willing to take on the burdens of renewed membership, I suggest that Congress condition any U.S. contribution to recapitalization to a best efforts initiative to seek renewed membership for Taiwan in the Bank and the Fund.

Of course, the PRC is going to object furiously. But I do not know of any case where banks allow borrowers to dictate from whom the bank can draw its funds. If the Taiwan taxpayer is prepared to join the Bank and contribute funds to the PRC, I say, let them do it.

H. Con. Res. 63 is certainly to be supported. It can advance the case but the case can be advanced even more if Taiwan will take the step of working through these specialized agencies.

Most U.N. members are small and poor. You have heard Kent Wiedemann talk about the fact that we have to have PRC cooperation in the Security Council. We need them for denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula. I have not understood why they do not also



need denuclearization since they live a whole a lot closer than we do.

But in any case, most of the members of the U.N. are not members of the Security Council and they do not have those interests at stake. They do not have any recollection of the great Chinese representation battles of the fifties or the sixties and they have little to fear from Beijing's displeasure. If Taiwan assists them in their key concerns, like where their next meal is coming from, they will assist Taiwan.

I ought to end there. Perhaps I will say just one more thing and that is, back in the days when I was in the State Department, I proposed the following mantra: "The United States will not propose a solution to the Taiwan problem. The United States will not oppose a solution to the Taiwan problem. The United States can accept any solution to the Taiwan problem that is acceptable to both sides freely, without coercion of any kind. And when it is in our interest to see Taiwan associated with a U.N. agency such as the bank and the fund or the World Health Organization, the World Meteorological Organization, or any other organization, I think we should support it.

Thank you, Mr Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Feldman appears in the appendix.]

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Dr. Shaw—and I am going to ask our remaining witnesses if they could please summarize their statements so that we will be able to fulfill our panel's obligations before we are called for a vote.

#### **STATEMENT OF YU-MING SHAW, DIRECTOR, INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS NATIONAL CHENGCHI UNIVERSITY**

Mr. SHAW. Thank you, Mr Chairman. After having flown a thousand miles to reach this hall of democracy to—

Chairman GILMAN. And we appreciate your coming and taking part.

Mr. SHAW. I think I will not try to summarize my written statement. I think—

Chairman GILMAN. We will be pleased to put your full statement in the record without objection.

Mr. SHAW. Yes, yes.

But in light of the discussion that has gone on this morning, I am inspired to say the following. I was very much touched by what Congressman Rohrabacher from California said. He has asked the fundamental question. What is the meaning of this great country? What does this country stand for? I think the spirit of the United States as a nation is to be a beacon of freedom and the foreign policy of the United States is to forge peace. And the United Nations was also conceived as an instrument to forge peace actually, at the time, in the 1940's, the consensus of the U.S. Government and its people was that it was a mistake for the United States not to have joined the League of Nations. So this was a second chance for you to construct the United Nations as an instrument for peace. And that is why the U.S. Government and its people donated such a valuable piece of land and spent so much money over the years to

support that organization. I think the United States has an obligation to its people to make that instrument successful. Also, it means that the United States should have a larger voice in resolving this Taiwan representation question, because without the United States, there would not be a United Nations.

We fought a war. That war gave birth to the United Nations. Let us not forget the historical background of the establishment of that organization. That is the first part of what I would like to say today.

Second part is about the Taiwan Relations Act. I am very appreciative of it, and think Taiwan's 21 million people are extremely appreciative. But for the efforts of the Congress of the United States, we would not have this Taiwan Relations Act in its present shape and substance. But I am afraid of what might happen if Taiwan does not become in some way a member of the United Nations, and if 1 day the PRC goes berserk. A week or two ago they fired some missiles 85 miles away from Taiwan. Six months down the road, they may become very unhappy—about something and fire missiles 50 miles north of Taiwan. If 1 day the United States were forced to intervene and fight against a PRC military attempt against Taiwan, you would have to do it all by yourself. But if Taiwan becomes a member of the United Nations, you could bring such a threat to the attention of that world body. You probably could also get overwhelming support for U.S. intervention in such a conflict.

Let us remember history. In 1950, the United States was able to fight on behalf of the United Nations because the Soviet Union was boycotting that organization. But I think that United Nations has changed. United States has changed. The world has changed. If Taiwan is somehow made a part of the United Nations, the United States, together with Taiwan, can really provide much stronger protection for the security of Taiwan in case of a PRC attack against us.

The third part of my testimony, in light of what is being discussed this morning, is that while the State Department, the U.S. Government, has expressed its unwillingness to support our effort to join the United Nations, while it has helped us to join APEC and to become an observer in GATT. But there are many other specialized agencies, such as the World Bank, the IMF, UNICEF, and the WHO. Why has the U.S. Government not done very much to help us become a member of these specialized agencies? I fully support Ambassador Feldman's argument that there are so many things that the State Department can do to help us become a member of these specialized agencies whose membership requirements do not include statehood. So if the U.S. Government finds it impossible to support our membership of the United Nations itself, then the 21 million people on Taiwan would like to see the U.S. Government, together with the U.S. Congress, give us more help in getting into those specialized agencies which in many cases do not include statehood among their membership requirements.

Last, here we are talking about 21 million people, a population larger than three-fifths of the member states of the United Nations. Taiwan is 25th in the world in terms of per capita income; 19th in terms of its GNP; it is the world's 14th largest trading na-

tion; and it is No. 1, or sometimes No. 2, in terms of foreign exchange reserve.

The most sacred part of the United Nations, to me, is the protection of human rights. The human rights of 21 million people's are being violated because they are being denied a chance to participate meaningfully in of world affairs. Even the Secretary General of the United Nations has talked about universal sovereignty. What are the concerns of universal sovereignty Human rights, refugees—these are matters that fall into the realm of universal sovereignty. And such a concept should take precedence over national sovereignty.

Here, therefore, we are dealing with a matter which concerns the human rights of 21 million people who are being denied, on many, many occasions, an opportunity to participate in and to contribute to world affairs. I think this is the fundamental question that we are talking about.

In conclusion, let me emphasize that, regardless of what has happened in political or diplomatic relations between our two countries, this solemn hall of democracy has always been a steadfast friend of the Republic of China. It was the U.S. Congress that made the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 possible. It was also the U.S. Congress that facilitated the visit of our President Lee Teng-hui to his alma mater.

Therefore, I hope that in the same spirit of friendship and support, this great Congress of the United States of America will also enable us to return to the United Nations, an organization for the creation of which we gave not only efforts, but lives. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Shaw appears in the appendix.]

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Shaw, for your very astute testimony and Director Parris Chang, Director of Taiwan Democratic Progressive Party, again, I would urge you to try to summarize your statement since we may be called for a vote very shortly and I would not like to end this so abruptly.

Dr. Chang.

#### STATEMENT OF PARRIS CHANG, DIRECTOR, TAIWAN DEMOCRATIC PROGRESSIVE PARTY

Mr. CHANG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Committee.

Chairman GILMAN. We will be pleased to make your full statement a part of the record without objection.

Mr. CHANG. Yes.

I will summarize my remarks, and I have the written testimony to be placed in the record.

Today I speak both as an expert and as an advocate. In the past quarter of a century, I have taught at Pennsylvania State University the subjects of international organizations, China, Taiwan, and I am now an elected representative of Taiwan. I am a member of the Foreign Relations Committee of Taiwan's Legislative Yuan, and I also head the U.S. mission of Taiwan's opposition party, DPP, Democratic Progressive Party, here in Washington.

Chairman GILMAN. We are pleased to welcome you as a parliamentary colleague.

Mr. CHANG. Yes.

I notice that the Department of State spokesman has misstated or misrepresented facts. Taiwan is an independent country. Taiwan is a sovereign entity and people there do not want to be part of China.

We have come a long way in our struggle and efforts to be master of our own house. Since its founding in 1986, our party has campaigned for Taiwan's membership in the United Nations. The drive has been very popular. As a result, our party has received considerable support from the voters. Currently, our party holds one-third of the seats in our legislature and holds many executive positions in the cities and the counties, including the position of mayor in the capital city, Taipei.

Our party believes that Taiwan ought to be a member of the United Nations, and we believe that China's claim that Taiwan is part of China is false. Since the PRC was established in 1949, it has never exercised any jurisdiction over China ceded Taiwan to Japan in perpetuity in 1895. China has no longer any claim to Taiwan. Taiwan belongs to the 21 million people. So I hope that the western press will no longer repeat the Chinese lies that Taiwan is a renegade province of China. It is not. Taiwan belong to the Taiwanese people.

Unquestionably, Taiwan more than meets the qualifications of membership as stipulated by the U.N. Charter. Our party favors a two-prong strategy. We believe that Taiwan should apply directly as Taiwan through the front door approach and simultaneously seek to join such specialized agencies and related organizations as IMF, the World Bank, WHO and WTO, in a back door approach as Ambassador Harvey Feldman suggested.

Taiwan merits admission into the U.N. as a sovereign state. I think the right of national independence or self-determination enshrined in the U.N. Charter, Articles 1 and 55, should be honored.

We are aware of the PRC veto, yes. But we will persevere in our endeavor to win our rights at the United Nations, regardless of the time it may take. The PRC spent 22 years, finally it got into the U.N. We are prepared also in Taiwan to press our issue every year until China succumbs to United Nations consensus and the pressure of world opinion.

United States support for Taiwan at the U.N. can and will make a difference. The United States can persuade other nations to take concerted action. The PRC has opposed Taiwan's admission to the U.N. on the ground that Taiwan is a part of China and I already stated, we reject that.

China has recently launched a series of ballistic missile test firings just 85 miles from Taiwan for the purpose of intimidating and destabilizing Taiwan. Such tests are a great threat to the security and the stability of Taiwan and East Asia and, as stipulated in the Taiwan Relations Act. Mr. Chairman you are great architect of the Taiwan Relations Act together with former Congressman Lester Wolff, and I testified before the Congress during consideration of the Taiwan Relations Act. I am familiar with the intent of the architects of the Taiwan Relations Act.

China's threat to Taiwan is a great concern to the United States and also an outright violation of the U.N. Charter. Why has the United States been so quiet about such a threat? The State Depart-

ment tenders too much to the wish and the intimidation of the PRC.

President Clinton said that United States should not coddle or appease the Chinese dictatorship. Is the State Department doing just the same?

The United States has been midwife to Taiwan's democratic polity and, in the past, the ceaseless urging by the U.S. Congress and the attentive American public have helped Taiwan move from a one-party dictatorship to a multi-party competitive democracy. The United States can be proud of the part it has played and still plays in Taiwan. As an elected representative of the Taiwanese people, I wish to thank the Congress and President Clinton for allowing President Lee Teng-hui to visit Cornell. Thanks to the PRC protest, President Lee's visit has fulfilled its objectives and really made a great accomplishment. I hope next May after Taiwan's first popularly elected president is inaugurated that the U.S. Congress and Administration will welcome him this time to Washington, D.C.

It is morally right and just for the United States to support Taiwan's U.N. membership. By upholding self-determination, a cardinal principle in international law, the United States will show itself to be the guardian of democracy and human rights. Equally as important, support for Taiwan will serve the American national interest and advance American values as well.

The State Department position, as of now, "one China", is morally blind and politically short-sighted. For the State Department not to support Taiwan's bid to join the U.N. is an outright violation of the Taiwan Relations Act. The "one China" policy initiated in 1972 by President Nixon and still embraced by the State Department today is outdated and out of touch with today's reality in East Asia and does not serve American interests. The Congress can and must take the lead to endorse normalization of relations with Taiwan, and to support Taiwan's U.S. membership, and to compel President Clinton to take heed and abide by the Taiwan Relations Act.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Chang appears in the appendix:]

Chairman GILMAN. Well, I want to thank you, Dr. Chang, for summarizing your statement and for your very forceful presentation. I want to thank all of our panelists.

At this point, I would like to enter into the record Congressman Ackerman's statement to be made part of the record at this point in the record.

Call on my colleagues, Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I would just like to compliment all of the panels today. I enjoyed all of your testimony and, Ambassador Feldman, I certainly appreciated some of your specific suggestions about how to proceed and took them to heart and will hopefully can be maneuvering and doing some of those things you talked about.

Mr. Bolton, we worked together in the Reagan administration. I appreciated your remarks.

In terms of our two representatives from Taiwan, just let me note that obviously there is a parallel interest between both of you, although you represent different parties, in watching out for the security needs of Taiwan and the people on Taiwan and also there

is a dual interest in protecting human rights and democracy and the fact that Taiwan and the 21 million people there are now living in a democracy, you, by doing so, have a brotherhood and sisterhood with all of the rest of us who believe in those concepts.

Let me just note for Mr. Chang, usually the party that wins the election is the one who proclaims what the policy is that is supported by the people and I know that it is easy for—I mean, believe me, I am not coming down on you hard because you won your election. But when your party becomes the majority party as elected by the 21 million people, then you can actually come here and say that the people of Taiwan really believe this and “We want this policy.” But, until then, we have to assume that Mr. Shaw’s position, because his party won the election, is the official position of those 21 million people and whichever one wins, that is what democracy is all about. We are going to pay attention to your point of view, but Dr. Shaw does represent the party that won the election.

Now, you may win the next time around and you may be in Dr. Shaw’s—and, hopefully, there would be amicable feelings between people who win and lose elections. We certainly try to get along with our Democratic colleagues in that way and that is part of democracy, too, is where you get along with people knowing that one party may win the election the next time or vice-versa.

So, with that, I appreciated both of your testimonies and I thank you very much and I take very seriously what is going on with Taiwan because I know that what happens with Taiwan, even if you do not want to be part of China, you are an inspiration to the people of China one way or the other. The great progress that has taken place in Taiwan economically and politically and the fact that two people who disagree can get along, this has been a role model for all of the mainland. And, in fact, with very little space you have produced a great amount of wealth per person. And the people of China know, if they are going to improve their standard of living, they have to have a system more like what has been going on in Taiwan and not what has been practiced and brought forward by the Communists on the mainland. I hope they follow your political reform as well as the economic reform and I appreciate it and thank you very much.

Mr. BEREUTER [presiding.] Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. And I want to join all of my colleagues in thanking all of our witnesses for their effort and for their excellent testimony here before the Committee.

Mr. Gilman wanted to also thank you for your testimony and for your efforts as well. He had to go to another meeting. He did ask me if I would convey a couple of questions that he has in mind and then I would like to move to my own.

One of the questions that he wanted to ask is this—and I invite any of our witnesses to answer—what approach can Taiwan take in its bid to join the U.N.? What is the best approach? And the other related question, should it take a back door approach through membership first in specialized agencies?

Do any of you have any comments upon that series of three related questions?

Mr. Bolton? And then I will come to Ambassador Feldman.

Mr. BOLTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think the best approach is the direct approach. First, political questions in the U.N. system should be decided by the political bodies. This has been the long-standing position of the U.S. Government. For example, when the PLO sought membership in the World Health Organization in 1989, the Bush administration very strongly opposed that on the se /GATTT/ground that the PLO did not meet the test of statehood that was required by the WHO charter. It did not control territory. It did not have a defined population. It did not have a capital city. It did not have a government. It did not meet any of the standard international law definitions of statehood.

And, as a second part of our argument, we argued very strongly that a World Health assembly of physicians and health ministers was not the place to decide a fundamental political question like the status of the PLO. And I think the same argument would be used not just by the United States, although that has been our long-standing position, but by a lot of others to preclude membership as a general proposition in the specialized agencies. The U.N. itself has a general policy endorsed by the United States to decide those sorts of questions in the General Assembly, although it should be said that each specialized agency's charter is somewhat different and you would have to look at each on a case-by-case basis.

I would also say that the IMF and the World Bank, although technically part of the U.N. system, should be considered separately from that question because they have functioned independently, again, consistent with U.S. policy, essentially from the beginning. So when we talk about the specialized agencies, we are leaving out GATT/WTO, IMF, and the World Bank. We are talking about FAO, WHO, ITU, that long list. I think that the approach of going through the specialized agencies is the equivalent of a Wilderness Campaign that would ultimately fail because it would not have U.S. support. I would say, regrettable though it may be, it is critical for Taiwan in getting U.N. representation to have U.S. support.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Bolton, thank you very much. By the way, I would say in your effort to be helpful to the Committee you gave a brief summary statement and I would just say that your paper is a very important scholarly and historical perspective on the issue and I very much appreciate it. I know the Committee does.

Mr. BOLTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BEREUTER. Ambassador Feldman?

Mr. FELDMAN. Yes.

As you know, on the basis of my previous testimony, I disagree with Assistant Secretary Bolton's statement. I disagree because there are, as I have said, a number of organizations which are open to non-U.N. members and there is no reason why Taiwan could not be in those organizations. I cited the World Meteorological Organization which says you can even be a non-self-governing territory and still be a member of the World Meteorological Organization.

Now, Mr. Bolton has just said that we take the line that political questions should be decided in the General Assembly and that certainly is true. But I do not understand why membership in the

World Meteorological Organization for Taiwan is a political question.

Let me give you another example. Taiwan has three operating nuclear reactors, nuclear power reactors, and is about to have a fourth. The statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency does not restrict membership in IAEA to members of the General Assembly. It makes every sense to me that, as a simple, practical matter, Taiwan should be in IAEA.

Now, as Mr. Bolton has said, this is not going to happen in most of these agencies unless the United States is prepared to support it. My answer to that is, yes, that is certainly true so why doesn't the United States support it?

The answer will be, this is going to overload the circuits with Beijing. To which I can only say, do we expect that they will sell nuclear technology to rogue states? Well, they are already doing that. Will they export missiles to the volatile Middle East? Well, they are already doing that. What U.S. interest is it that they do not now compromise that we think they will compromise if we say there is no reason why Taiwan cannot attend a meeting of the World Health Assembly?

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Ambassador.

Dr. Shaw, I see your hand.

Mr. SHAW. Thank you very much for the opportunity to answer this question.

I think that the whole question hinges upon the decision of the State Department. Without the American Government's support, we could not have entered APEC. Without American Government support, we could never stay on in the World Bank and the IMF almost 7 years after we left the United Nations.

The PRC has publicly announced it will not interfere in our cultural and economic activities of a non-political nature. Institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF are purely economic organization, and the WHO, the UNESCO are agencies of a cultural and economic nature more than anything else. So if the United States can mobilize its friends, I think there is a way for us to get into these organizations. Otherwise, on our own with only 30 nations recognizing us, it would be almost impossible for us to join them. It is really up to the U.S. Congress to convince the U.S. government that it is proper, it will serve the national interests of the United States for our 21 million people to be represented in these economic and cultural organizations. Then Taiwan's international stature will rise, and when our national security is endangered, it will be easier for the United States to mobilize world opinion to help us. Otherwise, with only the Taiwan Relations Act, you would have to intervene alone.

I think that the very existence of the Taiwan Relations Act binds our security destinies together. So whatever is good for us, in many ways, is also good for you in matters of security. Therefore, the more internationally involved Taiwan becomes, the better, the easier for the United States, to mobilize support when Taiwan's security is endangered, and the easier it would be for the United States to implement your policy toward Taiwan.

Thank you.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you.



Dr. Chang?

Mr. CHANG. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Briefly, we favor a dual strategy—a direct approach to apply to the U.N. as a new state and also, at the same time, to try to get into specialized agencies. We would not merely focus on specialized agencies as Ambassador Harvey Feldman has suggested.

A few years ago, our government did consider such an option but shelved it because it is considered too conservative and too slow. I think people in Taiwan want to get into the United Nation, and we will knock on the door every year until we get in. We will not take no for an answer.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much for the variety of responses and I think it is a helpful array of responses.

I would just comment, Ambassador Feldman, in your earlier statement you talked about the conditioning of our contributions, our replenishment contributions, to the multilateral development banks and your argument may have been for effect or rhetorical but I can assure you that, having served 10 years as a ranking member of the Banking Subcommittee that oversees our contribution and our participation, it is not possible to condition our contributions. It has been tried many times for many reasons and you either give the money or you do not give the money. Now, we do not have to give the money, but that is not conditioning.

On the other hand, if you were making the point that we can have influence, we assuredly can have influence in a variety of ways, even if we are down to 15 percent or 17 percent of our contribution to World Bank now. But I take your point in a more general sense and the points that you gave and all of your responses.

Ambassador?

Mr. FELDMAN. Yes, sir. What I really meant was that there is no reason why the United States should not, it seems to me, should not work actively and that is what I meant by conditioning. I did not mean that we have to say to the bank and the fund, "We will not give you this unless . . ." but rather that the Congress should instruct the State Department to work actively for Taiwan's Bank and Fund membership. It as pointed out, I believe, by Chairman Solomon at the very, very beginning of today's long session, that this is provided for in the Taiwan Relations Act itself.

Mr. BEREUTER. All right.

Mr. FELDMAN. And, of course, we cannot help noticing the citation of Section 3(c) which was referred to by Chairman Gilman.

If you will permit me, sir, when he cited 3(c), I could not help recalling that during the debate on the Taiwan Relations Act—and I was here, sir—I was the State Department representative at that time during the debate on the Taiwan Relations Act—during the debate, Representative Broomfield, who was then the ranking Republican member of this Committee under its former name, said that what this statement means is that the President of the United States should not wait until there is an actual crisis but that when there is a foreseeable crisis the President of the United States should inform the Congress. That just popped back into my mind when that was being discussed.

Thank you, sir.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Ambassador.

I would have repeated your mantra if you had not orally given it that I find on page 9. But let me ask you this, wouldn't an American initiative to seat Taiwan in the U.N. violate your principle that the U.S. should not propose solutions to Taiwan problems; that any solution to the Taiwan problem must be acceptable to both Taiwan and Beijing?

Mr. FELDMAN. No, sir. I do not think so.

Mr. BEREUTER. Why not?

Mr. FELDMAN. Because what is referred to there is the ultimate solution of the question of Taiwan's relationship to China and that is something that I believe strongly the United States should not get in the middle of. That is something for the people themselves to decide.

But, having said that, when it is in our interest to have Taiwan associated with the Bank and the Fund, just as we decided it was in our interest to have Taiwan associated with the Asian Development Bank, my answer would be, why not? And if Taiwan can make a contribution to developing countries through UNDP or UNICEF or the World Health Organization or the Food and Agriculture Organization, my answer is again, why not? This is no more determinative of the ultimate relationship between those two parties than having East Germany in the World Health Organization—and it was a member of the World Health Organization before it became a member of the General Assembly.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you.

I have one more question that I need to ask and I think, as far as I am concerned, it is one of the more important questions. Perhaps then we could conclude the hearing, unless the gentleman has further—

Would you have further comment? I will come back to you if you do.

This is the question we had asked before of Secretary Wiedemann. Your opinions, gentlemen, of the reactions and actions of the People's Republic of China if there is a House passage of H. Con. Res. 63. I did not say enactment, I just said House passage. Enactment, perhaps, would have a more profound effect. But what if the House took the action to pass H. Con. Res. 63 as it is laid upon the table at the moment?

Who would like to be brave enough to volunteer?

Mr. BOLTON. I would be happy to.

I think there will be a lot of rhetoric and a lot of heat and not much light. I do not think their fundamental positions would change. I do not think they can afford to change. And I think that, in any event, it is important for them to have to calculate when the United States has an important interest, such as supporting Taiwan's representation in the U.N.

It is one thing to argue about the tactics and strategy about how you go about it. It is quite another thing for the United States to state clearly to the world what our position is. That is something we have to state based on our assessment of our own interests. When we come to the tactical stage, we can calibrate how we go about it and what others think and so on and so forth. But for us to be less than forthright about what we think our own position is because of the feared reaction of another government, I just think

it is fundamentally inconsistent with our own long-term national interest.

Mr. BEREUTER. I believe you were fairly specific about your suggesting whether or not we should in your paper but I was asking for reaction which you gave me, and I appreciate it.

I will go right down the line and we will finish up.

Dr. Shaw first, if you want to react.

Mr. SHAW. Yes.

I think that the PRC would react somewhat strongly but we have to think about U.S. relations with the PRC on both an, immediate and a long-term basis. We have to educate them. They misread American democracy, so they thought President Lee's visit would not take place. But then the case was overturned by the overwhelming force sentiment in the Congress as well as in the press. So the Clinton administration switched its position. That testifies to the workings of American Democracy.

Now, I think that the great tradition of this Congress is that it represents the will of the people. Resolution 63, in my understanding, probably does not have binding force. Am I right?

Mr. BEREUTER. That is correct. It is a Sense of the Congress.

Mr. SHAW. Right.

I think that if it truly represents the sentiments of the Congress, let it pass. That at least will make the PRC understand that the separation of power, but the Congress represents the will of the people, has a right to express the will of the people. Otherwise, in the future they will not know how to respect the consensus of the Congress. So it is very educational in the long run. Therefore, I would not take their reaction too seriously.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Dr. Shaw. We certainly do have the right to express ourself from the Congress. We also have a responsibility, when we are involving ourself in foreign policy, to be very careful that the actions that we take are responsible actions.

Dr. Chang, did you wish to comment?

Mr. CHANG. Yes.

Mr. Chairman, Beijing certainly would not welcome the passage of such a resolution. They are going to be very angry in their reaction, but a lot of rhetoric, that is all. I think the United States by passing, approving such a resolution can tell China that American policy is made in Washington, not made in Beijing because China cannot dictate American diplomatic action. And, certainly, China should not try to dictate which country should be admitted into the U.N. Taiwan is a sovereign entity, not part of China, the Chinese leadership should be clearly instructed.

Mr. BEREUTER. Dr. Chang, do you feel—if I may just slip in another question—do you feel that in general the relationships between Taipei and Beijing are more positive as a general trend?

Mr. CHANG. No. It is going to get worse in the next year or so because Taiwan is going to have legislative elections this December and Presidential election next March. Taiwan, as an independent entity, is going to be institutionalized and the whole world will notice that. Beijing will not like to see Taiwan elect its own president. Guangdong Province, Sutrane Province, however populous they are, they do not elect a president. Only an independent country elects its own president. So Beijing will not like to see this kind of devel-

opment, and President Lee's position, the Kuomintang position is going to be closer and closer to the DPP. We really speak for the people of Taiwan. We are really the true voice of Taiwanese people.

Mr. BEREUTER. I hope that pessimistic forecast is not true because it is a contrast, it seems to me, to the general trend, the last month or so being an exception.

Ambassador Feldman, just to repeat the question, the passage of H. Con. Res. 63 by the House, the reaction or actions you would think it would cause from Beijing.

Mr. FELDMAN. Sir, I think that the PRC is sophisticated enough by now to understand the difference between a Sense of the Congress resolution and legislative action so they will reply with very, very strong rhetoric, but only rhetoric.

I believe it is important that the PRC understand, entirely aside from whatever rhetoric that they come up with, that they understand the context within which America's China policy has to operate and that they understand more clearly than they do now, apparently, the sentiments on the Hill and among the American people in favor of democracy. This is, regardless of what they say, regardless of however much they may denounce us, it is important that they understand these things.

There is a danger, however, and the danger is this. The danger will be, assuming that the resolution is enacted, the next step for the PRC would be to demand assurances from the State Department that it would not be put into practice and therein lies the danger. I hardly need be more specific about what is likely to happen if those assurances are demanded.

Mr. BEREUTER. Ambassador, thank you very much.

I want to say to all of you on behalf of the Committee and myself personally, I know that you have come here at some substantial cost, effort, sacrifice, for sharing your comments with the Committee. It is very greatly appreciated. Thank you very much.

We are going to adjourn. The committee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:45 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

# APPENDIX

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Statement by Representative Gerald B. Solomon  
to the Committee on International Relations

August 3, 1995

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee,

I appreciate very much the opportunity to appear before you today, here in the Committee where I served with so many of you for so many years.

It is good to be back, and I often wish I could come back. I have very fond memories of serving here.

My purpose for being here today is to discuss with you House Concurrent Resolution 63, which expresses the sense of Congress that "Taiwan deserves full participation, including a seat, in the United Nations and its related agencies."

Mr. Chairman and Members, the Taiwan success story is increasingly well-known and admired throughout the world -- it certainly does not need to be recited at length in the Committee.

Suffice it to say that what was an impoverished and neglected island as recently as 45 years ago is home today to the 19th largest economy in the world. Japan is the only larger country in all of Asia that has a higher per capita income than Taiwan.

But economic indicators are not the whole story.

Perhaps even more impressive is the political development in Taiwan, a process which has led to the establishment of multiparty democracy and which will culminate next March when a new president will be elected by direct popular vote.

Given Taiwan's extraordinary success, and given Taiwan's commercial and cultural relations with more than 100 nations, it perhaps should not be too surprising to learn that the government and many of the people in Taiwan are seeking recognition for a greater position in the international community.

And so the issue of membership in the United Nations has been raised.

This issue is all the more poignant when one remembers that the Republic of China was the very first signatory to the United Nations Charter at the famous San Francisco Conference in June of 1945.

Mr. Chairman and Members, separate and differently worded sense of Congress resolutions supporting membership for Taiwan in the United Nations were introduced in the 103rd Congress.

But it was neither possible nor appropriate to go forward with the consideration of either resolution in the last Congress in the absence of a consensus in Taiwan itself on how best to proceed.

All of that has now changed.

House Concurrent Resolution 63, which is before the Committee now, is the product of a strenuous negotiation that I helped to mediate earlier this year.

I believe the wording of this resolution has been welcomed and supported by both the government and the opposition!

I am told that House Concurrent Resolution 63 marks the first time in the history of Taiwan's democracy that the government and the opposition have reached a common position - by consensus -- on a sensitive foreign policy issue.

And so I am very pleased with how the wording of this resolution turned out. I believe it can speak for itself.

I would simply draw attention to a couple of whereas clauses that touch on points of special sensitivity at the present time.

First, "Taiwan has repeatedly stated that its participation in international organizations is one of parallel representation without prejudice to the current status of mainland China in the international community and does not represent a challenge to that status."

Ans second, "the decision of the United States to establish diplomatic relations with mainland China, as expressed in the Taiwan Relations Act, is based 'upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means.'"

I believe it is especially appropriate to reiterate that latter point -- which I am sure is self-evident to every person in this room.

The political future of Taiwan is for Taiwan for decide.

But the United States, and all democratic countries, have a vital interest at stake in seeing Taiwan's future decided in a peaceful -- and I might add, democratic -- way.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman and members, I would like to say that House Concurrent Resolution 63 is result of a genuine bipartisan effort.

This resolution enjoys broad bipartisan support.

And I would like to thank several members of this Committee who were particularly instrumental and supportive in the development of thos resolution:

Dan Burton, from the Republican side of the aisle.

And from the Democratic side: Bob Torricelli, Tom Lantos, and Gary Ackerman.

Thank you all very much for your time and attention.

TESTIMONY BY KENT WIEDEMANN  
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE  
FOR  
EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS  
  
BEFORE  
HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE  
  
AUGUST 3, 1995

TAIWAN AND THE UNITED NATIONS

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I welcome the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss one of the United States' most important relationships in Asia. We may have only unofficial ties with the people of Taiwan, but I will describe today a relationship that has strengthened and prospered under a unique set of circumstances. I will explain why the Administration cannot support Taiwan's participation in the UN, and the Administration's view that only by maintaining the unofficial character of our ties with Taiwan can we ensure that the people of Taiwan and the U.S. continue to enjoy a stable and peaceful future.

The "One China" Policy

I would like to begin by reviewing U.S. policy toward Taiwan. Our policy is often described simply as "one China," but too rarely is the full definition of this position set out. The key elements of our policy are as follows:

Since 1979, the United States has recognized the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China.

Since 1972, the U.S. has acknowledged the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China. The Reagan Administration, in 1982, clarified that the U.S. has no intention of pursuing a policy of "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan."

Within this context, the people of the U.S. will maintain cultural, commercial and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.

The U.S. has consistently held that resolution of the Taiwan issue is a matter to be worked out by the Chinese themselves. Our sole and abiding concern is that the resolution be peaceful.

These elements of our policy are set out in the three joint U.S.-PRC communiques of 1972, 1979 and 1982, and the legal framework for our unofficial relations with Taiwan is provided



by the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. The Act also stipulates that the U.S. will make available to Taiwan such defensive arms as necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. The Clinton Administration is committed to fully implementing this and all other elements of the Taiwan Relations Act, which is consistent with the three communiques. In our view, the TRA and the 1982 communique are complementary, both serving our goal of maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait area.

The foundations of our China policy have been supported by six administrations of both parties. All administrations since 1972 have shared these basic objectives: peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait area; constructive engagement with China; continuation of strong economic and cultural relations with the people of Taiwan; and peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue by the Chinese people. This "one China" policy has worked exceptionally well, and has enabled us to achieve progress toward all of our objectives. I will briefly discuss that progress.

### Peace and Stability

First, peace and stability. Without a doubt, our China policy has been a key factor in the reduction of tensions in the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan's defense capability is as strong as it has ever been. We cannot overlook the recent PRC missile exercise near Taiwan -- which is clearly not helpful to a peaceful and stable atmosphere in the Strait -- but we do not believe China poses an imminent military threat to Taiwan. In fact, we believe Taiwan has never been more secure.

What has this meant for the people of Taiwan, and for our relations with them? A great deal, in both political and economic terms.

The shift from a belligerent to a peaceful and stable climate in the Strait has had a direct impact on Taiwan's tremendous political transformation. Martial law was ended on Taiwan in 1987, setting the stage for democracy. In 1992, the Legislature was directly elected by the people of Taiwan, and the second election will be held in December. Last year the governor of Taiwan Province and the mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung were, for the first time, directly elected. This movement toward democracy will culminate next year with the first direct presidential election.

Peace and stability in the Strait also created the foundation for Taiwan's economic miracle. The people of Taiwan now enjoy an average annual income of US\$ 11,600 -- up from less than \$2,000 in 1979. Taiwan holds about one hundred billion dollars in foreign exchange, the second highest reserve level after Japan. Taiwan is a major force in the global high-tech market, as a producer of PCs and the world's largest supplier of computer monitors. Just over 25 years ago, the U.S. was providing aid to Taiwan. Now, Taiwan is an important aid donor to others.

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Another objective of our China policy is engagement with China. In recent testimony, Assistant Secretary Winston Lord and I have described the importance of the President's policy of pursuing a constructive, cooperative relationship with the PRC. Our strategic goal is to help China integrate further into the international community, and to encourage it to accept both the benefits and obligations that come with interdependence and cooperation. Under the engagement strategy, this Administration has secured China's cooperation on security issues such as North Korea, Cambodia, the NPT, narcotics trafficking, alien smuggling, and regional security dialogues. We have also reached important economic agreements. At the same time, we have had ongoing problems in other areas, notably human rights where the situation is distressing and disturbing. We hope to overcome our current difficulties and to make progress in this very important relationship.

### Cross-Strait Relations

Mr. Chairman, I would also like to focus today on another important relationship, the ties between Taiwan and China. These ties have grown at a phenomenal pace during the last two and one-half years. New exchanges in the fields of commerce, science and culture take place virtually every week. This year, trade across the Strait is expected to reach almost \$20 billion, nearly double the level of 1992. China may this year replace the U.S. as Taiwan's largest export market. Since 1987, Taiwan is estimated to have invested more than \$20 billion in the mainland. Delegations from academic and business communities cross the Strait for meetings, and nuclear scientists from the mainland have visited Taiwan to discuss power plant operation and disposal of low-level waste. Taiwan residents may take as many as 1.5 million trips to the mainland this year. Last month's PRC missile exercise may have slowed, at least temporarily, the pace of these exchanges, but they are expected to continue because they are in the interests of both sides. China recently suspended high-level meetings of the unofficial cross-Strait dialogue, indicating that this was tied to Lee Teng-hui's private visit to the U.S. We urge that these meetings resume soon.

Given Taiwan's important role in the global economy, it strikes some as anachronistic that the U.S. -- and all but 30 countries around the world -- maintain only unofficial relations with Taipei. I agree that it is an unusual, indeed unique relationship. The key point is that our policy works.

### US-Taiwan Ties

Let me quickly review the extent of our unofficial relationship with Taiwan:

- U.S. economic ties with Taiwan have grown stronger since 1979. Taiwan is our seventh largest trading partner. It is the fifth largest importer of U.S.

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agricultural products. We have a \$10 billion trade deficit with Taiwan, but that has declined from the high of \$17 billion in 1987. Cumulative U.S. investment in Taiwan now stands at over \$5 billion, representing a quarter of all foreign investment there.

- We are selling to Taiwan the material necessary for it to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability, consistent with the TRA and the 1982 joint communique with China.
- Under the auspices of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) -- our unofficial link to Taipei -- senior Administration officials regularly meet with Taiwan representatives. Most recently, Under Secretary Summers and his Taiwan counterpart met, at Treasury, to discuss a broad range of economic issues.
- AIT has signed 90 agreements with its Taiwan counterpart. These agreements call for U.S.-Taiwan cooperation on issues such as protection for the environment and endangered species, protection for copyrights, textile trade, safeguards for nuclear power plants, and disease prevention.
- Cultural ties have also expanded. In 1981, AIT processed about 70,000 nonimmigrant visas. Last year, there were more than 300,000. More than 37,000 Taiwan students are in the U.S., and American institutions are the top choice for Taiwan's post-graduate students. (By now, everyone knows that Lee Teng-hui earned a Ph.D. at Cornell.) Complementing that flow, more than 25,000 Americans are living in Taiwan.
- We have actively supported Taiwan's membership in international economic organizations open to entities other than states. For example, we ensured that Taiwan, under the name "Chinese Taipei," is a member of APEC. We are also strongly supporting Taiwan's accession to the WTO.

All of this adds up to an unofficial relationship that is closer, and more productive than the official, diplomatic ties we have with many countries. Our current China policy has made this possible.

#### Taiwan and the UN

The question before us today is, should the U.S. support Taiwan's participation in the United Nations, and can it do so without harm to its highly successful policy of the past 16 years? The Administration's answer is, no. Let me be clear. The U.S. could accept any solution to this issue which is

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consistent with the UN Charter and is agreed upon by the people on both sides of the Strait. Until Taiwan and the PRC reach such an agreement, however, we believe that no good, and considerable harm, would come from U.S. support of Taiwan's participation in the UN. We should not seek to insert the U.S. into the middle of this issue.

Let's look at this question from a practical perspective. Last year, 12 countries supported a UN resolution for Taiwan participation. The UN General Committee dropped it without a vote. This year, 15 countries support a similar resolution: Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, Costa Rica, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Guatemala, Nicaragua, the Niger, Panama, Solomon Islands and Swaziland.

Outside of these co-sponsors, there is almost no support for the resolution among UN members, and China has made clear its intention to block or veto UN consideration of the Taiwan issue. With a permanent seat on the Security Council, China can accomplish this.

Even if a motion for Taiwan participation in the UN is an effort doomed to fail, why shouldn't the U.S. lend its support? U.S. support for this Pyrrhic effort would come at great cost to our relations with China. Support for Taiwan participation in the UN, an organization of states, would contradict our policy, since 1979, of recognizing the PRC as the sole legal government of China. The PRC has said it would view U.S. support as our abandoning one of the most fundamental elements of the U.S.-China relationships, an element reaffirmed by the commitment in 1982, under President Reagan, not to pursue a policy of "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan." It is important to note that Taiwan continues to have a "one China" policy.

U.S. support for Taiwan's UN effort could also jeopardize China's support for a broad range of important issues in the UN -- issues of importance to the American people, such as democracy building in Haiti and stability on the Korean peninsula. Without Chinese cooperation, the UN would be significantly weakened.

Most importantly, U.S. support for Taiwan participation in the UN would jeopardize peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. We would put at risk the economic and political progress achieved by the people of Taiwan. We would also risk the growing peaceful exchanges between Taiwan and the mainland, exchanges that benefit people on both sides of the Strait.

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In the end, our support for an effort that clearly will not succeed could put at risk U.S. interests in the Strait area, as well as the interests of the people of Taiwan. Until Taipei and Beijing can reach agreement on this issue, supporting Taiwan participation in the UN is not in the U.S. national interest, and we believe it is also not in the interest of the people of Taiwan, nor the people of the entire region, who would not benefit from a destabilized situation.

So, where do we go from here? As I stated at the outset of my testimony, we continue to maintain that the question of Taiwan's relationship to the PRC is an issue to be resolved by the Chinese people themselves. Our abiding interest is that the resolution come about peacefully. This will obviously not happen overnight. We urge Beijing and Taipei to continue patiently the talks and economic interchange that they have successfully initiated. This -- not U.S. support for a quixotic resolution in the UN -- is the way toward a secure and prosperous future for the people of Taiwan.

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

THE QUESTION OF TAIWAN AND THE UNITED NATIONS

Statement by Harvey J. Feldman  
US Ambassador, retired

August 3, 1995

### In Search of a Way In

In 1971, when the ROC was expelled by Resolution 2758, and the PRC's representatives seated as "the only legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations," the issue was framed as a matter of accepting or denying the credentials of competing delegations. The General Assembly is master of its house and arrangements, and in such cases can decide which delegation to seat. In fact, competing claims of separate delegations, each insisting it is the only legitimate representative of a country, have been nothing new at the General Assembly either before the ROC was expelled or since. There have been, to cite only a few examples, the cases of Hungary in 1956, Cuba in 1960, Grenada in 1984, and Cambodia throughout the 1980s.

The case of the ROC and Chinese representation was different because it had been pursued in successive Assemblies for more than two decades and because in 1971 the United States had lobbied in favor of a resolution that would maintain a seat for Taiwan in the General Assembly while seating the PRC in that body. (The question of Security Council representation could not be pursued in the General Assembly but presumably would -- and did -- track with what took place in the Assembly). But the American attempt to make the issue an "Important Question", requiring a two-thirds majority, was defeated 55-59-15 and, with Resolution 2758 adopted, the dual representation resolution was considered to be overtaken and so was never put to a vote. The chance that the General Assembly might go on record as intending to seat both Chinese entities pending reunification or some other solution, was lost.

At that time, in 1971, there were indeed two delegations each claiming to be the legitimate representatives of the only lawful government of China. But that is no longer the case. The PRC continues to make that claim but the ROC does not. Instead, the ROC now speaks of two political authorities of equal validity and equal claim to international personality and UN representation -- consciously attempting to recall the German precedent.

In calling for the United Nations to extend membership to Taiwan, both the government and Taiwan's leading parliamentary opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party or DPP, have relied heavily on the matter of equity. Both have emphasized the injustice of denying representation to Taiwan's 21 million people. Both have attacked as unfounded Beijing's claim that since Taiwan was simply a province of the PRC and not a country, it was represented by the delegation sitting behind the nameplate "China" and could have no other form of representation. Both have emphasized that Taiwan's economic dynamism and full coffers could benefit the UN and its work. Both have pointed to such supposed precedents as membership for Byelorussia and Ukraine while still members of the Soviet Union, as well as membership for the two German and two Korean states.

The DPP continues to emphasize the equity argument, while pointing out that the PRC has never ruled in Taiwan. Some in the DPP add a legalistic argument, pointing out that imperial China, in the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki, ceded Taiwan to Japan in perpetuity; that later, in the Peace Treaty of 1952, Japan gave up Taiwan but did not bestow it upon China or any other country. The argument is interesting, but hardly settles the issue.

It does not settle the issue because there is no court which will decide Taiwan's status on the basis of legal arguments. The question of UN General Assembly membership is a political one, to be settled by political means with the Assembly itself. Most important of all, decisions taken by one General Assembly can be amended or nullified by subsequent Assemblies. It is entirely possible, therefore, that some future General Assembly could decide to amend Resolution 2758 and seat an ROC delegation while maintaining a seat for the PRC.

The opposition DPP wants the government to apply to admission as a new member called Taiwan. Of course this would run right into a PRC veto since the General Assembly can consider the application of a new member only after receiving a favorable recommendation from the Security Council in which Beijing holds a veto. But this is less important to the DPP than establishing the principle of separate nationhood.

The government has taken a different course. In successive assemblies since 1993, it has called for the creation of an ad hoc committee to report to the General Assembly about the special case of Taiwan. The government has hoped that the committee and much of the Assembly to which it reported, swayed by the equity arguments, would then make a political decision to grant representation. Beyond that, the ad hoc committee initiative allows the government to make the public argument that the DPP talks about joining the UN but its proposals are impractical; meanwhile the government is taking real action to promote Taiwan's case.

In fact government's action is no more likely to be effective than the DPP's prescription of applying as a new member. This because ad hoc study committees are appointed either by the President of the General Assembly or by the Secretary General of the United Nations. They normally have 17 to 20 members and are to be formed "with due regard for regional representation," which has come to mean a balance of East and West European and Third World countries plus significant membership from the Non-Aligned Group. Most important of all, under the operation of an informal convention known as "courtesy to the permanent members," each of the five permanent members is given an opportunity to place one of its nationals on the ad hoc committee, and that of course includes the PRC.

It is interesting that both times the ad hoc committee proposal has come before the General Committee, the PRC has used its clout to keep the item off the agenda. Since ad hoc committees normally work on the basis of consensus, one might believe a better strategy would be for Beijing to allow the formation of the study committee, sit on the committee and use its leverage with the Non-Aligned Group to steer it toward the conclusion that Taiwan has no case for membership. Apparently, in Beijing's view, even allowing a UN study committee to look into the matter would be an intolerable interference in what it claims to be a domestic affair, without regard to the conclusion the committee might reach.

### Going for the Brass Ring

If the ad hoc committee route is unlikely to achieve a positive result, and if an application



as a new member would face a PRC veto, are there alternatives which might do better? In fact there are.

Part of the mythology that surrounds the United Nations is the idea that the General Assembly gathers together the world's most brilliant minds to consider the globe's problems and, on the basis of logic and moral purpose, make wise decisions. In fact, the General Assembly, as the name tells us, is a legislature and it operates as any legislature does -- by log-rolling and alliances of convenience. Just as the American Congress is made up of political parties, so the General Assembly has its own equivalent: regional or affinity clubs like the Islamic Conference or the Organization of African Unity; economic interest groups like the Group of 77 or the Non-Aligned Movement. Arguments based on equity may sway some. Precedent can help construct a rationalization for an action which the Assembly wishes to take but which is deemed controversial. But what counts in the General Assembly is the ability to put together a coalition of more than 50% of those present and voting in an "ordinary question," and 66% in the case of an "important question."

The most effective way back to the General Assembly, in fact the only way back, would be to create a voting bloc that in the fullness of time would be large enough to amend Resolution 2758 in such a way as to enable the ROC to be seated in the Assembly and throughout the UN system.

After Resolution 2758 was adopted, the then Secretary General of the United Nations, Kurt Waldheim, wrote to the various organs and agencies within the UN family suggesting that they follow the example of the General Assembly and expel Taiwan's representatives. He cited General Assembly resolution 396 of 1950 which recommends that whenever more than one authority claims to be the government entitled to UN representation, other UN bodies should take into account the General Assembly's decision on the matter.

Waldheim could only suggest they do this because each specialized agency is master of its own house, just as the General Assembly is, and sets its own rules for membership or association. In some cases the specialized agency took action to expel the ROC delegates and replace them with PRC representatives within a matter of months. In other cases it took years. In fact, the ROC maintained membership in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund until May 1980, almost nine years after being expelled from the General Assembly. Indeed, had the US with its weighted one-third vote continued to work actively to preserve ROC membership, the ROC probably would not then have been expelled either.

*The key point is, non-membership in the General Assembly is not necessarily a bar to membership in other bodies related directly or indirectly to the UN system.*

A few examples. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund open membership to "countries" and do not specify that they be "states members" of the United Nations. Several non-UN members are members of the Bank and Fund, Switzerland being the most prominent. Hong Kong, which is not a country, participates in their work.

The International Labor Organization allows its General Conference to admit members without specifying statehood or UN membership as a requirement.

The World Health Organization nominally requires members to be "states", but a few years ago was prepared to make an exception in the case of the PLO -- because the PLO had to the votes to arrange it. The initiative was thwarted at the eleventh hour by a US threat to withdraw from the organization if the PLO was admitted. Since the US pays one-quarter of the WHO bill, the threat was effective.

Both UNESCO and the International Atomic Energy Agency specifically open membership to non-UN members.

Not only does it not bar countries which are not members of the United Nations General Assembly, the World Meteorological Organization also opens membership to non-self governing territories.

In addition, most UN agencies invite non-member states or representatives of certain other governmental or intergovernmental organizations to "observe" their proceedings. This is usually done by majority vote in the agency's assembly or governing body. The Director General of the World Health Organization on his or her own authority can extend an invitation to attend the World Health Assembly.

Given these facts, I believe the most effective way for Taiwan to elevate its international profile and ultimately rejoin the General Assembly is by a strategy of working through specialized agencies and certain intergovernmental bodies to establish a pattern of steady and growing ROC interaction in key parts of the UN system. In this way, UN members become accustomed to working with the ROC, and Taiwan can demonstrate the ways in which it can help the world community, and especially the developing countries. The good will thus earned helps to build the bloc of votes necessary to amend 2758.

To show how this might work, take as an example the Special Program for Research and Training in Tropical Diseases (TDR). TDR is a sub-body controlled by three organizations -- the World Health Organization, the UN Development Program and the World Bank. It hosts international conferences and conducts programs in Latin America, Africa, Asia and the South Pacific. It accepts donations to establish specific purpose funds, for example a fund for spraying mosquitos in countries where malaria is a serious problem. When it establishes such a fund, TDR normally names the fund in honor of the donor country and invites it to help administer the fund and oversee its work.

If the ROC were to make such a donation, something which might be called the "Taiwan people's Trust Fund for the Eradication of Malaria" could be established, with the ROC nominating respected health professionals to membership on its board of directors. In the normal way, those or other Taiwan health professionals would be invited to WHO meetings -- at first probably only those connected with tropical diseases, but over the course of time to WHO meetings generally, including those of the World Health Assembly. Because TDR is also the

child of UNDP and the World Bank, participation in the activities of those agencies becomes a natural consequence as well. It is easily foreseeable that within five or so years, Taiwan would be participating in WHO activities across the board, and associated in similar fashion with many World Bank and UNDP projects.

The same donor fund pattern could be used in several other UN agencies, for example the Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) or the Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM). Moreover, while a UN effort that depends upon the US for assistance runs into the theology and complex balances of Washington's China policy, following this path does not depend upon the patronage of America or any other power. Taiwan can do it itself, choosing its targets with care and employing its economic muscle to maximum effect.

Obviously the PRC would object and seek to block Taiwan's efforts. But every case in which donation of funds for health or other projects important to developing nations is blocked by PRC protest, Taipei would win friends and Beijing enemies.

Also, it is important to note that the PRC is a beneficiary rather than a benefactor of UN agency activity. The entire contribution of the PRC to the United Nations amounts only to about \$8 million a year.

I should point out that the PRC is also the largest borrower from the World Bank. Both the Bank and the International Monetary Fund are in need of substantial re-capitalization. Recalling that the ROC remained a member of both the Bank and the Fund for almost nine years after being expelled from the General Assembly, and that the ROC has more than \$100 billion in foreign exchange reserves and is both able and willing to take on the burdens of renewed membership, I suggest that Congress condition any US contribution to re-capitalization to renewed membership for Taiwan.

Naturally the PRC will object furiously. But since when do banks allow borrowers to dictate from whom the bank can draw its funds? Why should the American taxpayer have to make loan funds available to Beijing when Taiwan's taxpayers are prepared to do so?

### So Why Not?

If there are UN agencies which are prepared to work with the ROC - and there are -- why has the ROC government not followed this approach? If the study committee gambit cannot succeed, why does the government persist in it?

The pattern of political life in Taiwan has become even more complex and hectic than here in the United States. Taiwan has had a major election in each of the past few years, and will again this year with parliamentary elections and in 1996 when the president of the republic for the first time is elected by direct popular vote. ROC politicians, from President Lee down, seem to take the view that the specialized agency approach, which involves a good deal of work behind the scenes, is insufficiently dramatic to have public appeal. There is no major domestic

public relations "coup" to be had if it will take four or five years to establish a firm relationship with bodies like WHO (which the government refers to as "peripheral organizations"), and eight or ten or so to assemble the votes necessary to amend Resolution 2758. In Taiwan, as in the US, one of the problems of elective office is that its holders sometimes see no advantage to themselves in taking the long view. Dictatorships like the PRC do not have this problem. Beijing worked patiently for twenty-two years before ousting the ROC.

But there is no "magic bullet." Barring some reversal in PRC attitudes, the only way Taiwan can get back into the General Assembly is by accumulating enough votes to overturn or amend Resolution 2758 and the surest way of doing this is by working through the specialized agencies, to demonstrate to Third World countries how useful a partner the ROC can be. As I have written elsewhere:

"Most UN members are small and poor. The great powers may worry about the PRC using its Security Council veto against some pet project of their own. But the small and poor worry about childhood diseases, about next year's food crop, about general economic development. Few or none have any recollection of the great Chinese representation battles of the 1950, 60s and 70s. They have little to fear from Beijing's displeasure. If Taiwan assists them in their key concerns, they will assist Taiwan in return."

Moreover, participation in the work of the UN agencies is important for its own sake. It is these technical and financial bodies which make the rules for the world's telecommunications, posts, and civil aviation systems. They work for the peaceful uses of atomic energy, protect health, assist children and their families, develop better seed and plant strains for food and textile crops, propose regulations and procedures for protecting the environment, etc. Operating quietly and in the background, without the political Sturm und Drang of the General Assembly, these bodies are where the world's work is done.

Would it be possible to accumulate enough votes without working through the specialized agencies. Yes, but it probably would be more difficult and take even longer. John Bolton, who served as Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs in the Bush administration, and who is here today, suggested in an earlier committee hearing that the ROC should forget about the specialized agencies and simply work directly to repeal or amend 2758. He cites the precedent of the successful repeal in 1991 of the "Zionism is racism" resolution (GA resolution 3379 of 1975). But Bolton glosses over the fact that 3379 was repealed only because the United States launched a major world-wide effort to do so. American ambassadors to every country with which we had diplomatic relations were ordered to make representations at the highest possible level, seeking votes to overturn 3379. Repeated representations over a period of nine months at these very high levels brought about the desired result. But without so major and continuing an American effort, 3379 would still be on the books. That some future US administration would be willing to make a parallel effort in behalf of ROC UN membership remains in the realm of pure conjecture.

Unfortunately, Mr. Bolton misunderstands the twenty year long debate over Chinese

representation. He argues that ROC expulsion in 1971 was an illegal act because (a) the PRC did not apply for membership in the normal way (i.e. by application to the Security Council); and (b) it is *ultra vires* for the General Assembly to expel a member of the United Nations because the Charter says that a member may be suspended or expelled only upon recommendation of the Security Council (Articles 5 and 6). Since the Security Council made no such recommendation in 1971, says Bolton, obviously the action of the General Assembly under Resolution 2758 was completely illegal.

In putting forward this argument as a rationale for overturning Resolution 2758, Bolton ignores the fact that neither admission of a new member, or expulsion of a present member was involved. Two delegations appeared at the General Assembly in 1971. Each delegation claimed to represent the entity China, a founding member of the United Nations. It was up to the General Assembly, by vote of its members, to decide which delegation to seat. The General Assembly could have voted to send the PRC representatives packing, as they had done each year for twenty-two years. They could have voted to seat both sets of representatives. They chose instead to seat the representatives sent by Beijing as the lawful representatives of China, the same China which had been a member since 1945, and to send the ROC's representatives packing. That it is entirely within the powers of the General Assembly to decide which of two competing delegations to seat is not open to doubt.

But what is most important to understand is that questions such as this may be dressed up in legal language, but they are political not legal. Neither the International Court of Justice nor any other legal body is going to rule on the question of whether Taiwan should or should not have its representatives seated in the General Assembly or elsewhere in the UN system. Nor is there any superior body which can order the General Assembly to seat those representatives. If and when Taiwan has the votes, it will be seated. Until that day, it will not.

Of course the United States can help bring that day closer and in fact I think it should. How? We sponsored Taiwan's accession to the Asian Development Bank because it was in our and the region's interest that they be included. It is similarly in our and the developing world's interest that Taiwan, with foreign exchange reserves in excess of \$100 billion and still mounting, be associated in some form with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and with our weighted one-third vote we could bring together enough votes to accomplish this.

We could also encourage the other UN bodies I mentioned earlier, to consider Taiwan, organizations which do not limit their membership to members of the General Assembly. These include the International Atomic Energy Agency, an organization of which Taiwan, with its three (soon to be four) operating nuclear reactors and bomb building capacity, should certainly be a member; the World Health Assembly of the WHO; the Food & Agriculture Organization; UNESCO; the World Meteorological Organization; and so on.

Of course the PRC will complain. But the point is, even though it may not be in Beijing's interest, nevertheless it is in our interest and in the world's interest that Taiwan be included in these particular organizations.

Some will object that were we to do this we would dangerously overload the circuits. Should we take this to mean the PRC will sell even more missiles to Iran than they do at present? Or, that if Taiwan attends a meeting of the World Health Assembly Beijing will occupy another reef in the Spratly group? Or throw another American citizen into prison? What interest of ours that they do not now compromise, and so far with impunity, would they compromise if Taiwan pledged money to the International Monetary Fund? Money that they themselves can and probably will borrow.

Certainly we want to get along with the PRC, and to have a cooperative relationship with them. We hope they do with us. We can and should continue to reassure them that we have no intention of forcing Taiwan's detachment. We should iterate and reiterate this mantra:

The United States will not propose a solution to the Taiwan problem. The United States will not oppose a solution to the Taiwan problem. The United States can accept any solution to the Taiwan problem that is acceptable to both sides freely, without coercion of any kind.

When, as in the case of the Asian Development Bank, we believe that Taiwan can make an important contribution to the world's work, we should argue that they be allowed to make that contribution.

**Testimony of**

**JOHN R. BOLTON**

**President,  
National Policy Forum**

**before the**

**Committee on International Relations**

**United States House of Representatives**

**August 3, 1995**

**10:00 A.M.**

**Washington, D.C.**

Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss the subject of the Republic of China on Taiwan's interest in reobtaining representation at the United Nations ("U.N.") My name is John R. Bolton, President of the National Policy Forum, and I was Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs during the Bush Administration. I will summarize this prepared statement, which I request be included in the record of this hearing in full.

## INTRODUCTION

I believe that the United States should support the efforts of the Republic of China on Taiwan ("R.O.C." or "Taiwan") <sup>\*</sup>/<sub>1</sub> to become a full member of the United Nations. The U.N. Charter clearly contemplates an organization of universal membership, and it is anomalous that Taiwan remains on the outside. Its land mass (14,384 square miles, the size of Connecticut, Massachusetts and Rhode Island combined) and population (more than 21,000,000) alone make a strong case for membership in the United Nations. Taiwan's economic strength is even more convincing. Its \$220 billion economy, the 20th largest in the world, makes it 25th in per capita income, and it is the world's 13th largest trading partner.

Politically, Taiwan's democratic institutions now have firm roots, and its current record on human rights is strong, especially when compared to the Tiananmen experiences of its counterpart in Beijing. In fact, the State Department's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1993, issued in February, 1994, states "[i]n 1993 Taiwan continued its rapid progress toward a pluralistic system truly representing the island's population. Open political debate and a freewheeling print media contributed to a vigorous democratic environment." The 1994 Country Reports reiterates that "[d]uring 1994 Taiwan made significant progress in its transition to a democratic, multiparty political system -- a process which began with the lifting of martial law in 1987 -- by holding generally free and fair popular elections for three [major] previously appointed positions. The first direct presidential election is scheduled for 1996."

The prospects for instability in East Asia are high, as recent events on the mainland, the Korean peninsula and elsewhere demonstrate, and will almost certainly remain so for some time in the future. Many decisions directly affecting Taiwan and its people may be made in the Security

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<sup>\*</sup>/<sub>1</sub> For purposes of this testimony, I use the terms "Republic of China on Taiwan," "Republic of China," "R.O.C.," and "Taiwan" interchangeably. Major international political issues should not turn exclusively on fine points about names and designations, and the issue of Taiwan's eligibility for representation at the U.N. is certainly one such issue.



Council or other United Nations organs, and yet the R.O.C.'s 21,000,000 people, with enormous interests at stake, will be unrepresented. This unfairness must be corrected.

For obvious reasons, there are many practical obstacles standing in the way of the R.O.C.'s reassuming a seat in the United Nations. With your permission, Mr. Chairmen, I would like to address four main points in this testimony. The first involves the present international diplomatic environment, and the possible consequences of R.O.C. representation at the U.N. The second encompasses a series of legal and political questions surrounding the status of Taiwan as it relates to U.N. membership. The third involves several issues concerning General Assembly Resolution 2758 (XXVI), which denied Taiwan representation in the U.N., and how to resolve them. The fourth is an assessment of what the U.N. stands to gain from restoring the R.O.C.'s representation, and the practical results of Taiwan's current exclusion from the U.N. and U.N. specialized agencies, and from various international agreements.

## I. THE PRESENT DIPLOMATIC ENVIRONMENT

The Committee's hearings obviously take place at a time of significant developments in relations among the United States, the Republic of China on Taiwan, and the People's Republic of China ("P.R.C."). It is not my purpose here to discuss the larger ramifications of these developments, but merely to emphasize that today's diplomatic environment should at most only inform the tactical formulation of American foreign policy. Today's environment should not govern those tactics, and it most assuredly should not dictate our longer term goals. Too often in our diplomacy, some act as though our fundamental national interests can be determined from the morning's headlines, as if those headlines cannot be changed over time by strong and consistent American leadership on issues that matter deeply to us.

In the present context, two points should be stressed. First, although I prepare this written testimony without having seen the position on R.O.C. representation in the U.N. that will be taken by the witness for the Department of State, I have little doubt what that position will be. State will argue "not now," a phrase which often means "not ever" to our diplomats. Using a phrase like "at this particularly delicate point in U.S.-P.R.C. relations," they will contend that any major diplomatic effort at present in support of the R.O.C. would be ill-advised because of the potentially adverse consequences for bilateral relations with Beijing.

Obviously, no one desires capriciously to complicate an already difficult agenda between the United States and the P.R.C.. At the same time, however, no purpose is served by being less than candid with other major powers about what the proper American position on this issue should be, or by allowing our positions to be dictated simply because Beijing would disapprove of

a different viewpoint. For fifteen years at the State Department, it was also "inconvenient" to the Middle East peace process to seek repeal of the General Assembly's "Zionism is racism" resolution despite the clear American interest in doing so. Without effective leadership, the question of R.O.C. representation in the U.N. will probably also be "inconvenient" at State for fifteen years, or longer. Decisive action by Congress on the issue can help supply the necessary direction sooner rather than later, especially given the obvious diplomatic challenges that must be overcome before Taiwan's representation would become a reality in any event.

Second, it should be clearly understood that American support for Taiwan's (or any other government's) representation in the U.N. does not in any way constitute bilateral diplomatic recognition, or "approval" of any kind by the United States. There are several current U.N.-member governments which the U.S. does not recognize or even deal with except through intermediaries.

In 1991, for example, at the initial suggestion of the Soviet Union, all five Permanent Members of the Security Council co-sponsored the U.N. membership applications of both the Republic of Korea ("R.O.K.") and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea ("D.P.R.K."). The U.S. joined in this procedure (ultimately embodied in Security Council Resolution 702) to advance our goal of obtaining U.N. membership for South Korea, even though we had no diplomatic relations whatever with the North. Thus, American support for the D.P.R.K.'s membership in the U.N. in no way implied recognition of that government, or any approval of its policies or its status vis-a-vis the R.O.K. With the recent commentary over whether the United States should or should not recognize Taiwan as an independent state, this important aspect of a U.N. membership decision is worth stressing.

## II. TAIWAN'S STATUS AND U.N. MEMBERSHIP

Chapter II of the U.N. Charter restricts membership to "states." Under most accepted customary international law definitions, a "state" must control a defined territory, have a stable population, have a capital city, administer its own internal affairs, and be able to enter relations with other states. Under this definition, Taiwan clearly qualifies as a "state" within the meaning and practice of the Charter.

Some argue that "statehood" necessarily implies "independence," but these concepts are fundamentally different. In many respects, the situation of the "two Chinas" today is one of the few remaining hangovers of the Cold War, but the fact is that the People's Republic of China now holds the seat of "China" in the United Nations and its specialized agencies. Without getting into a very arcane discussion of cross-Straits relations, one can readily conclude from prior U.N.

experience that the precise relationship between Taipei and Beijing -- whatever it is -- is no bar to full U.N. membership for the R.O.C.

Moreover, I do not believe that political differences on Taiwan about reunification with the mainland or independence should be a factor in deciding the United States position. There is virtual unanimity of opinion on Taiwan in favor of U.N. membership, albeit for very different reasons. From the American perspective, that is all we need to know

The U.N.'s history has ample precedent for accommodating ambiguous circumstances. First, both East and West Germany held U.N. membership prior to their reunification, having both joined the U.N. at the same time in 1973 (ironically, just two years after Taiwan's representation was eliminated). Similarly, as noted above, the two Koreas both currently hold U.N. membership, even though their very existence as states stems only from the historical accident at the end of World War II that the Japanese on the peninsula surrendered to the Americans in the South and the Soviets in the North. The two Yemens also both held separate U.N. memberships, prior to their merger, as did Tanganyika and Zanzibar before becoming Tanzania.

Moreover, India was a founding member of the U.N. in 1945 even though it was still a part of the British Empire. Ukraine and Belarus were also founding U.N. members, even though they were manifestly part of the Soviet Union. Thus, even if one were to accept Beijing's contention that Taiwan is simply a province of the P.R.C., U.N. precedent would not bar separate Taiwanese membership. In fact, the R.O.C. acknowledged on May 1, 1991, the obvious circumstance that it does not exercise jurisdiction over the Chinese mainland, and that there is "one China" with "two international juridical persons." Beijing, by contrast, has never faced that reality

The fundamental point is that U.N. "legal" decisions are frequently tempered by practical political realities, especially since these decisions are made by member governments and not through legal opinions. That is why the practice of the United Nations in construing international law is so important.

For example, in 1989 and 1990, the Palestine Liberation Organization ("P.L.O.") made repeated efforts to join specialized agencies of the United Nations such as the World Health Organization ("W.H.O.") At the time, the United States and others argued strenuously that the P.L.O. did not meet the customary international law standards of "statehood," as described above. The P.L.O. countered by saying that some ninety nations (the count tended to vary) had "recognized" an entity known as "the State of Palestine," representing Palestinians in the occupied territories on the West Bank of the Jordan River and in the Gaza Strip. Indeed, even the United States had begun a dialogue with the P.L.O. at its headquarters in Tunis, following the P.L.O.'s

1988 renunciation of terrorism. The P.L.O. argued that such broad recognition (at the time, a majority of U.N. members), and the U.S. dialogue entitled "the State of Palestine" to U.N. membership

The 1989 World Health Assembly rejected the P.L.O.'s efforts, clearly affirming political support for the legal proposition that the P.L.O. lacked the requirements of "statehood." There, and in subsequent efforts in other U.N. agencies, the P.L.O. failed to overcome the insurmountable obstacle that "Palestine" possessed none of the necessary attributes of "statehood." Moreover, political reality also worked against the P.L.O. because Secretary of State James A. Baker III had stated "I will recommend to the President that the United States make no further contributions, voluntary or assessed, to any international organization which makes any change in the P.L.O.'s present status as an observer organization." Congress quickly followed with appropriate legislation. What was at best a highly dubious legal claim by the P.L.O. was crushed by the political reality of clear, decisive and unhesitating American leadership.

In the case of the R.O.C., however, the issue is far simpler, because the key legal question can be unambiguously resolved in favor of Taiwan's admissibility. Taiwan unquestionably meets the membership requirements of Article 4(1) of the Charter, which provides that "[m]embership in the United Nations is open to all peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter." Moreover, the R.O.C. is not arguing that it should be seated while simultaneously ousting the P.R.C. from either the Security Council permanent seat or from the United Nations itself. It is simply seeking separate U.N. representation for its own citizens, on whose behalf the P.R.C. quite obviously does not speak.

### III. REOBTAINING R.O.C. REPRESENTATION

#### A. ADOPTING RESOLUTION 2758(XXVI)

The P.R.C. never actually joined the United Nations, and the R.O.C. never actually left it. Instead, the P.R.C., acting only in the General Assembly and not in the Security Council, persuaded a majority of U.N. members to authorize a shift in "representation" for "China." This highly unusual, indeed unprecedented, action took place in 1971 during the 26th General Assembly. Resolution 2758 provided, in a preambular paragraph, that the representatives of the P.R.C. "are the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations." The Resolution's only operative paragraph stated that the General Assembly

"Decides to restore all its rights to the People's Republic of China and to recognize

the representatives of its Government as the only legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations, and to expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and in all the organizations affiliated to it."

The P.R.C.'s procedural approach was unquestionably adopted for practical political reasons, because the more appropriate methods of obtaining the same result would have proven unsuccessful

Thus, had the P.R.C. applied for membership in the U.N. on its own, it would have had to follow the mechanism described in Article 4(2) of the Charter, which provides that new members are elected "by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council." Quite obviously, such an approach would have subjected it to the R.O.C.'s and the U.S.'s veto (and, for at least some time, the U.K.'s and France's as well), and the issue would never have been considered by the General Assembly.

Another possibility for the P.R.C. would have been to try to suspend the R.O.C. from U.N. membership under Article 5 of the Charter. This was not a realistic alternative, however, since Article 5 provides for the suspension only of members "against which preventive or enforcement action has been taken by the Security Council," which was obviously not the case with Taiwan. Yet another possibility in 1971 would have been for the P.R.C. to seek Taiwan's expulsion from the U.N. pursuant to Article 6. That approach was also unrealistic, since Article 6 can be applied only against a member "which has persistently violated the Principles contained in the present Charter," which clearly could not be said about Taiwan. In the cases of both Article 5 and Article 6, as with Article 4, the General Assembly could not act except upon the recommendation of the Security Council, where the P.R.C. would again have faced the prospect of a multiple veto.

Moreover -- and very significantly for present purposes -- consideration of a state's membership, suspension or expulsion by the General Assembly is explicitly designated in all three cases as an "important question" by Article 18(2) of the Charter. Under this provision, "important questions" must be decided by an affirmative vote of "a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting." The Charter designates other important questions as well, including the election of non-permanent members of the Security Council.

All other questions in the General Assembly are decided by a simple majority of the members present and voting according to Article 18(3) of the Charter. This simple-majority rule applies to deciding what other issues might be considered "important questions," thus requiring a two-thirds majority to be adopted.

With this background in mind, it becomes perfectly apparent what the P.R.C.'s strategy was in the years leading up to the adoption of Resolution 2758. None of the routes specified in the Charter for dealing with representation -- membership, suspension or expulsion -- could escape vetoes in the Security Council or the high hurdle of a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly. Accordingly, the P.R.C. decided to end run the carefully crafted procedural protections of the Charter, and create a new and unauthorized procedure of simply replacing one set of "representatives" with another.

For many years, the United States, the R.O.C. and their supporters were able to thwart this evasion of the Charter. Initially, on December 15, 1961, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 1668(XVI), deciding that "in accordance with Article 18 of the Charter, any proposal to change the representation of China is an important question." In several subsequent General Assemblies, when the issue of representation was raised, Resolution 1668 was reaffirmed, including through the Twenty-Fifth General Assembly in 1970.

On October 25, 1971, however, the Twenty-Sixth General Assembly rejected the "important question" draft resolution by a vote of 55 in favor, 59 against, 15 abstentions, and 2 absent. Once this critical procedural protection was lost, the draft resolution which became 2758 was adopted by a vote of 76 in favor, 35 opposed, 17 abstentions and 3 not participating. The Republic of China was listed as not participating even though Minister of Foreign Affairs Chow Shu-kai had announced the R.O.C.'s decision to withdraw from the U.N. prior to the vote.

There are compelling arguments, therefore, that Resolution 2758 violated the U.N. Charter. It had the de facto -- but not de jure -- effect of admitting a new member, expelling a sitting member, and replacing a Permanent Member of the Security Council, all without Security Council action. Moreover, Resolution 2758's supporters argued that none of these results was an "important question" under the U.N. Charter, and a majority of the General Assembly ultimately agreed. Whether illegal or not, however, Resolution 2758 was adopted, and the question now is how to address its consequences.

## B. REPEALING RESOLUTION 2758

The most obvious option for the R.O.C. is to seek the repeal of Resolution 2758 and regain representation. In effect, Taiwan faces the mirror image of the problem the P.R.C. faced before 1971. Directly attempting to obtain membership through the normal Charter procedures under Article 4(2) would almost surely produce a Beijing veto in the Security Council, at least without major diplomatic efforts that would embarrass the P.R.C. into simply abstaining. Without the enthusiastic support of other Permanent Members of the Security Council -- especially the

United States -- this option has limited practical utility, at least for now.

Accordingly, repealing Resolution 2758 and reaffirming Taiwan's right to be represented would appear to be the most realistic approach, although that also will require considerable diplomatic efforts. I propose here to discuss several legal and procedural objections that might be raised to a repeal effort, and hope to show that they are without merit.

First, it was argued for many years that the actions of one General Assembly could not be overturned by subsequent General Assemblies. Although such a notion might seem strange to members of Congress, it acquired near-mythic proportions in the General Assembly, largely during years when American and Western values were routinely assaulted by Cold War and Third World ideological adversaries.

In fact, it always was a myth. As early as 1950, the General Assembly had repealed a Resolution by an earlier Assembly. On November 4, 1950, the General Assembly, in Resolution 386(V), rescinded Resolution 38(I) of December 12, 1946, which had barred Spain -- as a former "enemy state" -- from U.N. membership, and recommended the withdrawal of diplomatic representation from Madrid. Other former "enemy states" (such as Germany and Japan) were subsequently admitted to the U.N. without a General Assembly vote revoking their "enemy" status precisely because of Second and Third World fears of the impact of repealing earlier General Assembly Resolutions.

Whatever doubts existed about the authority of the General Assembly to repeal earlier resolutions were completely dispelled on December 16, 1991, when the infamous "Zionism is racism" resolution was repealed. Adopted in 1975, Resolution 3379(XXX) had been the subject of broad and deep bipartisan opposition in the United States, with successive Administrations of both parties committed to its repeal. The repeal resolution was ultimately adopted by a vote of 111 in favor, 25 opposed, 13 abstaining, and the remainder not participating.

With so recent and so important a precedent at hand, there can be no doubt that the General Assembly possesses plenary authority to repeal Resolution 2758.

Second, Taiwan's opponents will undoubtedly raise the question whether the General Assembly has the authority -- acting on its own without the Security Council -- to "reseat" Taiwan. The Charter is essentially silent on this point because the Framers simply never contemplated the unique situation in which the R. O. C. finds itself today. Of course, the Charter was equally silent on the ultra vires procedures followed by the General Assembly in adopting Resolution 2758.

Recognizing the P.R.C.'s "representatives" is neither the admission of a new member under Article 4, nor acceptance of credentials pursuant to the General Assembly's Rules of Procedure. Similarly, for the General Assembly to "expel" Chiang Kai-shek's "representatives" has no basis whatever in the U.N. Charter. Moreover, the P.R.C. had no legal "rights" to "restore," as Resolution 2758 states, since it was never previously a U.N. member.

Significantly, Resolution 2758 itself cites no authority in the Charter, a tacit admission that there is no such authority. It is clear that "expelling" a head of government's "representatives" does not constitute suspension of the R.O.C.'s rights and privileges of membership under Article 5, or expulsion from the U.N. under Article 6.

Even assuming the illegality of Resolution 2758, however, it is still important to articulate a persuasive argument that the General Assembly can, in fact, reseal Taiwan by its own actions alone. In 1971, recognizing the likelihood that the P.R.C.'s efforts to replace Taiwan would finally succeed, the United States and others had introduced a draft resolution for "dual representation" of both the P.R.C. and the R.O.C., with the P.R.C. being seated as a Permanent Member of the Security Council. Operative Paragraph Two of the draft American resolution stated specifically that the General Assembly "Affirms the continued right of representation of the Republic of China."

In describing this draft resolution on October 25, 1971, then-Ambassador George Bush said

"Some may ask where and when the Charter has been used before in precisely the way our resolution proposes. The answer is: nowhere -- because in 26 years the United Nations has never faced precisely this situation. But we have demonstrated in other actions that the Charter is a flexible document. It was written by wise men to cope with the unforeseeable."

Bush noted such examples as the three votes of the U.S.S.R. and the membership of India before its full independence (discussed above), and concluded by saying:

"In every such case the United Nations has faced a reality, not a theory -- and has acted accordingly, finding new solutions for new problems. We are in a similar situation now. We face a reality, not a theory. Our proper concern must be to do justice to the complex reality that exists today in the form of effectively governing entities [*i.e.*, the R.O.C. and the P.R.C.], and the Charter gives us the room to innovate to satisfy that concern."



Because Resolution 2758 was adopted, and because of the R.O.C.'s position that it had withdrawn from the United Nations, the draft "dual representation" resolution never came to a General Assembly vote in 1971. Nonetheless, reseating Taiwan today would have the practical effect of adopting the 1971 "dual representation" resolution. Although both approaches result in adding an additional U.N. member, that outcome cannot be any different in legitimacy than Resolution 2758 itself. It would be absurd to say that the General Assembly is unable to correct the iniquitous effects of a probably illegal earlier Resolution simply because of doubts about the Resolution used to make the correction. Otherwise, the General Assembly would be unable to overcome self-inflicted wounds, even when it had the will and the ability to do so. The Framers of the Charter could hardly have expected such a result, lending confidence to the conclusion that reseating Taiwan in the U.N. through a General Assembly Resolution is permissible.

Third, some might argue that, whatever the legality of Resolution 2758, the R.O.C.'s 1971 attempt to withdraw from the U.N. means that Taiwan renounced its status as an original U.N. member, and that it must now reapply under Article 4 as a new member. The "withdrawal" occurred in the following manner: On October 25, 1971, shortly after the vote was lost on whether to declare the Albanian draft resolution (which became Resolution 2758) an "important question" under Article 18, the R.O.C. delegation made a point of order in the General Assembly, saying that it would no longer take part in any further proceedings. The next day, President Chiang Kai-shek said "[b]efore this infamous [Resolution 2758] could be put to a vote, this country announced its withdrawal from the United Nations, an organization which it took part in establishing."

The U.N. Charter deliberately made no provision for the withdrawal of member governments, largely to prevent the threat of withdrawal from being used as a form of political blackmail or to evade obligations under the Charter. Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations in March, 1933 -- to signal its repudiation of the League's condemnation of Japan's invasion of China -- was very much on the minds of the Framers of the U.N. Charter. (The two other major Axis powers, Germany and Italy, also withdrew from the League.) It is, therefore, not at all clear whether withdrawal by a member government is even permissible under the Charter. The only other example of an effort to withdraw from the United Nations -- by Indonesia in 1965 -- actually tends to show that withdrawal, at least in the short term, is not permissible.

Because Resolution 2758 is itself such an anomaly, however, the applicability of the Indonesian precedent is questionable. Moreover, the R.O.C.'s "withdrawal" is so completely intertwined with Resolution 2758 that it is doubtful whether the purported withdrawal should play any role here at all. Any fair reading of the situation in 1971 demonstrates that the R.O.C.'s various expressions of intent to withdraw all involved the actual or expected adoption of

Resolution 2758, and should all be taken as part of a single transaction which expelled the R.O.C.'s representatives and installed those of the P.R.C. Thus, the repudiation of Resolution 2758 eliminates the need for the R.O.C.'s withdrawal, making it moot. Today, the real issue is the political will of the General Assembly to correct this 1971 wrongdoing. If that will exists, the withdrawal issue is insignificant

Fourth, opponents of the repeal of Resolution 2758 will undoubtedly attempt to declare the repeal an "important question" under Article 18 of the Charter, thus requiring a two-thirds vote to be successful. Here again, the 1991 repeal of the "Zionism is racism" resolution provides an important precedent. When the "Z/t" repeal effort finally culminated in a plenary debate in the General Assembly, opponents attempted to have the vote on the repeal resolution declared an "important question."

Significantly for present purposes, Resolution 3379 had been adopted by a simple majority, which provided a telling argument against those who wished to have its repeal conditioned on a two-thirds majority. The effort to have the repeal of Resolution 3379 declared an "important question" failed by a vote of 39 in favor; 96 opposed; 13 abstaining; and the remaining nations not participating. Exactly the same argument applies here, since Resolution 2758 was not decided as an "important question." Neither, therefore, should the subject of its repeal be an "important question." The P.R.C. might argue that the R.O.C. and its supporters should not be permitted to reverse the positions they held in 1971, but the response is clear: the General Assembly made its decision on the "important question" issue then, and fairness dictates that the same issue be treated in a symmetrical fashion on a vote to repeal.

Although this perspective would appear to be a matter of simple logic, there is every reason to believe that the P.R.C. and its supporters (ironically, reversing their 1971 position) will use the "important question" tactic. In purely practical political terms, however, if there is a majority in the General Assembly favoring repeal, that very same majority should oppose -- and defeat -- an "important question" motion.

#### IV. THE COSTS OF EXCLUDING THE R.O.C. FROM THE U.N.

The question of Taiwan's U.N. membership is undoubtedly an important political and diplomatic issue in and of itself. The membership issue has other significant ramifications as well, however, which are often overlooked in the political debate. I hope to address some of these overlooked issues here, especially as they reflect on the damage done to the international community because of Taiwan's exclusion.

At the outset, however, I would like to explain how Taiwan's lack of U.N. representation hurts the United States. Although numerous improvements have taken place in the past six or seven years in the overall behavior of the General Assembly, much remains to be done. A relatively large, democratic, prosperous, and non-OECD new member would be of considerable assistance in continuing the progress that has been made to date. Moreover, in due course, following the traditional rotation system within the regional groupings, we could once again expect to see the Republic of China sitting on the Security Council, this time as a non-permanent member. Such a result would almost certainly be in America's best interests.

As for the international community as a whole, renewed representation for Taiwan would significantly contribute to resolving a number of critical issues. Without membership, however, such contributions are virtually impossible to make, as explained below.

First, as a practical matter, the only realistic way to become a member of the most important specialized agencies and related organs of the U.N. system is to join the U.N. itself. Although essentially all of the specialized agencies can be joined independently of joining the U.N., this is a rare course, usually taken by very small states with only limited interests in narrow areas of U.N. activities. Moreover, any application by the R.O.C. for membership in a specialized agency would be seen as political, and many members would treat it very unfavorably as such. The United States itself, for example, has for years, on a bipartisan basis, opposed the politicization of the specialized agencies, arguing that fundamentally political issues be decided by the U.N.'s political organs (the Security Council and the General Assembly) and not in fora unsuited to making such decisions.

The net impact, therefore, is that Taiwan is excluded from such U.N. organs as:

-- the International Atomic Energy Agency. With all of the uncertainty on the Korean peninsula at present, it is unfair to the people of Taiwan that policies and strategies that literally could affect their very existence are being developed completely without their participation. Moreover, the Non-Proliferation Treaty's regime has obvious implications for a people located hard by one of only five of the world's declared nuclear powers.

-- the International Maritime Organization. Taiwan, as one of the world's leading trading nations, has important interests in maritime safety procedures (such as the Global Maritime Distress and Search System), pollution issues and questions of international salvage rights. Because it has no representation at the U.N., however, the R.O.C. cannot participate in the work of this small but critical specialized agency.

-- the International Telecommunications Union. Because the R.O.C. is effectively precluded from joining the I.T.U., it cannot be assigned a permanent "country code" for international telecommunications purposes. As a result, it must make do with temporary codes, which can be taken away when new nations qualify for their own country codes. Last year, for example, Taiwan lost two separate codes to the new nations of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Just as when anyone's telephone number changes, altering Taiwan's country code causes enormous disruptions and inefficiency in international commerce and communications.

-- the World Intellectual Property Organization. Without membership in this protector of intellectual property rights, citizens of the R.O.C. cannot be protected against infringements on their rights, nor can foreigners receive reciprocal protection in Taiwan. As intellectual property rights become more and more important, protection of those rights becomes more important as well. Given the size of Taiwan's growing economy, leaving it outside the international community benefits no one.

-- the World Health Organization. Even with the AIDS pandemic worldwide, the R.O.C. can neither protect the interests of its citizens in this important organization, nor can it provide the benefits of the lessons learned from its public health initiatives.

These are just a few of many examples where Taiwan's lack of representation impairs the functioning of the international community.

Second, in some other cases, the only way to participate in the work of a U.N. organ is to be a member. For example, the U.N. Environmental Program ("UNEP") is such an agency. General Assembly Resolution 2997(XXVII) of December 15, 1972, which created the Program, provides in Operative Paragraph One that only U.N. members can participate in UNEP's Governing Council. This requirement effectively excludes Taiwan and all non-U.N. members from UNEP's work at precisely the time when environmental matters are receiving heightened attention all around the world. Similarly, the R.O.C. is precluded from participating in many U.N.-sponsored environmental conventions, such as the 1987 Montreal Protocol on protecting the ozone layer against further depletion.

Participation in the U.N. Development Program, the main funding agency for U.N. development activities around the world, is also limited to countries already a member of the U.N. system. Thus, although Taiwan has conducted extensive development assistance programs in a limited number of LDC's through its International Economic Cooperation and Development Fund

(established in 1988), many countries are precluded from access to its expertise through the U.N.'s multilateral channels because the R.O.C. is not a U.N. member. Similarly, UNICEF is entirely comprised and funded by U.N. member states.

These exclusions are especially hard to understand, particularly since Taiwan retained full donor membership in the Asian Development Bank (under the name "Taipei, China") even after the P.R.C. was admitted in 1986. The R.O.C. has undertaken co-financing projects with the Inter-American Development Bank, and it is a non-regional member of the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (under the name "Republic of China"). Taiwan has also established a technical assistance program in agreement with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. In each case, the R.O.C. has made valuable contributions, in both financial and human resource terms. There is no reason such contributions to international development should not also be made available through the U.N. system.

The foregoing very partial catalogue is plainly sufficient to demonstrate that the P.R.C.'s position opposing Taiwan's efforts to secure representation is impairing the security, humanitarian and economic functioning of the U.N., all because of a Cold-War era dispute.

## CONCLUSION

The time has come for the United States to take the lead -- as it must in any important U.N. issue -- to seek representation for Taiwan throughout the U.N. system. It is in our national interest to do so. We have an important opportunity in the upcoming Fiftieth General Assembly next month to move the debate forward substantially, and we should not miss the chance to do so.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I would be happy to answer any questions you or members of the Committee may have.

**U.S. Support for Taiwan's Participation in the United Nations**

**Testimony**

**at the Committee on House International Relations, August 3, 1995**

**by**

**Dr. Parris H. Chang**

**Ranking Member, Foreign Relations Committee,**

**Legislative Yuan, Taiwan**

**Director, Taiwan DPP Mission in the US**

**Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University**

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the International Relations Committee, I am honored and pleased to be able to testify before this Committee on Taiwan's membership in the United Nations. For almost a quarter of a century, I have taught at Pennsylvania State University the subjects of international relations, the United Nations, China, Taiwan, East Asian politics, and other courses. So, I will speak in a dual capacity: East Asian expert and advocate for Taiwan. I am also a member of the Foreign Relations Committee of Taiwan's Legislative Yuan (our parliament), and I head the diplomatic mission of Taiwan's principal opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), here in Washington, D.C.

In recent times, we have witnessed a dramatic reconciliation between two old enemies--Israel and the PLO. The courage and statesmanship of Prime Minister Rabin and Chairman Yaser Arafat are inspiring, and a new era of peace and reconciliation in the Middle East is emerging. People of good will and peace-loving nations throughout the world are assisting the Israelis and the Palestinians in their economic reconstruction. For our part, the people in Taiwan are willing to contribute financially to this noble cause.

Likewise, the Taiwanese people yearn for peace and reconciliation across the Taiwan Straits. We look forward to peaceful coexistence, cooperation and coprosperity with China. We extend amity to the Chinese people, and we are willing to provide more investment and assistance to China's economic modernization. At the same time, we urge the PRC government to renounce the use of force against Taiwan and honor our wishes to be free and independent from Beijing's control.

In less than two years -- in 1997 -- the PRC will take over Hong Kong. Most of the six million Chinese in Hong Kong do not seem to relish the prospect of living under the Chinese communist government. As 1997 approaches, some predict that there will be a massive increase in flights of human resources and capital, even an exodus of "boat people."

Whereas statesmen, pundits, and the media in the West have praised the collapse of communist systems and the liberation of millions from communist dictatorships in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, at the same time they seem to condone and rationalize the communist takeover of Hong Kong and show no concern for the fate of the Hong Kong Chinese. What an irony!

We Taiwanese are determined not to suffer the same fate as the people of Hong Kong. We reject Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord's recent prediction that Hong Kong will provide a model for Taiwan's surrender to communist China. Taiwan belongs to its 21 million people who practice a system of government based on consent of the governed. We have never lived under communist rule and do not want to live under communism in the future. We will do what is necessary to protect our freedoms and determine our own destiny. Is this not the logical conclusion of democratization? In order to maintain our independence from communist control, we in Taiwan have already

paid a high price and will continue to pay the necessary price. At the same time, we seek and call for assistance from the American people and the international community.

### **UN MEMBERSHIP**

Since its founding in 1986, our party, the DPP, has campaigned for Taiwan's membership in the UN. The drive has been highly popular. As a result, our party has received considerable support from the voters. The DPP, the first truly democratic party to represent the political aspirations of the people on Taiwan, currently holds one-third of the seats in the Legislative Yuan, as well as significant municipal and county executive positions, including the mayoralty of the capital city, Taipei. The DPP is challenging the ruling party, the KMT, for political leadership. Initially, the KMT government opposed Taiwan's membership in the UN due to its one China policy; in recent years, the KMT has shifted its stand and adopted the DPP UN platform as the government's top foreign policy priority.

For our people, membership in the UN will serve several important purposes. It will mean acceptance of Taiwan as a sovereign state and as a member in the family of nations. It will strengthen Taiwan's security and give our people a greater sense of self-respect and confidence. Moreover, membership in the UN will enable our people to participate more actively and fully in international affairs and make a greater contribution to the world community.

The General Assembly has admitted more than 20 new members since 1991. More than 65 of the 185 UN members are smaller in territory than Taiwan. Our island nation ranks 41st among the 185 UN members in population size. What's more, Taiwan has the capacities and the willingness to support the principles of the UN and implement the objectives of the UN system, and to act as an ally to the United States in the UN.

### **Strategy for entering the UN**

Unquestionably, Taiwan more than meets the qualifications of membership as stipulated by the UN Charter. The DPP favors a two-prong strategy. We believe that Taiwan should apply directly as "Taiwan," a new member, through "the front door" approach, and simultaneously seek to join such specialized UN agencies and related organizations as the IMF, World Bank, WHO, and the WTO, in a "back door" approach.

First, Taiwan meets the criteria to be admitted to the United Nations as a new state. The right of national independence, or self-determination, is enshrined in the UN Charter Articles 1 and 55.<sup>1</sup> A lack of means for implementation cannot detract from the

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<sup>1</sup> UN General Charter:

Article 1

(2) To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;



principle of self-determination. In fact, application by territories seeking self-determination and declarations have established precedence under international legal principles.<sup>2</sup>

Second, Taiwan intends to expand its participation in international agencies/organizations. If Taiwan is permitted to join many of these specialized and technical agencies, it will become an active and valuable member helping to facilitate the objectives of the UN system.<sup>3</sup> China has sought and received much international economic and financial aid from the World Bank and other UN agencies as a developing nation. Taiwan is willing and able to provide much needed economic and technical assistance to the developing world through the UN system.

We are keenly aware of China's veto power. But, we will persevere in our endeavor to win our rights at the UN, regardless of the time it may take. We are prepared to press our issue each year, every year, until China succumbs to international consensus and the pressure of world opinion. We will expose Beijing's hypocrisy and anti-UN and anti-Third World actions when China, unable and unwilling to give, blocks monetary contribution to development projects, or donations to relief aid. We will rightfully win friendship and sympathy, while China risks nurturing resentment and hostility.

### The Chinese obstacle

Thus far the Peoples Republic of China has opposed Taiwan's admission to the United Nations on the ground that Taiwan is a part of China, and Taiwan cannot hold a separate seat. We emphatically reject Beijing's assertion. Taiwan is by no means a part of the PRC. Moreover, the Western press should stop repeating the Chinese lie that Taiwan is a "renegade province."

Since the PRC was established by Mao Ze-dong in 1949, it has never exercised any jurisdiction over Taiwan. Beijing's claim to Taiwan is an illusion held by China's

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#### Article 55

With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote...

<sup>2</sup> The 1960 UN Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples clearly entitles Taiwan to the right of self-determination based on its status as a former Japanese colony, as does the UN Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, The Universal Declaration on Human Rights, and The UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

<sup>3</sup> It is important to note that Taiwan is able to coexist as a member of both the Asia Development Bank and APEC alongside China without conflict. After UN Resolution 2758 (which admitted the PRC government in place of the ROC government on Taiwan as the legitimate UN representative of China) was adopted, then UN General-Secretary Kurt Waldheim attempted to rely on General Assembly resolution 396 of 1950 which recommends that other UN bodies consider the General Assembly decisions on admission of competing governments in deciding whether to follow suit. However, each organ and agency is not bound by the General Assembly decisions.

leaders, neither based in reality, nor justified by international law.<sup>4</sup> Taiwan is a full sovereign state in that there exists: a defined territory of governance; an independent administration that carries on relations with other nations on behalf of the territory and its 21 million people, and subjects to no higher authorities; and the exercise of taxation and revenue spending on behalf of the territory. Taiwan fulfills every requirement for statehood under international legal principles.

In **any** other circumstances, involving **any** other two states other than Taiwan and China, the outrageous treatment of a small country dictated by the hegemony of a much larger one would not be tolerated, let alone condoned by any democratic state. Unfortunately, the Taiwan-China situation is the exception. China has the audacity to intimidate all nations, including the United States, into denying the rights of Taiwan's 21 million people. The problems between Taiwan and China are not "domestic issues" to be settled among "the Chinese people," as China would have the world believe. Rather, it is a Chinese (PRC) attempt to force Taiwan to surrender its sovereignty to the PRC and become the next Hong Kong.

Thus, peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region are serious matters of international concern. The world community should not allow China to bully and subjugate Taiwan by military threat and political coercion. Nor should the family of nations condone, or, even less, assist China in its scheme to exclude Taiwan forever from the UN and deprive the human rights of the 21 million people on Taiwan. The US and major world powers should take stock from the lessons of appeasing Iraq and the Nazi Germany dictatorship, and not allow Beijing to dictate their foreign policy decisions.

China has recently launched unprecedented surface-to-surface ballistic missile exercises just 85 miles north of Taiwan proper aimed at intimidating and destabilizing Taiwan. Such tests are a grave threat to the security and stability of Taiwan and East Asia and a violation of the UN Charter. Specifically, Article 2 section 4 of the UN Charter states, "All Members shall **refrain** in their international relations **from the threat or use of force** against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." Worse yet, denial of UN membership for Taiwan prevents us from having a peaceful forum to address such serious concerns. If Beijing continues to impose its views on the world, and Taiwan remains unable to develop normal diplomatic ties and is excluded from the UN and other major international organizations, the sense of isolation and insecurity among

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<sup>4</sup> Let us look at historical facts: the treaty signed between representatives of the Chinese government and that of the Japanese government on April 17, 1895, commonly referred to as "The Treaty of Shimonoseki," ceded Taiwan in perpetuity to Japan. From that moment forward China lost all claim to Taiwan and has held no jurisdiction over the island this last one hundred years. Moreover, as a matter of international jurisprudence, national and governmental succession holds that a new regime inherits all the powers and responsibilities of its predecessors when a succession in national or governmental regimes occurs. Simply put, the People's Republic of China government must uphold the obligations its predecessors are bound to even as it seeks to enforce its rights under existing covenants signed into force by the same. Besides, China is naive to think it can undo the consequences of 100 years of separation between it and Taiwan by "ignoring" the Treaty of Shimonoseki today.

the people on Taiwan could compel the Taiwan government to strive for protection and security through the development of nuclear weapons, as President Lee Teng-hui hinted only recently on July 28th of this year. The United States and the Asian nations must think through the full implications of such serious consequences.

### IMPLICATIONS/REASONS FOR U.S. SUPPORT

On June 27, 1950, two days after North Korean armies invaded South Korea, President Harry Truman dispatched the Seventh Fleet to "neutralize" the Taiwan Strait, thereby deterring the Chinese communists from conquering Taiwan. In the past four decades, thanks to a US security umbrella against China's military threats, and generous economic and technical assistance, Taiwan has developed into a fully industrialized country. It is the envy of most developing states. Indeed, the island nation is a world economic power -- it ranks as the 13th largest trading nation (by volume), the world's 19th largest economy, and America's fifth largest trading partner. Taiwan has proven herself a loyal and worthy friend.

The United States has been midwife to Taiwan's democratic polity, for the ceaseless urgings by the US Congress and an attentive American public since the 1980's have helped Taiwan move from a one-party dictatorship to a multi-party competitive democracy. The United States can be proud of the part it has played and still plays in Taiwan. As a next step, it should support Taiwan's admission to the United Nations.

It is morally right and just for the United States to support Taiwan's UN membership bid. Moreover, by upholding self-determination, a cardinal principle in international law, the United States will show itself to be the guardian of democracy and human rights. Equally as important, support for Taiwan will serve the American national interests and advance American values as well. If the US seeks to protect long-term peace and security in East Asia and other American interests, it should cease coddling and appeasing the Chinese communist dictatorship or bowing to its hegemonism and policy of intimidation. Many nations in Asia have had doubts as to whether the US can or will safeguard their security from communist expansionism and bullies in the region. The US can reassure its allies and friends all over the world by a strong and principled American foreign policy.

It is most unfortunate and disappointing that many State Department officials adhere to a so-called "One China" policy refusing to support Taiwan's UN membership. Such a position might be characterized as moral blindness and political short-sightedness, but, more importantly, must be exposed as a quick route to grave economic and military insecurity for the United States. American interests are not enhanced by a policy of appeasement. On July 28, prior to departing for the ASEAN Conference in Brunei where he would meet with China's Foreign Minister, Secretary of State Warren Christopher spoke at the National Press Club. Christopher said that the three joint communiqués acknowledging China's claim that Taiwan is a part of China worked well for all parties involved. We cannot disagree more strongly. Such a formula ignores the reality that

Taiwan is an independent state and its people do not want to live under communist dictatorship; it serves well the interest of China and perhaps those of the State Department, but directly violates the Taiwanese people's rights and jeopardizes their freedom and security.

### **THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S VIOLATION OF THE TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT (TRA)**

The Taiwan Relations Act, passed by Congress in 1979, has provided clear and unambiguous guidelines for handling bilateral relations with Taiwan. Moreover, as federal statute, the Taiwan Relations Act is the law of the land. Its authority preempts the three communiqués with China. The Clinton Administration's refusal to support Taiwan's UN membership bid is a serious violation of the TRA.<sup>5</sup> The TRA mandates that, "the preservation and enhancement of the human rights of all the people on Taiwan are hereby reaffirmed as objectives of the United States."<sup>6</sup> Section 4(d) of the Taiwan Relations Act reads in part, "Nothing in this [Taiwan Relations] Act may be construed as a basis for supporting the exclusion or expulsion of Taiwan from...[any] international organization."<sup>7</sup> The TRA is clear and unequivocal with respect to U.S. policy regarding Taiwan's participation in international organizations: Taiwan's UN membership is clearly construed to be within the purview of the TRA. As an elected representative of the Taiwanese people, I know our people want Taiwan to join the United Nations.

Secretary of State Warren Christopher's July 28th remarks in response to a question submitted by my office on U.S. support for Taiwan's United Nations membership violates the provisions in the Taiwan Relations Act. No administration can stand above existing federal legislation. Thus, the State Department is in serious violation of federal statute by refusing to support Taiwan's UN membership bid.

It is one thing to institute an unpopular foreign policy, it is a totally different issue to defy existing legislation in carrying out such a foreign policy. As long as the Taiwan

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<sup>5</sup> Secretary of State Warren Christopher affirmed that the U.S. government will not support Taiwan's UN membership bid under the present circumstances in his recent National Press Club speech.

<sup>6</sup> Taiwan Relations Act. Public Law 96-8 [H.R. 2479], 93 Stat. 14, approved April 10, 1979; as amended by Public Law 98-164 [Department of State Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1984 and 1985; H.R. 2915], 97 Stat. 1017 at 1061, approved November 22, 1983.

Sec.2

(c) Nothing contained in this Act shall contravene the interest of the United States in human rights, especially with respect to the human rights of all the approximately eighteen million inhabitants of Taiwan. The preservation and enhancement of the human rights of all the approximately eighteen million inhabitants of Taiwan. The preservation and enhancement of the human rights of all the people on Taiwan are hereby reaffirmed as objectives of the United States.

<sup>7</sup> Taiwan Relations Act

Sec.4

(d) Nothing in this Act may be construed as a basis for supporting the exclusion or expulsion of Taiwan from continued membership in any international financial institution or any other international organization.

Relations Act is the law of the land, the Clinton Administration cannot oppose Taiwan's UN membership bid. Congress must curb this blatant abuse of power and move quickly to see that the provisions of the TRA are abided by and faithfully implemented by this administration.

### **CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP WORKS**

Now more than ever, Congressional leadership and initiative are needed for the US to support Taiwan's UN membership. Martial law was lifted in 1987, in part due to U.S. Congressional pressure. The KMT's infamous blacklist of Taiwanese dissidents was ended in 1991, in part, due to U.S. Congressional criticism. In February, Congressional hearings on freedom of speech in Taiwan persuaded the KMT to award Taiwan's fourth television network to an independent group not controlled by or affiliated with the ruling party. Most recently, due to overwhelming Congressional support, President Clinton was compelled to overrule the State Department and permit Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui to return to his alma mater, Cornell University, on a private visit.

The "One China Policy" as initiated in 1972 by President Nixon is outdated, out of touch with today's realities in East Asia, and does not serve US interests either. The Congress can and must take the lead to endorse normalization of relations with Taiwan, support Taiwan's UN membership, and compel President Clinton to take heed and abide by the Taiwan Relations Act.

The Republic of China's Case for Representation  
in the United Nations

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Mr. Chairman, members of the U.S. Congress, ladies and gentlemen:

I am speaking today, on this auspicious occasion, very much with mixed feelings. My country, the Republic of China, fought alongside the United States through the long, bloody years of the Pacific War from 1941 to 1945, and together we worked strenuously and enthusiastically for the establishment of the United Nations, becoming founding members of that organization and members of the UN Security Council from the first day of its existence. But fifty years later, I am here to beseech your help, and the help of the U.S. Congress, in returning to an organization for the creation of which we gave not only efforts but lives. The very fact of my being here today speaks both for the irony of history and for the cruelty of international politics. All the same, I feel deeply honored to be invited to give testimony regarding my country's return to the United Nations. I shall deliver my testimony in five parts.

*1. The Republic of China and the United Nations: A Historical Perspective*

Students of American history tend to use the term "second chance" to describe the U.S. decision to establish the United Nations, as it is sometimes seen as an attempt to correct the United States' mistake in failing to join the UN's precursor, the League of Nations. The feeling and rationale behind the U.S. effort to create the United Nations in 1945 was that had the U.S. joined the League of Nations, it could have done more to prevent the outbreak of World War II. My country has always shared the high ideals and vision of the United States. We identified with the Wilsonian idealism that inspired the League of Nations, so we joined that organization after World War I. We admired President Franklin D. Roosevelt's vision of world peace, so we joined with the United States in establishing the United Nations in 1945. My country took it as a great honor to be the first to affix its name to the United Nations Charter, and our name remains on that solemn document today, even though we left the UN in 1971.

Throughout the years of our membership of the United Nations, no matter how our political fortunes fluctuated, no matter what the state of our country's finances, we always lived up to both the letter and the spirit of that organization. We always paid our membership dues and we supported almost every action approved by the UN. So right up to the day we left the United Nations in October 1971, I can proudly testify that our record of participation was free of blemishes. But though we were a model member and made great contributions to the UN's work, we were forced to leave that organization in 1971. This was one of the most glaring injustices in the modern history of man.

## 2. *The Deficiencies of UN Resolution 2758 of 1971*

If I may, I would like to recall how the question of China's representation in the United Nations came to a vote in October 1971. After the question was first placed on the agenda of the General Assembly in 1961, the United States, among others, made repeated efforts to have any proposal to change the representation of China considered an "important question" under Article 18 of the UN Charter. As an important question, such a proposal would require a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly. These efforts were successful until 1971, when the General Assembly voted by a narrow margin of four votes, fifty-nine to fifty-five, to no longer characterize the matter as an important question. This opened the way for the adoption of Resolution 2758. The most compelling argument for the entry of the People's Republic of China into the United Nations was that the PRC accounts for one-fifth of humanity, and it is a major country both politically and in other dimensions. Another argument was that there are many issues on which the PRC could exert its influence, and it would be impossible to resolve these without the PRC's participation in the UN. So, in the end, the vote went in favor of the PRC.

I am speaking here today in the capacity of a person who has worked all his life in the fields of international relations and international law. I fully understand and can even acknowledge the validity of those arguments for the representation of the PRC, nor am I here to challenge the PRC's membership of the United Nations. Instead, I am here to seek your help in remedying the shortcomings of the 1971 resolution. With regard to its membership, the United Nations has always been guided by the principle of universality, and that principle should today be applied to my country, the Republic of China, just as it has been to the PRC. We are a sovereign state with a population of 21 million -- which is larger than the populations of two-thirds of the world's nations -- and a territory of 36,000 square kilometers. Our government is still accorded diplomatic recognition by thirty nations throughout the world, and we have extensive economic ties and other links with most countries. So I want to ask your assistance in enforcing the principle of universality without prejudice, in a way that will make it possible for my country to be represented in the United Nations, thereby remedying the deficiencies of the 1971 resolution.

## 3. *What the Republic of China Can Contribute if it Returns to the UN*

The Republic of China has been in continuous existence on Chinese soil since 1912 -- on the Chinese mainland until 1949, and after that on Taiwan, which is also Chinese territory. It has never ceased to exist as a sovereign state for a single day. The number of countries recognizing us may vary, but we have preserved our international personality up to the present.

Since our government came to Taiwan in 1949, we have made tremendous achievements. Our per capita income of over US \$12,000 ranks twenty-fifth in the world; we are ranked nineteenth in terms of GNP and are the world's fourteenth largest trading economy. In terms of foreign exchange reserves, we are sometimes number one, and today we are number two. As for our international behavior, we have never taken the initiative to engage in unnecessary or unjustifiable military conflict with any other nation and we have always fulfilled our obligations as a member of the international community. For many years now, we have been very active in international aid, offering assistance to developing countries in Africa, Latin

America, and Asia. We have devoted billions of dollars worth of technical assistance and economic and humanitarian aid to these countries, and dispatched thousands of specialists and technicians. In 1988, we established the International Economic Cooperation Development Fund to further our efforts in this regard. As recently as last year, we donated US\$2 million to refugee relief in Rwanda -- we had to do that through the United States Committee of the United Nations Children's Fund, because we are not a member of the United Nations. Now that we have such a solid economy and have accumulated such a great wealth, we feel that we should make a more meaningful contribution to less fortunate countries, just as we ourselves received help several decades ago. Therefore, we are applying for representation in the United Nations not only because we want to be accorded the dignity and respect that we deserve as a sovereign state, but even more important, because we feel that we should do more to help our fellow human beings in a meaningful and substantive way at a time when the world is becoming more and more like a village and nations' destinies are becoming increasingly intertwined.

We have never been defeatist or pessimistic in our evaluation of the United Nations. We believe, on balance, that the United Nations has made an enormous contribution to humanity, and unless we can become part of the UN and its specialized agencies it will be very difficult, if not impossible, for us to make a return contribution to the family of nations. Only by gaining representation in the United Nations and its related agencies will we have a regular channel for our assistance. Let me reemphasize here, just as the 1.2 billion people on the Chinese mainland have the right to be represented in the UN, so do we 21 million Chinese in Taiwan. Since the two sides cannot represent each other, they must do their part and we must do ours to fulfill the obligations of a responsible member of the international community.

#### *4. New Trends and Practices in International Organizations and International Law*

Do we have any precedents for divided states joining the United Nations? Yes, we have several. The two Germanies, for example, both joined the UN as sovereign states in 1973, and this accordance of mutual respect and the subsequent experience of cooperation hastened rather than hindered the reunification of Germany in 1990. In another example, the two Koreas were such hostile enemies in the early 1950's, yet their bitter fratricidal conflict did not prevent them from joining the United Nations in 1991. These divided nations were able to join the UN because the international community had come to recognize that while the two halves had contrasting political ideologies and life-styles, they both deserved a place in the United Nations, and that this would promote peace and friendly relations between them and with the rest of the world. Even the PRC recognized the two Germanies and the two Koreas and did not oppose dual representation for these countries in the UN.

The Republic of China has functioned in Taiwan since 1949 without interruption, and the People's Republic of China has never exercised sovereignty over Taiwan for so much as one day. The PRC government has collected no taxes, issued no passports, and has never represented us in any international organization or activity with our consent. For the last four decades we have discharged our duties, both political and economic, as an independent sovereign state. The Republic of China and the PRC share Chinese sovereignty but have jurisdiction over different parts of China as separate political entities. In recognition of these undeniable facts, I believe that the United Nations should provide all Chinese people with the opportunity for



involvement in issues affecting them and the world as a whole.

In recent years, international law has given attention and recognition to the new phenomenon of divided nations. There is nothing in international law that requires one part of a divided nation to submit to the other simply because it is smaller or because it is militarily less powerful. Instead, international law allows the two parts to exist and function side by side in order to guarantee the well-being of each and that of the family of nations in general. I hope that you will keep these new developments in international organizations and international law in mind when you consider our case, and that your government will assist my country, the Republic of China, to acquire a proper place in the United Nations and ensure that the well-being and rights of my people are adequately and equally protected in that organization.

##### *5. Why the U.S. Should Support Our Case*

The United States of America and the Republic of China have been friends, allies, and partners for over eight decades. We fought side by side in World War II and we were military allies in the Western Pacific from the 1950's to 1980, when our Mutual Defense Treaty was terminated. The development and growth of East Asia to its present level of peace and prosperity is largely the result of your efforts and, in no small degree, of our also. Even though we have had no official relations since 1979, thanks to the Taiwan Relations Act we are closer to the United States, both in sentiment and substance, than we are to any other nation in the world. Let me give you just one small example: two-thirds of our Cabinet members, including our president and premier, were educated in the United States, as was the majority of our elite in many walks of life. The United States has been either our fifth or sixth most important trading partner for the last two decades. Because of your material and spiritual assistance and encouragement, the Taiwan economic miracle and Taiwan's recent achievements in political democratization are almost as much your success story as they are ours.

The future peace and prosperity of East Asia is so important that we will need to work even closer together to ensure that it continues in the next century, the so-called Pacific century. And because of the Taiwan Relations Act, our security is not only our problem, it is yours also. In Section 2(b)(4) of this Act it is stated that the United States considers "any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means...a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to you too. Also, in Section 3(c) of the TRA, the US president is directed to inform Congress promptly of any threat to Taiwan's security, so that proper action can be taken to deal with it. I am not crying wolf here. I shall use a very recent example to emphasize my point. Just a week or two ago, the PRC fired six missiles into the East China Sea 150 miles north of Taiwan, under the pretext of a military exercise. In the future these missiles could be well aimed only one hundred miles or fifty miles away, or even directly at Taiwan. For obvious reasons I do not want to see that happen, and there is no need for me to exaggerate the danger -- but it is within the realms of possibility that the PRC may one day attempt to do this. It would be better to prevent such an occurrence than to live to regret it.

How, then, can Taiwan's security be better guaranteed? One way would be for us to become, in some capacity, a part of the United Nations. The UN could then take some action

if Taiwan's security was threatened. As things stand at present, if the United States felt forced to intervene, under the Taiwan Relations Act, to protect Taiwan's security, it would have to do so alone. But, if we were, in any shape or form, a member of the United Nations, that organization would most likely support your action.

If you agree with the logic of my preceding analysis, you will acknowledge that the Republic of China's representation in the United Nations will serve both our own national interests and those of the United States. We are realists; we know that we will have to travel a long and tortuous road before we can return to the United Nations. But we are determined to do whatever is right and whatever is good, and therefore two years ago we asked our friends in the United Nations to submit our case for consideration by that organization. Though some of our friends have warned that this attempt cannot succeed and that we are only creating trouble for ourselves, we will do whatever is right and whatever is good -- for ourselves as well as for the United Nations.

I would also like to seek your assistance in entering other international organizations, whether they are related to the UN or not. Our strength as a state will allow us to make many contributions to these organizations, and we attach just as much importance to them as we do to the UN.

Before I conclude, let me emphasize that regardless of what has happened in political or diplomatic relations between our two governments. This solemn hall of democracy has always been a steadfast friend of the Republic of China. It was the US Congress that extended diplomatic recognition to the Republic of China shortly after it was founded in 1912; it was the US Congress that made the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 possible; and it was the US Congress that facilitated the visit of our President Lee Teng-hui to his alma mater. I hope that in the same spirit of friendship and support, this great Congress of the United States of America will also enable us to return to the United Nations and many other international organizations. I thank you.

(To be included in the official hearing record following the testimony of Dr. Parris H. Chang before the International Relations Committee, August 3, 1995)

**U.S. Support for Taiwan's Participation in the United Nations**

by

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Department of Foreign Affairs,  
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## **Participation in the World Community: Necessity, Not Only Pride**

In today's new world order, issues of diplomacy, economics, security, and environment are no longer mutually exclusive. Regional and U.N.-affiliated organizations play a crucial role in handling these dynamic and complex relationships. No nation can survive and prosper outside the framework of international cooperation; and Taiwan, a major economic power in its own right, is no exception. However, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has prevented Taiwan from entering most international organizations. Sadly, its attempt to isolate Taiwan diplomatically, intimidate our 21 million people, and block our UN membership bid, have met with little protest from the community of democratic nations. Indeed, China's outrageous hegemony against Taiwan and its intimidation tactics against our allies has been a serious obstacle to Taiwan realizing UN membership. Nevertheless, Taiwan can claim both a moral and legal right to U.N. Membership.

### **Taiwan's Moral Right to U.N. Membership**

Taiwan's participation in the world community is of practical benefit to the system of world trade and regional security. Taiwan also has a moral right to U.N. membership. Taiwan's government exercises effective jurisdiction over a territory with the consent of those governed. Taiwan's citizens overwhelmingly support U.N. membership. Moreover, Taiwan has transformed itself into a model of democracy in Asia. Taiwan is neither a North Korea nor an Iraq operating as a pariah state outside the norms of international behavior. It is unfair for Taiwan to be denied U.N. membership because of its territorially ambitious neighbor.

### **The PRC's strategy**

Beijing's claim of sovereignty over Taiwan is rooted partly in naked territorial ambition, and partly in the historical conflict between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese Kuomintang Party (KMT). The CCP's old guard seeks nothing less than to swallow up Taiwan and extinguish the last vestiges of the power of its old rival, the KMT. To achieve this goal, China employs three interlocking strategies: (1) China seeks to cut off Taiwan's international breathing space, prohibiting countries that have diplomatic relations with China from having official ties with Taiwan in order to prevent Taiwan from participation in international organizations. (2) China consistently wages a "peace offensive" against Taiwan, hoping to lull Taiwan's people and government into complacency. China seeks to form a fifth column of sympathizers in Taiwan, manipulating public and business opinion. (3) Finally, the above two strategies are executed against a backdrop of military intimidation against Taiwan. While Beijing expands its military force and strengthens its ability to project that force it also has implemented a strategy of preventing Taiwan from acquiring defensive weapons. Germany, France, and the U.S. have all been attacked and punished by China for agreeing to provide weapons for Taiwan's defense. Fortunately, this strategy has largely failed.

Beijing's actions have succeeded only in sowing fear and revulsion toward the PRC in Taiwan and in the international community at large.

### **The History of the One China Myth**

Beijing's strategy has an unwitting ally in the KMT government which commits foreign policy blunder after blunder based on an inflexible and outmoded "One China" policy. In 1971, Taiwan spurned international recognition based on a "Two China" or "One China, One Taiwan" formula which would have led to dual representation in the U.N. for Taiwan and the PRC. The words of the then U.S. ambassador to the U.N., George Bush, spelled out clearly the support Taiwan had. In remarks to the U.N. General Assembly he said, "In my Government's extensive consultations with almost all Members of the United Nations, we have heard one view expressed more consistently than any other. It was that the Republic of China ought not to be denied representation here as the price for opening the door to the People's Republic of China."

The KMT recalcitrance eventually led to the U.S. recognition of the PRC. The KMT, in being a deposed regime from China, has for most of its history been singularly focused on China at the expense of Taiwan. Its existence until 1991 was based on the myth that the KMT regime represented all of China, Taiwan inclusive -- never mind that its territorial control is limited to Taiwan. This contrasts sharply with Mao Zedong's earlier remarks acknowledging that Taiwan was not a part of China. As John F. Cooper writes in *Words Across the Taiwan Strait*, "Mao had...put Taiwan in a category of nations or territory outside of China." Cooper quotes Mao's remarks written in Edgar Snow's *Red Star Over China*, as follows:

"It is the immediate task of China to regain all our lost territories, not merely to defend our sovereignty below the Great Wall. This means that Manchuria must be regained. We do not, however, include Korea, formerly a Chinese colony, but when we have reestablished the independence of the lost territories of China and if the Koreans wish to break away from the chains of Japanese imperialism, we will extend them our enthusiastic help. The same thing applies for Formosa."

The Chinese Communist Party emerged victorious from the Chinese civil war forcing its rival, the KMT, to flee to Taiwan in 1949. Upon establishing its exile government in Taipei, Taiwan, the KMT asserted that Taiwan is a part of China attempting to create the illusion that the party still controlled some Chinese territory. This led to world misperception that Taiwan was and has always been a part of China. The KMT created this fictional history, and the UN and the United States endorsed it. George Bush advised against this in his 1971 speech when he said, "The United Nations should not...attempt to write the future history of China, or to influence the evolution of that part of the world."

While the KMT no longer contests sovereignty over the Chinese mainland, it still employs a weak strategy. Its One China doctrine has become a word game with little

credibility. In Taiwan, a broad-based consensus across all political parties supports U.N. membership while rejecting the People's Republic of China's claim (we hope the name "Republic of China" does not obscure this fact).

### **The "Taiwan Problem" is an International Concern**

The "Taiwan Problem" is not, as the PRC claims, an internal problem of China. Taiwan and China have been politically separate for a full century -- ever since the Sino-Japanese War in 1895. The "Taiwan Problem" is an international issue with serious implications for regional stability. This was recognized in America's Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, which set the parameters of U.S.-Taiwan non-official relations, and provided a guarantee of Taiwan's security.

### **The U.N. Mandate: Prevention of War**

As an international issue, Taiwan's sovereignty falls squarely under the purview of the United Nations whose original and overriding purpose is to prevent war. It is imperative that Taiwan be permitted to join the United Nations and pursue a peaceful resolution to cross-strait conflict. Dr. Allan Gerson, Professor of Law at George Mason University's International Institute has written that the key requirement of the U.N. Charter (Article 2 section 4) "is the renunciation by all states of not only the use of force, but the threat of force, against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state."

The United Nations is poised to assume an increasingly important role in the post-Cold-War era. A membership bid, even if unsuccessful, would tell the world that yes, Taiwan is a sovereign state qualified for U.N. membership and that Taiwan desires to be a responsible participant in the world community. A membership bid will keep the Taiwan issue on the international agenda. China could no longer convincingly portray Taiwan as a domestic problem. Its contempt for the U.N. Charter would be exposed. True, China can block Taiwan's membership with its veto power on the U.N. Security Council. But, repeated exercise of this veto power, year after year, will surely diminish China's stature in the eyes of the world.

### **Taiwan has long been a Sovereign Nation**

By any standard, Taiwan is and has long been a sovereign nation. Taiwan's government exercises effective authority over a territory with the consent of those governed. Taiwan therefore has the right to enter the United Nations and participate fully in the world community. However, objectivity seldom prevails in realpolitik. Taiwan has been dealt setback after setback in the diplomatic arena. At last count, only 30 countries maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan. This means unfair treatment for Taiwanese citizens traveling abroad. Worse yet, it prevents Taiwan from fully participating in the emerging world economic order to the detriment of both Taiwan and its trading partners.

## **America's Role**

Taiwan and the United States have enjoyed a close relationship for many decades. Throughout the Cold War era, Taiwan relied on America's protection against its hostile neighbor across the Taiwan Strait. Today, Taiwan still counts on America for military equipment and moral support, and of course, economic and cultural ties between the two countries are closer than ever.

The people of Taiwan are grateful for the recent support of the U.S. Congress. Having achieved free elections, a free press, and human rights only in the last seven years, the people of Taiwan feel honored by this vote of confidence from the world's greatest democracy. We hope that other nations follow America's example and welcome Taiwan to its rightful place in the world community.

The Democratic Progressive Party of Taiwan thanks the U.S. Congress for the support voiced in H.Con.Res. 63. However, we feel the resolution's use of the term "Republic of China," obscures the fact that Taiwan is culturally, economically and politically separate from China. We advocate U.N. membership as a new country. Taiwan's name and fate should be decided by the people, as was the case with Mongolia in 1945 when it became independent from China. Taiwan's participation in the world community, an end to our diplomatic isolation, and the survival and security of our 21 million citizens are the most important issues. The Democratic Progressive Party feels that Resolution 63 does much to further these goals. However, it should be understood that this is a compromise between the DPP, Taiwanese-Americans, and the KMT.

## **The DPP's Foreign Policy**

It must be stressed Taiwan is a sovereign state whether someone "declares" it or not. We are not a piece of territory seeking to break away from the mother country, such as when America declared independence from England. We believe that only a U.N.-supervised plebiscite of Taiwan's people has the ultimate authority to decide the question of independence or unification with China.

Until its people decide otherwise, Taiwan is a sovereign state. We believe that our foreign policy strategy is the only way to ensure Taiwan's security and survival. In the new world order, no nation can survive and prosper as an international orphan. Therefore, the DPP vigorously advocates promoting mutually beneficial relations with other nations and achieving international recognition as a sovereign state, so that Taiwan can be a good world citizen and contribute to the comity of nations.

As with any nation, the top priority of Taiwan's foreign policy should be the security and well-being of its people. In the modern world, no nation can achieve this goal without full membership in the international society. Taiwan's foreign policy must start with a sober assessment of reality: Our sovereignty extends only to Taiwan,

Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu. With the objective realization that Taiwan is Taiwan and China is China, Taiwan frees itself to expand international breathing space.

Economic liberalization and internationalization is another important part of rejoining the world community. Taiwan has made much progress in this area, but we believe we can do much more. The government has announced plans to replace Hong Kong as Asia's commercial and financial hub. It is time to back up these plans with action. Unfortunately, as a result of the KMT government's policies, today Taiwan's banking and financial industries are among Asia's most restricted. The Taiwan stock exchange limits foreign capital more stringently than markets in Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, The Philippines, and Indonesia. As the April 1995 issue of the American Chamber of Commerce magazine, *Topics*, stated, "Insular policies and heavy government control over the banking and capital markets have left the domestic financial markets overregulated and uncompetitive."

If Taiwan's economy and stock market were truly liberalized, the resulting American, European, and Japanese participation in the stock and bond markets and the general economy would be a powerful force for stability. As Taiwan's own outward investments have made it one of the largest investors in Southeast Asia and China, the government needs to attract inward investment from abroad to continue the country's economic expansion. By aligning its interests with those of international investors, Taiwan would achieve much greater security.

With prudence and patience, we believe Taiwan can gradually build a mutually beneficial relationship with China based on strong economic ties. As the second largest investor in China, Taiwanese money has played a large part in China's development. The DPP wishes to continue these close economic ties. In fact, the DPP was at the forefront of urging dialogue with China when Taiwan began opening up to China in the late 1980s.

While we support strengthening ties with China, we also realize the need for a strong military to protect Taiwan's territorial integrity. Because of the influence of China, Taiwan has had trouble securing high-tech military equipment from the US and Europe. Currently, China is strengthening its military with massive purchases from Russia and, as a result of the Clinton Administration policy, purchases of high-tech American machines and weaponry. If the US were to shut the military sales to Taiwan in the future it would be playing straight into the hands of China. Fortunately, President Bush realized this when he approved the sale of F-16 planes to Taiwan during his administration.

It should be stated that under the DPP policy, Taiwan has no territorial ambition in its desire for a strong military defense. The DPP wishes to approach negotiations over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea from a position of equality with its Southeast Asian neighbors, in stark contrast to China's position. Joint development of potential resources in the Spratly Islands is the best possible solution for the conflict over the South



China Sea. However, Taiwan's exclusion from ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum on Security prevents our country from making a positive contribution.

Taiwan's exclusion from organizations such as UNICEF, the World Health Organization and other U.N.-based organizations is a loss not only for Taiwan but for the international community. With over US\$100 billion in foreign reserves, Taiwan is willing to play a responsible and productive role in relief and humanitarian operations around the world. As an example, in 1992, following the breakup of the Soviet Union, Taiwan provided US\$60 million worth of aid, including medical supplies, fuel and 100,000 tons of rice to CIS countries. Taiwan has been active in Africa, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and South America as well. Whenever disaster strikes and human suffering demands a helping hand, Taiwan will be there. When the UN began relief operations for Rwanda, Taiwan was there to help with financing. Unfortunately, due to the politics within the U.N., Taiwan's offer was rejected.

Thus, if Taiwan is to fully realize its ambition to play a constructive role in the world community it requires admission to the United Nations. As the influence of multilateral organizations grows, Taiwan must be able to participate as an equal member with equal rights and responsibilities.

### **Working to Realize the Aspirations of the Taiwanese People**

The challenge for our party is to get the message out that Taiwan is an independent, sovereign state and to convince the world to accept this reality. Our work in foreign affairs is focused on meeting this challenge. In Taiwan, we receive visitors at our headquarters every week including reporters, politicians, diplomats and business leaders. Media visitors come from major organizations such as CNN, The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, and The Economist. Recent political guests include Prince Rokujo, of the Japanese royal family, 8 Chairs of the Democratic Party in the U.S. and Sir David Steel of the British Parliament. Often these people have very little understanding of the history of Taiwan's political situation and its history of isolation from China. Through our contacts with these visitors, we have been able to explain the aspirations of the Taiwanese people to the world.

Through these contacts we have also built a network of relationships with important groups in America, Asia, and Europe. Every year we organize delegations to visit various countries and regions to promote Taiwan's position in the world. Because of its importance, we have focused a great deal of effort in building relations with the U.S. For the past several years we have held receptions for members of Congress and their aides to inform them of developments in Taiwan. We also have lobbied various ambassadors at the U.N. to support Taiwan's admission to the United Nations. In order to continue this work we established a representative office in Washington this year.

In Europe, we annually visit the European Parliament where we have won support for Taiwan's admission to the U.N. We have established good relations with the Socialist

Party which is one of the largest parties in the Parliament. When we visited in 1994, the Socialist Party's leaders agreed to sponsor a resolution supporting Taiwan's position. This support could not have been possible without the support of Liberal International.

The Liberal International (LI), founded in 1947, is a global network of over 70 political parties that works for the promotion of liberal values, such as human rights, tolerance, freedom, pluralism, democracy and an economy based on market principles. Members of LI include ruling parties and coalition government partners in countries as varied as Canada, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Brazil, and Slovakia. An organization within the Democratic Party in the U.S. is also an observer member of LI. This year at its meeting in Belfast, Northern Ireland, LI members sponsored a resolution condemning China's attempts to interfere with Taiwan's sovereignty. The DPP has been one of the most active members of LI in Asia.

In 1993, the DPP, together with other liberal and democratic parties in Asia, formed the Council of Asian Liberals and Democrats (CALD). Since then, major conferences have been held to discuss regional issues and to promote democracy in Asia. In 1993, CALD's General Assembly was hosted by then Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai of Thailand and attended by the founding 6 member parties. In 1994, the General Assembly was held in the Philippines and hosted by President Fidel Ramos. This year, Taiwan will assume the presidency of CALD and host CALD's General Assembly in Taipei with participants from Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Sri Lanka, and Cambodia. CALD provides a forum for political leaders in Asia to discuss future political, social and economic developments in Asia.

The DPP has also been very involved with the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO), a grouping of nations and peoples who are inadequately represented at the United Nations. Since its founding in 1991, UNPO has formed a strong network in Washington, D.C., The Hague and the United Nations where it informs the international community of the plight and suffering of unrepresented nations such as Taiwan and Tibet. The organization is also active in preventive diplomacy and assistance in conflict resolution. It works for the promotion of democratic processes and institutions which will lead to the empowerment of all sectors of society to participate in determining the destiny of their nation or people.

Through our participation in LI and CALD, we have been able to educate political leaders throughout the world about the reality of Taiwan's sovereignty. Taking advantage of these multilateral forums, we have developed bilateral relations with the various member countries of these organizations. In trips to Eastern Europe, we have found strong support for our cause since these countries have experienced the tyranny of communism. In trips to Southeast Asia, we have also found similar support because these countries share Taiwan's concern about China's aggressive moves in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait.

In the future, we shall continue establishing communications and building relationships with other nations in order to create a diplomatic space for Taiwan. We shall also seek to promote the development of democracy in Asia and throughout the world based on our belief in self-determination and human rights.

Finally, President Clinton should direct the U.S. delegation at the United Nations to commit its resources to a long-term and vigorous diplomatic campaign in support of Taiwan's membership in the U.N. On this, the 50th anniversary of the United Nations, the admission of Taiwan would redress this injustice and reaffirm the U.N. principle of universality.

## OPENING REMARKS

HON. LEE H. HAMITON

H.CON.RES. 63 - RELATING TO THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA  
(TAIWAN'S) PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS

August 3, 1995

I want to commend Chairman Gilman for calling today's hearing.

Our topic -- the triangular relationship linking Taiwan, the People's Republic of China, and the United States -- is a highly complex one, with tremendous importance for U.S. interests.

Americans have watched with admiration and pride as Taiwan has transformed itself over the past generation from an impoverished and authoritarian island into one characterized by flourishing democratic institutions and a vigorous economy.

In recent years the American relationship with Taiwan has deepened and matured, until today it is as close as at any time since 1979.

I, like my colleagues, applaud that development.

No one should doubt our commitment to Taiwan, or our desire for cordial relations between Washington and Taipei.

Similarly, it is important to remember that sound relations between the United States and the PRC are very much in America's interest.

- China is the world's largest country and possesses one of the world's largest economies.
- China has the world's largest standing army, which has a direct bearing on peace and stability throughout East and Southeast Asia.
- As a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, China is not only a key country in Asia, but has a significant impact on U.S. interests around the world.
- U.S. efforts to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction -- in North Korea and elsewhere -- can succeed only if China cooperates with us and the rest of the international community.
- On the economic front, American exports and American jobs are dependent upon decent relations with China.

- Last year we sold over \$9 billion of goods to China.
- These exports supported 180,000 high-wage American jobs.

In other words, it is very much in our own national interest to foster a good relationship with Beijing.

This of course is not always easy.

The Chinese-American relationship is a complex one, and frequently difficult to manage.

We have very tough issues with the Chinese: on human rights and democracy, non-proliferation, and trade.

Recently we have been angered by the arrest of Harry Wu, and by other evidence that China continues to violate the human rights norms we value.

Nonetheless, as we listen to our witnesses today, and consider what new steps, if any, the United States should take to demonstrate its support for Taiwan, I would urge my colleagues not to discount the importance -- for the United States -- of maintaining decent relations with Beijing as well.

Similarly, true friends of Taiwan should think seriously before urging steps that would disrupt a status quo that has served Taiwan's interests so well.

Mr. Chairman, again let me commend you for calling this very timely hearing.

I look forward to listening to our witnesses.

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STATEMENT BY DOUG BEREUTER  
CHAIRMAN  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC  
THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

TAIWAN AND THE UNITED NATIONS

August 3, 1995

Thank you Mr. Chairman. With your indulgence, Mr. Chairman, I would like to take a few minutes to speak forthrightly on the legislation, House Concurrent Resolution 63, which has been referred to this committee. I believe it is necessary to speak on this legislation and issue and I want to explain my position in some detail, because, as you know, I have strong views on the matter before us today.

At this time in particular, I strenuously oppose H. Con. Res. 63 which calls for a U.S.-led effort to promote Taiwan's full membership in the United Nations. While all of us may like to see some type of Taiwan representation, practically speaking this membership is not possible without Beijing's consent, since China has a permanent seat on the Security Council with veto power over new memberships. Because of that reality, this resolution will only aggravate the downward spiral in U.S.-Chinese relations with no hope of achieving its espoused goal.

I oppose the resolution, sponsored by my good friend, the distinguished gentleman from New York, Mr. Solomon. I rarely disagree with Chairman Jerry Solomon. We have almost always worked in concert on issues before the North Atlantic Assembly and on many other security issues. As a rule, his foreign policy instincts are excellent and his motives are always unimpeachable. However, I do not believe H. Con. Res. 63 serves U.S. interests or, for that matter, at this time the interests of Taiwan.

I am afraid that in general -- not specifically addressing this legislation -- Congress is, despite the outward appearance of agreement in Taiwan, allowing itself to be drawn into a domestic partisan contest in Taiwan. If anyone were to believe that this resolution is "totally non-controversial," as some lobbyists have apparently said, they are sadly mistaken. I have to believe that responsible leaders in Taiwan, having witnessed the aftermath of the Lee visit, must be questioning the pace of Taiwanese-American and U.S. Congressional promotion of more official U.S.-Taiwan ties. It is no accident that the stock market in Taiwan has dropped sharply in the wake of the visit of President Lee and the heightened Chinese rhetoric against the United States and Taiwan. I suspect that President Lee's recent decision to regret the invitation to visit Anchorage in September is evidence of these second thoughts -- in short, an effort to cool it. In their heart of hearts I am convinced that the

leadership of the Taiwanese government do not want to see this legislation enacted -- at least not at this time. In fact, I'm convinced, at least in retrospect, they wouldn't want to see it even considered at this particular time. In part, of course, the support for this legislation is driven by Taiwanese-American interests whose motives are good, but it may very well damage the very values and ends they hold dear and seek.

U.S. China policy, Mr. Chairman, has undergone many swings and changes since President Nixon visited Beijing in 1972. One consistent thread throughout this period, however, has been our "One-China" policy. During the last 23 years, six administrations of both political parties have closely examined this policy and reached the same conclusion -- i.e., that it serves fundamental U.S. interests and must be maintained. Even former President Reagan, as close an American friend as Taiwan has ever had, embraced this policy. In several letters to Chinese leaders in 1982, President Reagan wrote, and I quote "Our policy will continue to be based on the principle that there is only one China. We will not permit unofficial relations between the American people and the Chinese people on Taiwan to weaken our commitment to this principle."

Why did all these administrations of different political parties and orientations reach this same conclusion? Very simply, because this policy has been essential in maintaining peace, stability and economic development on BOTH sides of the Taiwan Strait. Not only has this policy permitted us to maintain mutually beneficial ties with both parties, but it has also provided an indispensable foundation for the expansion of contacts between Beijing and Taipei.

The historical animosity between the PRC and Taiwan can only be resolved by the parties themselves. Unofficial, but government sanctioned, bodies from both sides have met for formal negotiations on several occasions since April 1993. Practical agreements have been signed on highjacking, stowaways, fishing disputes and mail services. More than five million visitors from Taiwan have gone to the Mainland. Taiwan's annual trade with the PRC is \$14 billion. Cumulative Taiwan investment on the Mainland amounts to \$20 billion. While contacts at the political level have lagged, we have even seen suggestions of movement in this area. In speeches earlier this year, China's President JIANG and Taiwan's President LEE have hinted at the possibility of an eventual summit between the two. Such talk across the Taiwan Straits is unprecedented and deserves our encouragement.

In opposing this resolution, I am not saying that I oppose Taiwan's membership in the UN. As my colleagues are all too aware, Taiwan has all the de facto attributes of an independent state, except one -- but it's a big one. The political reality is that very few countries recognize Taiwan as a state and China

will not tolerate Taiwanese membership in the United Nations. Taiwanese membership in the UN, if it is ever going to happen, must be part of negotiations between the parties concerned -- not imposed from the outside against the will of one party. The precedent of the two Germanies and two Koreas joining the UN is often cited in support of this resolution. But we must remember that these parties joined the UN simultaneously at their own initiative, not because the U.S. or some outside power pressured one party to agree to allow UN accession by the other.

All three witnesses at a recent Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific hearing on China's future agreed that it would be a mistake for the U.S. to push for full Taiwan membership to the UN. Even former Ambassador James Lilley, a outspoken Taiwan supporter, warned against a U.S. initiative for Taiwan's admittance in the UN as a "sudden leap in policy in a manner which challenges the PRC on a matter of sovereignty." Finally, I would point out that the Heritage Foundation, hardly a coddler of Chinese communism, has modified its position on Taiwan's UN membership, and endorses only Taiwan's membership in UN "specialized agencies" which, in Heritage's view, would not "threaten PRC sensibilities."

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I agree the U.S. should take steps to continue to advance Taiwan's international stature, commensurate with its economic power and political development. We should focus these efforts on financial and trade institutions such as the World Bank, IMF and WTO and, possibly, UN specialized agencies. Nevertheless, I believe any steps we take in this direction must be taken carefully so as not to upset the delicate Taipei-Beijing relationship -- notice I did not say Sino-American relations, but Taipei-Beijing relations. These steps must not be taken in a fashion that only serves to raise Beijing's already high level of suspicion of U.S. intentions. H. Con. Res. 63 does not meet this test. Mr. Chairman, I believe advancement of this legislation at this time is contrary to the national interests of the United States of America and, in my view, at this time, contrary to Taiwan's interests.

Those are my views, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses today. I strongly urge the committee to avoid even taking up H. Res. 63; if we do mark it up, we should soundly reject it by a strong vote.

Thank you.



Honorable Dan Burton  
House Committee on International Relations  
Hearing on H.Con.Res. 63  
Thursday, August 3, 1995  
10:00 a.m., 2172 RHOB

Mr. Chairman, I want to commend you for holding today's hearing on the important topic of the Republic of China of Taiwan's lack of representation in the United Nations. I also want to commend Representative Gerald Solomon for introducing House Concurrent Resolution 63 which expresses the sense of Congress that the Republic of China deserves a seat in the U.N. and that the U.S. Government should immediately begin to encourage the U.N. to provide them this resolution which takes an important first step in correcting one of the most regrettable episodes in U.N. history -- when the Republic of China was forced to give up its U.N. seat to Communist China.

Mr. Chairman, it's time to give representation back to 21 million people of the Republic of China on Taiwan, and I am hopeful that we can bring this resolution to the House floor for a vote sometime this year.

Statement of Congressman Edward Royce  
before the Committee on International Relations on  
H.Con.Res. 63  
August 3, 1995

Mr. Chairman: I thank you very much for holding this important hearing today.

I believe strongly that the twenty-one million people of Taiwan deserve to be heard, and seen, and fully welcomed into the community of nations. The reasons are moral as well as pragmatic, and they are fully consistent with American values and ideals. We should do everything possible to ensure that Taiwan participates fully in the world community.

Taiwan has made great strides in terms of both economic and political pluralism, and in increasing the scope of human rights and personal freedoms for its 21 million people.

They now enjoy a higher degree of liberty and prosperity than the vast majority of their neighbors. Their economy ranks in the world's top 20 and they are our 5th largest trading partner. As is often noted here, our exports to Taiwan are double those of our exports to China.

I think that for this progress alone they should be granted the diplomatic and institutional recognition they seek.

Lastly, we should and we must differentiate our policy toward democratic and market-oriented nations that share our values and that have kept faith with us if we expect to have allies and alliances that are meaningful and will withstand the tests of the coming century.

It is my sincere hope that as Taiwan's democratic and market system continues to evolve, it will serve effectively as a model for the other Chinese society across the straits; and that, at the same time, Taiwan's participation in the community of nations will be increased.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

SHERROD BROWN  
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT  
OHIO

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT  
AND INVESTIGATIONS  
(VICE CHAIRMAN)

SUBCOMMITTEE ON HEALTH AND  
THE ENVIRONMENT

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

COMMITTEE ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE

**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**  
**Washington, DC 20515**

**Statement of Congressman Sherrod Brown**  
**on August 3, 1995**  
**Committee on International Relations**

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Mr. Chairman:

United Nations membership for Taiwan is important. In the spirit of universality of the United Nations charter, it is an outrage that the 21 million people of Taiwan are not represented in that body.

The country of San Marino is a member with a population of 24 thousand. I therefore wholeheartedly support the spirit of H.CON.RES.63. Indeed, Taiwan should get its own seat in the United Nations.

I would like to make one point, though. Our institute maintains unofficial diplomatic relations with Taiwan, there is a Taiwan Coordination Desk at the State Department, the legal document through which we deal with Taiwan is the Taiwan Relations Act, and we all have something in our households which is "Made in Taiwan."

When looking at H.CON.RES.63 I am struck by the title of the resolution which states:

HOUSE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 63  
"RELATING TO THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA (TAIWAN)'S  
PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS"

I ask my colleagues: Doesn't it make sense to take Republic of China out of the title and just refer to the island of Taiwan as "Taiwan" and nothing else.


That leads me also to my second point; The resolution reads: WHEREAS, the United Nations and other international organizations have established precedents concerning parallel representation, such as the cases of South Korea and North Korea and the former two Germanies;

We talk about two Germanies and two Koreas in this resolution. But are we dealing with two China's or are we dealing with "One China and One Taiwan" of which the latter's lack of international representation we are discussing now?

I therefore suggest to take "Republic of China" out of the title of the resolution and delete the paragraph which deals with so-called "Parallel Representation."

### UN Resolutions in Local Legislatures

As of July 1995, local legislatures in 36 states, <sup>4</sup>three territories, two counties and nine cities in the United States have passed 78 resolutions or proclamations supporting Taiwan's bid for UN membership. With only one exception, all resolutions were passed referring to the country by its official name -- the Republic of China or the Republic of China on Taiwan.

State & Bill Number	Current Status	Wording
<u>Alaska</u> H.J.R. 63	Passed State Senate 4/21/94 Passed State House 4/6/94	ROC on Taiwan
<u>Alabama</u> HR 353	Passed State House 4/5/94	ROC on Taiwan
 <u>American Samoa</u> Sen. Con. Res. 23-32	Passed State Senate 3/3/94 Passed State House 3/7/94	ROC on Taiwan
<u>Arkansas</u> HCR 1001	Passed State Senate 1/24/95 Passed State House 1/13/95	ROC on Taiwan
<u>Arizona</u> HCR 2004	Passed State House 2/15/95 Passed State Senate 3/22/95	ROC on Taiwan ROC on Taiwan
<u>California</u> AJR 55	Passed State Senate 8/23/94 Passed State House 4/7/94	ROC on Taiwan
<u>Connecticut</u> SR 35	Passed State Senate 5/18/95	ROC on Taiwan
<u>Florida</u> Resolution House Res. #2871	Passed State Senate 6/13/94 Passed State House 3/25/94	ROC on Taiwan ROC on Taiwan
<u>City of Miami, FL</u> Res. #94-21	Passed City Council 1/13/94	ROC on Taiwan
<u>City of Coral Gables, FL</u> Res. #28539	Passed City Council 6/22/94	ROC on Taiwan
<u>City of Orlando, FL</u> Resolution	Passed City Council 7/12/94	ROC on Taiwan

City of Kissimmee, FL  
Res. #22-94

Passed City Council 6/14/94

ROC on Taiwan

City of Ft. Lauderdale, FL  
Proclamation

Proclaimed by the Mayor 4/24/95

ROC on Taiwan

Georgia

H.R. 1170

Passed State House 3/14/94

ROC on Taiwan

Fulton County  
Proclamation

Passed County Council 5/94

ROC on Taiwan

Guam

Res. 235

Res. 361

Passed Guam Legislature 9/29/93

ROC on Taiwan

Passed Guam Legislature 9/29/94

ROC on Taiwan

Hawaii

SCR 257

Passed State Senate 4/18/94

ROC on Taiwan

Passed State House 4/27/94

HR 273

HCR 285

Passed State House 4/3/95

ROC

Passed State House 4/3/95

ROC

County of Kauai  
Res. #101-94

Passed County Council 6/14/94

ROC

Idaho

SCR 135

Passed State Senate 4/19/95

ROC on Taiwan

Passed State House

Illinois

HJR 108

SJR 111

Passed State House 3/2/94

ROC on Taiwan

Passed State Senate 6/1/94

ROC on Taiwan

City of Chicago, Ill  
Resolution

Passed by City Council 4/15/95

ROC on Taiwan

Indiana

House Res. 74

Passed 4/29/95

ROC on Taiwan

Iowa

HCR 8

Passed State House 3/10/95

ROC on Taiwan

Kansas

Senate Resolution 1869

Senate Resolution 1854

Passed State Senate 5/2/94

ROC on Taiwan

Passed State Senate 4/28/95

ROC on Taiwan

<b><u>Louisiana</u></b> SCR 133 HCR 104	Passed State Senate 4/19/95 Passed State House 4/20/95	ROC on Taiwan ROC on Taiwan
<b><u>Massachusetts</u></b> Resolution	Passed State Senate 9/8/94 Passed State House 6/30/94	ROC on Taiwan
<b><u>City of Boston, MA</u></b> Resolution	Passed City Council 11/2/94	ROC on Taiwan
<b><u>Michigan</u></b> SR 350 S. Con. Res. 372	Passed State Senate 2/24/94 Passed State House 3/1/94	ROC on Taiwan ROC on Taiwan
<b><u>Minnesota</u></b> S.F. 459	Passed State House 1/27/95	ROC on Taiwan
<b><u>Mississippi</u></b> S.C.R. 604 H.C.R. 87	Passed State Senate 3/24/94 Introduced 2/95	Taiwan
<b><u>Missouri</u></b> Resolution House Resolution 9	Passed State Senate 9/14/94 Passed State House 2/22/95	ROC on Taiwan ROC on Taiwan
<b><u>City of Kansas City, MO</u></b> Res. 931314	Passed City Council 11/18/93	ROC on Taiwan
<b><u>Nebraska</u></b> Legislative Resolution 81	Passed 6/8/95	ROC on Taiwan
<b><u>Nevada</u></b> AJR 30	Passed State House 5/17/95	ROC on Taiwan
<b><u>New Jersey</u></b> Assembly Res. 140 Res. 78	Passed State House 5/22/95 Passed State Senate 6/22/95	ROC on Taiwan ROC on Taiwan
<b><u>New Hampshire</u></b>	Passed State House 4/25/95 Passed State Senate 4/25/95	ROC on Taiwan ROC on Taiwan

<u>New Mexico</u> H.J. Memorial 8	Passed State House 2/14/95 Passed State Senate 3/13/95	ROC on Taiwan
<u>North Carolina</u> HJR 1056	Passed State House Passed State Senate 6/19/95	ROC on Taiwan
<u>Northern Marianas</u> Senate Res. 9-103 House Res. 9-110	Passed 5/4/95 Passed 6/22/95	ROC (Taiwan) ROC (Taiwan)
<u>Ohio</u> S.R. 2108	Passed State Senate 5/20/94	ROC on Taiwan
<u>Oklahoma</u> HCR 1107	Passed State Senate 5/16/94 Passed State House 5/9/94	ROC on Taiwan
<u>Rhode Island</u> 93-S 3186	Passed State Senate 3/17/94 Passed State House 2/27/95	ROC on Taiwan
<u>South Carolina</u> S. 1383 H 3432	Passed State Senate 4/27/94 Passed State House 2/8/95	ROC on Taiwan ROC on Taiwan
<u>Tennessee</u> SR 28 HJR 369	Passed State Senate 5/26/95 Passed State House 5/26/95	ROC on Taiwan ROC on Taiwan
<u>Texas</u> SCR 13	Passed State Senate 1/11/95 Passed State House 3/29/95	ROC on Taiwan
<u>Washington</u> SSJM 8008	Passed State Senate 3/9/95	Taiwan, ROC
<u>City of Kennewick, WA</u> Res. 95-12	Passed City Council 2/7/95	Taiwan, ROC
<u>Wisconsin</u> SJR 45	Passed State Senate 2/15/94 Passed State House 3/1/94	ROC on Taiwan
<u>Wyoming</u> Joint Resolution	Passed State Senate 2/24/95 Passed State House 2/24/95	ROC on Taiwan



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